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Liberty has traditionally been conceived of as an important and social good, and indeed the prime 
moral good, by liberal and libertarian thinkers. This thesis argues that the traditional conception of 
political liberty in the negative sense – freedom from interference – is insufficient as an explanation, 
and political liberty should instead be conceived of as freedom from domination, as espoused by 
republican thinkers, especially Philip Pettit. However, it is further argued that non-domination 
requires additional conceptual and practical support, by the republicans’ own logic, than has 
traditionally been extended. Most critically, a critique is advanced based on the additions of 
alienation and structural domination as key republican concepts. This critique argues that corporate 
power, and the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few, drastically undermines 
republican freedom, and must be combated via regulation and economic reform, which the thesis 
refers to as “strict material equality”, in contrast to Pettit’s “loose material equality” and 
“expressive egalitarianism”. The form this regulation and reform might take is considered in detail 
before the thesis presents a potential solution based on a form of democratic socialism which makes 
use of social recognition, socialisation, and controlled voluntary exchange in the model Joseph 
Carens presents in his book “Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market”. The remainder of the 
thesis is devoted to explicating and defending a republican take on his “egalitarian system”, and 
defending his socialisation process, explicit utopianism, and the socialist elements which the thesis 
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Introduction to the Thesis 
 
The goal of this thesis is to question the safeguards necessary for the protection of political liberty 
(as opposed to liberty of metaphysical will, for example), arguing that those commonly envisaged 
are insufficient. It will undertake this via two methods.  
 
First, it will be argued that the conceptions of liberty commonly adopted by modern libertarians, 
liberals, and egalitarians – frequently drawing upon what Berlin calls the “negative” conception of 
liberty, freedom from obstruction – are inadequate. The most important reasons are both articulated 
neatly by the neo-republican philosophy of Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, and others (Dagger 2011, 
708-709). Traditional arguments of this conception of liberty generally rely upon direct imposition, 
obstruction or the plausible presence thereof. Republican theorists, however, assign greater 
importance to the unequal social positioning that allows for such impositions. In plainer terms, the 
republican conception of freedom argues that one is unfree when one is in a position to be interfered 
with, even if no interference actually takes place (Pettit 2012, 66). An individual is therefore un-free 
whenever they are subservient to another. If subservient, they will not be able to defend themselves 
properly, nor achieve recourse, from potential interference. Freedom consists in the absence of 
domination, not merely interference. 
 
The second major argument of the thesis is that many republican theorists underestimate the 
resources required for protection, although they1 claim that their theories allow for a more robust 
justification than that of their rivals. Further, drawing on the work of Schuppert, the thesis argues 
that absent a strict material equality, to be supported by social recognition responsive to republican-
 
1  Primarily Pettit, but Lovett and Maynor also cite the justification of common resources and narrow distributions of wealth on reference to 
freedom alone. Pettit cites this as a philosophical strength of his theory, as negative libertarians must bring in concepts like equality and 
(distributive) justice. 
 
aligned social norms, irreparable socio-economic inequalities will create a society where the vast 
majority are dominated, despite the presence of institutional, democratic safeguards and personal 
security, insurance and insulation, as Pettit outlines in Just Freedom. While Pettit’s requirements, if 
properly implemented, would aid in delaying or mitigating the harms involved, they would be 
equally affected by these inequalities, and there would be no guarantee of preventing the society 
from lapsing into one closely resembling modern day capitalism. This would be problematic, as 
despite the great economic good capitalism offers, it provides numerous opportunities for socio-
economic inequality – thus feeding the cycle anew. 
 
Having established this, the thesis will examine potential solutions. The thesis’ preferred solution is 
a form of socialism which still makes use of markets and voluntary exchange, yet maintains strict 
material equality and a norm-friendly pattern of social recognition, based on the work of Joseph 
Carens. It bears repeating that this is not the only viable solution; a form of Rawlsian property- 
owning democracy merits serious consideration, especially supported by a universal basic income. 
A needs-based socialism which did not require the market to function might be superior, but the 
thesis could not find a viable way to outline such. 
 
The thesis will devote the rest of the introduction to explaining both the terms used and its rationale 
for marking some of its philosophical divides, before outlining the content of its chapters. Berlin’s 
dichotomy of positive and negative liberty is explained in chapter one; suffice to say here that the 
“liberal schools of thinking” (Pettit 2014, 23) mostly adhere to it. Of greater concern may be the 
patchwork coalition of opponents; a libertarian who demands the restriction of government, and an 
egalitarian who supports a generous welfare state, might be viewed as having diametrically opposed 
interests. And in many ways, this is true. Where the two converge, along with the classical 
liberalism of the 19th century – Mill, Spencer, and so on – and the left wing of modern American 
 
political thought, commonly called liberal2 is upon Berlin’s great summary:  ‘What is the area 
within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is 
able to do or be, without interference by other persons?'  
 
The answer is exceedingly different within these traditions, let alone between them, but they all 
attend to this basic question. Skinner and Pettit mutually identify the split between republican and 
liberal as arising in the 18th century, shortly after Rousseau’s writings. Rousseau himself is often 
considered a patron saint of republicans – that is, those who wish to create a constitutional republic. 
The modern republicans do not follow Rousseau, however; Pettit and Skinner hearken back to an 
earlier conception of republican theory, as espoused by Roman authors and Machiavelli, who was 
enamoured with the Roman tradition himself. For these new republicans, Rousseau’s republicanism 
has serious flaws. For example, his requirement that political government should embody the 
general will (Pettit 1997, 233) is contrasted against the republican need for contestation, and he is 
labelled as unacceptably communitarian (Pettit 2012, 12-18). Pettit and Skinner thus lay claim to an 
“Italian-Atlantic” tradition, quoting figures such as John Milton and Algernon Sidley. 
 
The liberal tradition described here thus contains those who would normally be regarded as bitter 
(philosophical) enemies – Cohen and Nozick, Nagel and Hayek, etc. For Pettit’s part, he identifies 
liberalism with Bentham and Paley (Pettit 2012, 7-11). This may be thought of as incongruous, with 
very different political traditions aiming at different outcomes. But as noted by Cunliffe, many of 
the debates of libertarianism and liberalism from it are anchored in self-ownership and private 
property. As Cunliffe puts it: “On this (self-ownership), both right-libertarians and left-libertarians 
agree. There is a shared commitment to private property in internal resources...the second question 
(private property) concerns rights over external resources.” It is this secondary debate, that of 
private property, that distinguishes liberal from libertarian. (Cunliffe 2000, 1). Defining the liberal-
 
2  It bears very little resemblance to classical liberalism, at this point. It is also not neo-liberalism, in the same vein. 
 
egalitarian tradition strand is therefore the move away from (nearly) unlimited private property 
rights, that being right-libertarianism and classical liberalism, towards the left of the debate, that 
private property should be in many instances controlled and possibly even pooled. Republicanism 
stands on this side of the debate, as Pettit establishes quite clearly: unchecked material inequality 
ensures that individuals will have too much power over one another, and he thus opts for 
“expressive egalitarianism” of one kind or another.  
 
It is worth noting that there have been suggestions that liberalism and republicanism should not be 
considered particularly divergent; Van Parijs describes republicanism as a “close relative” (Van 
Parijs 2017, 119) to liberalism. Both Kramer and Carter argue that non-domination is misguided in 
its attempts to diverge from negative liberty, not least because they view the question of potential 
interference as merely one of probabilities. The negative libertarian might well concede that 
potential interference, though it did not deprive one of liberty precisely, was still an area of great 
concern. 
 
In the author’s view, this is misguided. Kramer and Carter’s critiques of non-domination are 
reviewed later in considerable detail, but the republican/liberal distinction is built on more than 
interference. In particular, while republican theorists have historically been in favour of both self-
ownership and private property3, of greater concern has been their preoccupation with the free state 
(Bellamy 2011). The liberal-egalitarian tradition is certainly in favour of a democratic state that 
allows for great individual freedoms, but this is not the same thing. Skinner in particular emphasises 
that a colonial state, or one which is bought and sold by creditors4, is no longer in a position to 
guarantee the freedoms of its citizens. From this example, amongst others, one can easily 
distinguish the republican concern with the state and its apparatus as being far more extensive than 
 
3  Though their approach is far closer to the liberal or left-libertarian approach; republicans dating back to Machiavelli have never been in 
favour of unlimited private property rights. 
4  This is an inference on the author’s part, discussed in chapter three of the thesis, but it seems a plausible extension of Skinner’s arguments. 
 
that of liberalism as a whole. Their requirements are much more exacting. This is a point of 
disagreement because of the republican concern with freedom, power etc as relationships – as 
opposed to a distinct status. On the liberal account, the freedom of a state itself should have no 
bearing on the freedom of the individuals within it, except insofar as its subjugation might cause 
their freedoms to be impinged. 
 
Another area in which republicanism differs from liberalism is in its embracing of civic norms and 
virtues. According to Pettit, republicanism should embrace the prospect of using norms and beliefs 
as a technique to stabilise government and offer both a good society and a well-functioning political 
discourse. This is supported to an extent by the historical republican tradition, as Machiavelli writes 
for a great need of love of patria – and the fatherland – and virtu, though his use of this term is not 
the same as Pettit’s use of civic virtue. Virtu is moral and political fortitude, divorced from the 
notions of the right and the good per se. For the liberal tradition, the question of inculcating and 
more importantly suppressing particular beliefs has normally met with a resounding denial, as 
typified by JS Mill’s response: “If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would be 
no more justified in silencing that one person than he, had he the power, would be justified in 
silencing mankind.” (Mill 1974, 76). Mill and Pettit are in agreement on the necessity of vibrant and 
unhindered political discourse, and republicans speak of the need of an active, contesting citizenry, 
fulfilling the ideal that a government should be afraid of its people, rather than vice versa. But the 
two traditions are apt to disagree bitterly on the neutrality of public discourse and government 
policy. 
 
Where republicanism has carefully scrutinised government, the liberal egalitarian tradition has 
focused more upon private property and how a just distribution of resources might be constituted. 
While Pettit and other modern republicans (Lovett, RS Taylor, Gourevitch etc) have made great 
 
strides in this area, Pettit’s concerns with maximising freedom and letting the rest follow as a direct 
result have evoked numerous criticisms from republican and liberal scholars alike, which the thesis 
discusses in chapters two to four. 
 
Republicanism might therefore be better served with a more egalitarian focus on resources, 
protections, and in particular, the prospect of systemic domination. Egalitarianism, making up the 
other strand of the liberal-egalitarian tradition, must be distinguished from liberalism, but also from 
socialism. All socialists are concerned with equality, of persons and resources (or at least access to 
resources), but not all egalitarians are socialists. Egalitarian philosophy of the modern day, 
supported by authors such as Dworkin, Rawls, Sen and Pogge, does not differ overly from 
liberalism in its political aspirations, but offers far more substantial economic change, depending on 
how its advocates view equality, or even what ought to be equal (Stanford, Egalitarianism). It is 
perhaps best to say that the distinction can become quite fuzzy. 
 
As with liberalism, republicans and egalitarians have broad agreement on desirable outcomes with a 
few points of sharp divergence. Both desire a level of material equality, though Pettit makes no 
particular demands on how that equality should take shape beyond there being the guarantee of the 
“eyeball test” and some loose material equality, which places him closer to Rawls than say, Sen. 
Egalitarians and republicans likewise scorn the idea of “formal” freedom, and demand economic 
resources to supplement the political in order to assure effective political representation. Both are 
comfortable with strong democratic government, as opposed to the liberal tradition, which even 
when government might be effective remains wary of imposition. 
 
The most critical difference between republican and egalitarian thinking rests on the extensiveness 
of their programmes. Pettit criticises what he considers radical egalitarian proposals, such as Rawls’  
 
- who is by no means the most radical of egalitarians – as being unrealistic and unsustainable, 
instead suggesting his own array of policy proposals. Other republican authors, such as Taylor, see 
even less need for government control than Pettit does. This may be because egalitarians more 
easily accept and identify problems on the systemic level, such as the proposition of systemic 
domination. Even here, republicans like Gourevitch and Anderson allow for radical changes in 
capitalist organisation and hierarchy, and are discussed in chapter five. Overlap is not impossible. 
 
A further kind of egalitarianism is also drawn upon in the thesis: social5 egalitarianism.  Social 
egalitarianism is defined by David Axelsen as “the view according to which a just society is one in 
which people relate to each other as equals and are free from, for example, relationships of 
domination or oppression” (Axelsen & Bidandanure 2019, 336). Naturally, this has great resonance 
with republican thought, and there are overlapping cases such as Elizabeth Anderson (Anderson 
1999, 287-337, Anderson 2015, 47). Further similarities can also be drawn via its focus on the 
relationship between people, and between people and the social, economic and political structures 
that surround them. Most concepts, such as freedom being threatened by subservience, are mutually 
intelligible. (Axelsen & Bidandanure 2019, 344-345, Schuppert 2015, 444-445). 
 
But there are important differences as well, not only between more traditional egalitarian thought 
and social egalitarianism, but between social egalitarianism, republicanism, and socialism. Social 
egalitarianism questions if egalitarianism can be reducible to mere distributive fairness (Axelsen & 
Bidandanure 2019, 338-341); its conception of justice notably differs from Rawls’, who defines it 
as the “proper balance between competing claims” (Rawls 1971, 9) and Pettit’s, who follows Rawls 
in holding that social justice will be hold as competing claims by citizens are treated equally in their 
claims to freedom (Pettit 2014, 79-82). And while social egalitarianism seeks arbitration of 
inequalities that arise from class, race, etc, and of various kinds, of wealth, esteem, etc, ensuring 
 
5  It has also been called relational egalitarianism; the thesis sticks to Schuppert’s usage. 
 
that only appropriate socio-economic relationships exist (Schuppert 2015 B, Ch5), social 
egalitarianism lacks a sustained analysis of democracy, of class interests and antagonisms, etc. In 
contrast to socialist thought, in particular Marxist thought, it also lacks an assessment of why these 
particular relationships exist and endure. Anderson, for example, focuses on the problem of “private 
government”, yet concentrates on a “workplace constitution” (Anderson 2015, 70) over reforming 
and addressing the system of capitalism as a whole. Much of the social egalitarian approach is 
palliative, despite Schuppert’s assessment that “the background institutions of society must indeed 
be designed in such a way so as to treat all members of society as equals.” (Schuppert 2015 B, Ch5). 
 
This difference in focus could be considered problematic for the thesis, which concentrates 
primarily on corporate power in terms of economic distribution; not in the sense that the economic 
distribution is unjust, although it is, but because that economic distribution allows for the distortion 
of freedom and because private control of the means of production is clearly allowing for enormous 
power and political influence in the hands of a few, distorting democracy altogether.  Yet, such 
distribution (and the accumulated power it permits, following the Marxist account in chapter three, 
to be outlined shortly) is no less harmful from the perspective of social relationships. And while, as 
will be conceded, the thesis does not address the problem of inequalities of this kind altogether, the 
elimination of those arising out of inequalities of wealth, of which there are many, should 
presumably be a worthwhile endeavour. It should also be noted that an unjust distribution of 
resources may create inequalities of recognition in its own right. 
 
A small point: the thesis’ particular focus on Schuppert is for two reasons. Firstly, because of his 
use of an account of alienation and structural domination which – though incomplete, as the thesis 
will argue – offers an excellent amendment to republican considerations of autonomy. Secondly, 
because he engages with Pettit, one of the thesis’ main sources, in a thorough and exacting manner. 
 
As the thesis relies upon Pettit’s conception of non-domination as a foundation, Schuppert’s 
arguments are useful for moving beyond Pettit, and towards a broader, more egalitarian form of 
republicanism. 
 
The thesis’ focus and foundation using Pettit does not mean that his theorising is perfect or as 
comprehensive as it could be. Three critiques will be offered against Pettit, drawing first upon a 
social egalitarian account of alienation and systemic domination, followed by a Marxist account of 
class and exploitation, which in turn helps establish a last critique of his account of corporate power, 
necessitating far more safeguards and government oversight – and even ownership – of the 
economy than he countenances. 
 
Alienation is best established as a threat to autonomy and free agency, what Pettit establishes as 
discursive control (Pettit 2001, 70). Pettit does not, however, support a particular view on alienation, 
nor does he establish discursive control as an ideal to be politically obtained. The thesis disputes 
this by reference to an egalitarian critique, and argues that Pettit underestimates both the value of 
autonomy and the harm of alienation. It is worth noting that the thesis discusses two types of 
alienation, Schuppertian and Marxist. These frequently intersect, and one reinforces the other often, 
but they are distinct and should be treated as such. 
 
Systemic domination, which could also be called structural domination, is more wide-ranging than 
personal domination; it is harder to identify and dissect, which may be why Pettit gives it very little 
detail (Pettit 2014, 53-54). Systemic domination not only arises when an individual is dominated by 
a group, of whom no particular member is dominating but as a whole, the group ensures their place 
is a subordinate one; it may also occur when one is subordinate to or dominated by an entire 
systemic function. An example of both would be the South African apartheid – while non-white 
 
individuals were often personally dominated as well, a combination of laws and social norms 
ensured that a black individual could not freely speak their mind, or succeed against the wishes of 
the white, privileged minority. 
 
The very basis of group identity may cause systemic domination. This is best demonstrated by the 
existence of economic classes. Under Marxist theory, society is essentially divided by the 
ownership of private property6, between the proletariat – who have little – and the bourgeoisie – 
who have far too much. On this account again, any individual member of the proletariat may not be 
personally dominated, and – unlike the South African example – may have the ability to speak their 
mind as they see fit, rise and succeed, etc. But the unequal power relation persists on a group basis; 
the voice of the proletariat is muted, even inconsequential, and their ability to dispute the bourgeois’ 
power is limited. This is discussed in further detail in chapters three and five, but presents – if 
accurate – a serious concern to republican theory, because it implies that the requirements Pettit sets 
for a healthy and legitimate democratic state are in practice unachievable when such classes persist. 
 
Marxist theory, and its later defenders and intellectual descendants – Cohen, Gramsci, and so on – 
thus help to explicate such class antagonisms and compensate for the lack of republican theorising 
on the topic. More detailed policy such as that of modern egalitarians – and those who refer to 
themselves as “social egalitarians”, splitting the difference, such as Schuppert – is also helpful in 
giving greater support to Pettit’s theorising. This leads the thesis towards differing solutions. Pettit 
lists a number of policies and general principles in terms of a just distribution compatible with 
maximising republican freedoms and effectively giving the resources for freedom and political 
influence alike. But precisely because Pettit under-theorises systemic domination and 
 
6  Used here in the Marxist terminology, where private property means land, capital, industrial equipment, etc – what is often called the 
“means of production” (https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/m/e.htm#means-production). Even in Marx’s own time, workers would own 
some small necessities, and the working class Briton of today is far better off than their counterpart of the 19th century. This is contrasted with 
the ownership of goods, commodities, and items of sentimental value, called personal property. 
 
underestimates the potential threats of material inequality7, these polices are inadequate, especially 
when it comes to addressing corporate power. As the thesis will demonstrate, corporate power is not 
responsive to the tools Pettit suggests – public opinion and legal accountability – in modern 
capitalism, and there is little to suggest this will change without significant, revolutionary 
adjustments to the global economic system. 
 
That being the case, there are various revolutionary changes one might propose. The thesis 
concentrates on two major ideological and organisational proposals, along with more minor 
organisational principles that might supplement them, such as universal basic income. The first, and 
the thesis’ preferred solution, is a form of socialism. Socialism is here defined as any system where 
the ultimate ownership of private property rests in the hands of society. This allows for many forms 
of organisation that could be called socialism, in a wide assortment of theories and extremes. For 
example, both a Marxist-Leninist command economy and a communal, collectivist group like the 
kibbutzim (Wikipedia, Kibbutz) could rightfully be called socialist, even though they differ 
substantially. The thesis’ preferred solution is a form of market socialism patterned on the work of 
Joseph Carens, which maintains the market as a mode of organisation, but equally splits all non-
invested profits among the society as a whole, for consumption purposes. 
 
The other viable alternative the thesis considers is some form of capital redistribution in the vein of 
Rawls’ works, maintaining some inequality at the benefit of a potentially more effective and 
efficient economy, as well as averting socialism’s strong dependence on the state, which is 
explicitly problematic for republican thought (Pettit 2012, 218; Pettit 2014, 77). This would instead 
disperse capital widely throughout the society, rather than the current concentration of wealth and 
investment at the top. This would not only have positive effects economically, but also politically, 
 
7  It is worth noting that Pettit supports “expressive egalitarianism” and a “loose material equality”. It is not that Pettit is unaware of 
inequality’s dangers, nor does he support it; much of his concern seems based on practicality (Pettit 2014, 82-83, McBride 2015, 360.) 
 
as it would provide both stability and a democratic voice (Rawls 1973, 270-274, Rawls 2001, 136-
140). 
 
It might be noted that both of these follow suggestions of Rawls in the first place, as he accepts a 
kind of “liberal socialism” (Rawls 2001, 136-139, 150, 178). But he gives such little detail to it, 
adopting such reticence, that the thesis must look elsewhere to determine how such a state would 
look. Not coincidentally, many socialist theorists – notably Cohen and Roemer, though for 
distinctly different reasons – have taken umbrage with Rawls’ theories. Therefore, the thesis draws 
a distinction between the two, even though a socialist state based on Rawlsian principles is 
eminently possible. It should also be noted that neither is proposed as a perfect, perpetual solution. 
Both do represent substantial improvements on current capitalist practice, but the thesis’ preferred 
solution would have difficulties in implementation – instability is likely – and would maintain 
inequalities of a social, rather than political or economic, kind. This does not mean it is not 
worthwhile. 
 
As for more minor organisational principles, the first would be some form of universal basic income. 
While the thesis’ preferred solution incorporates this, not all forms of socialism do, nor does 
property- owning democracy by necessity. There are numerous reasons to endorse such a 
programme, which the thesis discusses in detail. The second organisational principle the thesis 
discusses is that of workplace republicanism or workplace democracy – various authors have 
argued that the proper solution for economic inequality entails a change not in greater economic 
organisation, but in basic firm organisation and the workplace (Anderson 2017,  61-71, Breen 2017, 
430-438). These are best viewed as an addition to reforming the system as a whole; while the latter 
maintain a focus on the conditions within any given system, they would harmonise well with either 
of the above approaches. 
 
 
For clarity, the structure of the chapters is as follows. In the first chapter, negative and positive 
liberty are further defined and discussed, followed by an explanation for republican freedom, which 
is then defended against a critique from the liberal-egalitarian perspective. In the second chapter, 
Pettit’s requirements and resources for liberty are discussed in greater detail, before moving on to 
the ways in which his theory is limited – his inability to properly account properly for systemic 
domination, following Schuppert and Marxist critique. His decision to focus on a “broadly 
consequentialist” account of freedom is also discussed. The third chapter outlines how the 
inequalities created by capitalism undermine the pursuit of freedom and lead to both personal and 
structural domination, as well as the loss – or hollowing out – of Pettit’s democratic resources, in a 
corrosive fashion. It also objects to libertarian arguments that markets preserve freedom in any way 
whatsoever; although a market may aid in preserving individuals from domination by a government 
monopoly, it allows for other – and frequently as severe – forms of domination. 
 
Chapter four thus turns towards potential solutions to the problem of corporate domination, 
inequality and power. It primarily concentrates on Rawls’ proposed solutions, via the principle of 
maximising the gains of the least advantaged, via a form of property-owning democracy (or POD). 
While Rawls’ solutions are unquestionably superior to the present economic organisation of much 
of the world today, or even what Rawls calls “welfare state capitalism”, e.g.: a strong social 
democracy such as Denmark or Norway, Rawls fails adequately to adequately address the problems 
of systemic domination as well. In part, this is because of a focus on procedure, rather than 
interfering on behalf of individuals or groups despite it producing a sub-optimal outcome 
societally6. Further criticism of POD leads the thesis to consider socialism, but a command 
economy socialism as envisaged by Marxist theory lacks practical and political support. Instead, a 
market-based socialism which still supports Pettit’s democratic requirements is argued as being 
 
both practically achievable and better at supporting the strict material equality necessary for 
freedom to be accomplished. One concern that remains is alienation in the Marxist sense, which can 
be limited but may persist nonetheless, absent changes which cannot be guaranteed. 
 
The specific form of such socialism is drawn from the work of Joseph Carens, which chapters five 
and six focus on, first to illustrate his theories and then to answer potential critics. Due to his heavy 
reliance on motivational arguments, socialisation of proper norms and his unwillingness to explain 
how his theories could be practically be addressed, all these potential avenues of concern are 
answered. This being done, there is a brief discussion on civic virtue, both to explain its role as 
supplementing republican theory and to indicate other areas where Carens’ socialisation could be of 
considerable use to republicanism. The last chapter ends by considering the tensions between the 
avowed utopian character of Carens’ theories, and the realism and practical implementations that 
Pettit, and to a lesser extent Marx, demand. 
 
Why end on this point? Primarily because the distinction of utopian and realist theory, which can be 
defined by utopians seeking to establish a grand change in human behaviour and politics, while 
realists focuses on the immediately possible, consider the fragmented state of human politics to be 
constant, and do not seek a change to human character (Nicholson 1998, 66-69). Republicanism and 
indeed political philosophy is, to Pettit, characterised by modest and traditional ambitions (Pettit 
1997, 2-3, 11-12). It is thus fitting to establish if the thesis’ solution has stepped beyond republican 






Section One: Positive and Negative Freedom to Non-Domination 
 
We begin with Berlin. Berlin defines two “senses” of freedom (or liberty, which he uses 
interchangeably) as follows: “‘What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of 
persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other 
persons?”'  & “‘What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to 
do, or be, this rather than that?”’ He defines these as negative and positive liberty respectively 
(Berlin 1969, 121-122). 
 
It is important at this point to establish the distinction between concepts and conceptions, as Rawls 
does in a Theory of Justice. He argues that they are not the same thing; a concept may be contested  
but we may still agree on its meaning. Justice, for example, being “‘the role of its principles in 
assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages”’. But a 
conception of justice “is an interpretation of this role” (Rawls 1973, 7-10). Most would agree that a 
just society is worthwhile, but there is controversy over how justice is to be enacted and measured. 
The thesis will accept Rawls’ concept/conception distinction. 
 
Berlin, however, articulates two very different approaches to freedom. They “are not two different 
interpretations of a single concept, but two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the 
ends of life...each of them makes absolute claims. These claims cannot both be fully satisfied” 
(Berlin 1969, 166).  Negative liberty makes a claim for the limitation of oversight, especially 
government oversight, to a minimum; it has a deep distaste for any imposition on freedom, and 
posits that transgressions in this vein are rarely justifiable (Berlin 1969, 122-131). Thus, any 
imposition is a dangerous one, no matter the kind, although one may be justified by dint of some 
 
other good – justice or equality, for instance. It could also be justified to prevent a far greater loss of 
liberty (Berlin 1969, 169-172). 
 
Positive liberty, in contrast, claims the necessity of the individual “to be his own master”, to operate 
on terms without being beholden to others. This gives a much broader view than negative liberty of 
what can be imposed and justified does (Berlin 1969, 131-144). Yet it is precisely this broader view 
on which Berlin is deeply sceptical. It is vulnerable to two major problems, in his opinion. First, it 
is very easy to assume that someone is subjected to restraints or impediments, even of the mind, 
which must be removed for full freedom to blossom. Yet this could be coercive: it is one thing to 
say that this coercion or obstruction of liberty, for example, a prohibition on violent action, permits 
greater liberty, and quite another to say that “‘I have willed it, whether I know this or not, and am 
free (or ‘truly free’) even while my poor earthly body and foolish mind bitterly reject it” (Berlin 
1969, 132-134), leading to an unpleasantly coercive paternalism. 
 
The second vulnerability is that positive freedom can take a form whereby “some single formula 
can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized” 
(Berlin 1969, 169), and this is “demonstrably false”. Berlin later writes of the “freedom to choose 
ends without claiming eternal validity for them” (Berlin 1969, 172), and it is precisely this which is 
at stake. Positive freedom can become  too constraining when the range of actions we may 
justifiably undertake is reduced to a handful at most. 
 
Berlin need not be accepted uncritically. Neither vulnerability is a necessary component of positive 
freedom, merely a likelihood. Conceivably, one could devise a kind of positive freedom to which 
the objections did not apply. Negative liberty may, by contrast, be viewed as too ungenerous, as 
 
simple lack of interference may still result in a life where this freedom is merely formal, 
accomplishing nothing. 
 
 If Berlin’s dichotomy is accepted, then the thesis may argue for a conception of positive freedom to 
which his criticisms do not apply, or instead argue for a specific conception of negative liberty that 
is superior to other conceptions thereof. If his dichotomy is rejected outright, we would need to 
specify a new concept of freedom, and our conception thereof. Only once this is done can the thesis 
discuss what is necessary for an individual to be free. 
 
The thesis will argue that Berlin’s view is incorrect, for two main reasons. Firstly, Berlin’s position 
is overly narrow. Some of the views he takes to be positive (Marx, for instance), have been re-
argued in a manner fitting negative liberty (Cohen 2011, 153-165). Indeed, there have been 
arguments to the effect that all conceptions of liberty are inherently negative, or at least that the 
distinction between positive and negative is meaningless (Nelson 2005, 58-78). It is also plausible 
for a conception of freedom to demand an unobstructed will as well as unobstructed action. The two 
concepts may remain distinct, but some elements of both become necessary for a fully-fledged 
theory of freedom to be intelligible. Such a view is advanced by Philip Pettit, who will be discussed 
at some length shortly. 
 
Secondly, Berlin’s dichotomy fails to capture an important element of freedom. Although claiming 
to be concerned with political freedom, he gives little indication of what constitutes a free state, or a 
free populace – the freedom of the collective. Arguably, this is up to each individual conception to 
determine, but the idea that individuals could be given an exceedingly large area of activity (or be 
subjected to very few controls or dictates, for positive liberty) and yet as a whole populace be 
unable to affect meaningful political change remains curiously absent. It may be possible, as Berlin 
 
concedes, to raise the freedom of all by denying certain freedoms, but this says little about how we 
might determine the freedom of a group as a whole. Each of its members may have extensive 
individual liberties, while the group is constantly obstructed or dictated to by those outside and 
above it.  Whether members of the group are free or not is unclear by reference to the concepts (and 
conceptions thereof) alone. 
 
Happily, Pettit’s theory of freedom offers an answer to both criticisms. In his work, A Theory of 
Freedom, Pettit advances a political ideal of liberty in terms of non-domination, as opposed to non-
interference or non-limitation. He begins by asking the question: what is freedom? He concludes 
swiftly that freedom is “fitness to be held responsible” (Pettit 2001, 6-25). Such an answer seems to 
resemble that of positive freedom, for Pettit swiftly asks in turn: what is it about free actions that 
makes it so that we are so responsible? (Pettit 2001, 32-33). When is an agent suitable of being 
defined as free? 
 
He concludes that it is discursive control8 – when someone has the same capabilities and respect as 
when one is in a discourse. “People enjoy freedom as discursive control so far as they have the 
ratiocinative capacity to enter discourse and so far as they have the relational capacity that goes 
with having only discourse-friendly linkages with others.” (Pettit 2001, 103). It will need to be 
clarified exactly what each of these mean. 
 
The ‘ratiocinative capacity’ is that of reasoning, and in particular, reasoning with others (Pettit 2001, 
67), but also in regard to what makes an agent a person. Pettit argues that a person will not be truly 
free – they will not have fitness to be held responsible – insofar as they lack any real continuity of 
identity, continually reinventing themselves or being unable to “live up to the legacy of 
 
8  Following a lengthy consideration of rational and volitional control (Pettit 2001, 29-64). The thesis will assume that Pettit is correct in his 
various arguments as to why these are inadequate. 
 
commitments that they own” (Pettit 2001, 82-87)9. Those who are not yet fully developed in this 
way, children for example, cannot be counted as persons, though they may be perfectly free to act. 
 
‘Discourse-friendly linkages’ is a broad term. The vast majority of relationships in modern society 
display this, provided the individuals involved can debate the merits of any given topic, with none 
wielding power10 over any other. This can be, as Pettit points out elsewhere (Pettit 2014, xiii-xvii, 
30, 45-46), a matter of soft or implicit power, as well as explicit power. He gives the example11 of a 
wife who is denied macaroons by her husband, who otherwise dotes on her and puts up with her 
eccentricities. However, his patience is merely on sufferance, and at any time, he can effectively 
shut down all opposition she may raise. Even if he is a kind and conscientious man who would 
never think to do so, the linkage is a discourse-unfriendly one. For this to be averted, there must be 
no way for any party to arbitrarily end discussions arbitrarily or coerce the other party into so doing.  
 
Hence, Pettit’s theory of free agency thus far relies heavily upon not only the individual’s own 
mental fitness and stability, but upon the individuals around them. What of the second critique we 
put to Berlin, the idea of a free collective? Pettit argues that just as it is possible for an individual to 
be a free person, a collective can exhibit the exact same qualities and be subjected to the exact same 
requirements for discourse- friendly linkages (with individuals and/or other collectives) and rational 
behaviour (Pettit 2001, 119-124).  
 
He expands his conception further in On the People’s Terms, making use of what he calls the 
“eyeball test”:; no-one should be so far above or below anyone else that they cannot look them in 
the eye, and have a full, discursively functional discussion about the merits of their respective views 
 
9  This is particularly relevant for the thesis’ later discussion of alienation, but Pettit uses no specific conception of alienation in his 
discussion of discursive control, though he readily allows it could be interfered with. In On the People’s Terms, he discusses revealed will vs real will 
(Pettit 2012, 47-49) but concludes that whether one’s will is “real” is an ethical or psychological challenge, not a political one.  
10  The definition of power will be discussed later in the thesis; allow for its brief usage here, as the precise definition is less important at this 
time. 
11 Specifically, he cites the play “A Doll’s House” by Henrik Ibsen. 
 
(Pettit 2012 82-87, Pettit 2014, xxvi). One might therefore be tempted to consider Pettit merely 
offering a nuanced conception of positive freedom, one based heavily on autonomy, or what Pettit 
calls psychological free will – orthonomy (Pettit 2012, 27), rather than breaking free of Berlin’s 
distinctions. 
 
Pettit is insistent otherwise, however, when it comes to a “political ideal of freedom”. When we 
speak of liberty and justice for all, we are not simply speaking of fitness to be held responsible. He 
specifically objects to any attempts by a government to foster discursive control in relation to 
intrapersonal factors, being extremely sceptical of attempts to improve people’s psychology, 
following Berlin’s critique of positive freedom. Thus, there is no political obligation to deal with 
internal interferences. Rather, the state should only involve itself in interpersonal arrangements, the 
“discourse-friendly linkages”. However, he argues that these arrangements are both those of 
specific interpersonal relationships and environmental factors (Pettit 2001, 127-128). Rather than 
articulating such a political ideal as positive freedom or negative freedom per se, he instead 
considers competing concepts of liberty as non-limitation, non-interference, and non-domination 
(Pettit 2001, 128-129). The thesis will discuss Pettit’s critique of his competing approaches and his 
own position on non-domination in some detail before returning to discursive control12. 
 
Pettit’s critique in A Theory of Freedom starts with non-limitation13. Despite appearing similar in 
character to positive liberty as Berlin defines it, Pettit maintains it is still a kind of negative liberty 
(Pettit 2001, 130), wherein obstruction is characterised both as intentional and unintentional 
interference. Yet despite the richness this offers in terms of what can be done to mitigate injustices 
and threats to our freedom (on its terms), this becomes crippling. Because non-limitation would 
 
12  It is worth noting here, however, that if intrapersonal difficulties are not also solved by his proposal, then by his own earlier logic, 
discursive control is potentially at risk. 
13  In On the People’s Terms, Pettit instead uses non-frustration, non-interference, and non-domination. Non-limitation and non-frustration 
are not identical, however, and the latter, by dint of the argument Berlin levies against it (Pettit 2012, 31-33) is not particularly persuasive. Non-
limitation, however, rears its head later in the thesis, and thus is mentioned directly here. 
 
permit, according to Pettit, almost any degree of manipulation or control in order to mitigate such 
interferences overall, it is intolerable. Pettit justifies this by noting that the idea of discursive control, 
if considered carefully, does not give equal weight to personal and impersonal obstructions to 
discursive control, the latter generally being in the category of unintentional interference. Non-
limitation is far more demanding as a result, but without achieving proper protections of discursive 
control. Thus, it risks autonomy entirely, according to Pettit (Pettit 2001, 130-132). 
 
Accept that he is correct for the moment. If so, then non-limitation cannot be permitted. Pettit 
moves on swiftly to non-interference. This he divides into two parts. One may not be subject to 
interference by others, and be formally free. However, to be actually free, Pettit argues that one 
must enjoy an “environment of opportunity in which there is ample scope for the exercise of that 
capacity”. Limitations of the unintentional, structural or any other kind that do not meet the criteria 
for interference must be of lesser importance, although Pettit remains ambiguous on how exactly 
this can be structured (Pettit 2001, 133). This appears to be much closer to negative liberty as Berlin 
describes it. 
 
Non-interference, however, is coupled with serious difficulties of its own. Pettit regards non-
interference as unacceptable; although non-interference regards almost all government interference 
as inherently objectionable, on the one hand, which may seem questionable, he wields the much 
more important criticism that such an outlook is blind to domination. Thus, non-interference seems 
to be “impoverished” when it comes to the development of society, but more damningly, it is also 
incomplete. Pettit defines such domination as uncontrolled14 interference, and clarifies that it is not 
only the uncontrolled interference in itself that is objectionable to freedom, but exposure to it – the 
 
14  He defines it in A Theory of Freedom as arbitrary interference. However,, he changes it to uncontrolled interference in On the People’s 
Terms (Pettit 2012, 58-59), in response to ambiguities in the meaning of arbitrary (Blunt 2015, 2-15).Therefore, the thesis will use uncontrolled 
interference in preference at all times, including direct quotation. 
 
potential that one may interfered with, without regard to one’s well-being – in other words, it does 
not track to our avowable interests (Pettit 2001, 134-141) 
 
When is interference uncontrolled, and how can we tell whether it tracks to our interests or not? On 
an individual level, this is quite easy; we can define our interests and argue that any given action 
was against them (Pettit 2001, 150-151). Of course, such an action may have a practical or moral 
reason, but it is still a denial of our freedom. Ensuring that a democratic government is attending to 
our interests, or that a collective’s interests are being considered, is more difficult. There is a danger 
that the state may exert public power – imperium – in a way that is unjustly coercive, arbitrary, and 
dominating (Pettit 2001, 152-155). In order to ensure that a state is free in and of itself, and is 
composed of free and politically active citizens, Pettit gives an extensive list of requirements and 
resources, which sum up as a need for citizens to have editorial and authorial opportunities on both 
government policy and legislation as a measure of influence and control while necessitating a 
democratic state that is responsive to popular wishes, particularly in “two dimensions, electoral and 
contestatory” (Pettit 2001, 159-173). 
 
Some examples may be useful in order to clarify Pettit’s arguments15at this point. Steiner makes a 
distinction between “pure” negative liberty and other, “impure” kinds on the basis of an action 
being not impossible, but “ineligible”, based upon moral or motivational considerations (Steiner 
1994, 6-21). In a pure conception of negative liberty, ineligibility has no effect; one is unfree only if 
one’s action is made an impossibility, and any interference upon you – regardless of its eligibility or 
your own action’s lack – is an imposition or obstruction. Non-domination would not fit this 
definition, and Pettit would undoubtedly reject such a pure conception. Thus, while Pettit himself 
does not use such terminology, his theories might be considered by Steiner as an “impure” negative 
conception. This is mentioned because such conceptions do not strictly fit Berlin’s definition of 
 
15  The examples hold for collectives and individuals alike. 
 
negative liberty either, for they must be concerned with some additional criteria beyond interference. 
Pettit’s critique, however, is still concerned with obstructions, whether justified or unjustified, and 
therefore it seems absurd to count him amongst those Berlin sets out as positive libertarians. This, 
again, suggests the positive/negative distinction is flawed. 
 
Returning to Pettit, his own example of controlled interference is that of Ulysses/Odysseus, who 
ordered his crew to tie him to the mast and block their ears with wax, thus rendering them unable to 
hear his contrary, objectionable orders to sail towards the sirens and wreck their ship, and allowing 
him to experience the beauty of their song without dying. According to non-interference, Ulysses 
must surely be un-free; he is being interfered with, after all. But according to Pettit, this makes little 
sense. For Ulysses’ interests are being considered, as he has explicitly detailed them, and are being 
attended to despite his unwillingness/irrationality to consider them himself. The interference is 
entirely a controlled and legitimised one, and his discursive control has been entirely respected 
throughout the process16. 
 
Quentin Skinner gives another useful example. He speaks of a slave who is living on his master’s 
estates. The slave may not be in a position to be interfered with often – his master may have been 
away for years, in fact. But the master could return at any time, and the slave may therefore be 
punished if the master is displeased in any way, or even if he just happens to feel like it. Thus the 
slave could live like a king until such a time as he was caught and punished. He therefore has a 
substantive reason to adjust and amend his behaviour, and remains in the power of another – he is 
subservient to his master. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that he lacks something fundamental 
and vital to being free. This same example holds true for a nation-state as well; a colony can never 
be truly free of its homeland without independence, which Skinner points out directly (Skinner 
1998, 50-51). 
 
16  This has much to do with Pettit’s idea of laws as pre-commitment and thus control for a political collective. 
 
 
There will remain challenges from non-interference against such arguments, but they will be 
covered later, in section three. Pettit also offers another argument against non-interference along 
Berlin’s lines. While it does not substantially support the controlled/uncontrolled interference 
distinction, it provides additional support for Skinner’s example of exposure. He argues that, by 
strictly considering things in terms of non-interference, it should be possible to achieve freedom 
through ingratiating yourself with those who are more powerful, who might interfere if they chose. 
This seems to be an absurdity (Pettit 2012, 64-65). 
 
A restatement of the argument thus far is necessary before proceeding. The thesis began by 
outlining Berlin’s positive/negative liberty dichotomy. Rather than relying upon the dichotomy, the 
thesis argued that many conceptions of freedom blur together negative and positive concepts, and 
that Berlin also did not consider the idea of a free society or a free collective. Pettit, who abandoned 
the dichotomy and sketched out an ideal of freedom as non-domination was then examined, 
presenting both a theory of individual (and collective) free agency, and individual (and collective) 
political freedom. Non-domination offers a distinction of uncontrolled interference;, it provides a 
richer foundation for civil society and it adds the additional consideration of subservience. What 
remains, however, is to examine Pettit and non-domination in greater detail and to consider 
objections against a move towards a conception of freedom as non-domination.
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Section Two: Pettit’s Account in Full 
 
Having outlined the overall thrust of non-domination, the thesis focuses now upon the specifics, 
beginning by outlining what exactly constitutes uncontrolled interference. Per Pettit’s own 
presentation of non-domination, the thesis will initially assume that domination arises solely out of 
interpersonal causes17 (Pettit 2001, 154-158, Pettit 2012 50, 60-74). Intrapersonal interference 
against discursive control, or any kind of structural or systemic interference, will be considered later. 
For now, the thesis is solely focused upon interpersonal causes, whether they are environmental or 
via discourse-unfriendly relationships. 
 
Such uncontrolled interference may be obvious. For example, someone may instruct us to vote a 
certain way in an upcoming election, or have our legs broken. By the earlier logic, even if our legs 
are never broken (perhaps because he has a great many defiant individuals’ legs to break), we are 
exposed to this risk, and our liberty is seemingly diminished. There may be subtler examples, 
however. Instead of threats to break our legs, we are offered a large sum of unmarked, untraceable 
currency if we vote a certain way. Certainly, this represents an interference in our choices, but it is 
difficult to see whether it is a controlled or uncontrolled one. 
 
Pettit clarifies the ideas of uncontrolled interference in On the People’s Terms by considering these 
distinct kinds of interference as “hindrances to free choice” (Pettit 2012, 34-36). He splits these into 
two: generic hindrances are vitiators, and specific hindrances are invaders. “Where vitiatiors affect 
the capacity presupposed to being able to satisfy your will, invaders target the capacity to satisfy 
your will just as such; they are designed, as we might put it, to thwart your will” (Pettit 2012, 38). A 
lack of resources is a vitiating hindrance; an invasion involves the imposition of another’s will 
 
17  Notably, Pettit backslides on this point by suggesting there is a form of structural domination in Just Freedom (Pettit 2014, 53-54), but he 
goes into very little detail. Therefore, the thesis will go by his earlier writing and adopt Schuppert’s definition of structural domination, but Pettit 
may be less opposed to the concept than presented as here. 
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(Pettit 2012 43-44). Only the latter can count as an uncontrolled interference. Interference in and of 
itself is not invasive, as this could be according to our wishes; Pettit uses the example of an 
alcoholic who makes sure his friend will return the key to his liquor cabinet only on twenty-four 
hours’ notice (Pettit 2012, 57-58). The interference is not one subjected to an “alien will” (Pettit 
2012, 58). But any case of invasion involves domination, and any domination also permits invasion. 
For if I am subject to any such “alien will”, if I am subservient to it along the lines of Skinner’s 
arguments, then any lack of invasion on my choices is solely at the discretion of that will. 
 
Pettit is concerned primarily with the threat of domination. But he recognises that vitiating factors 
are important for the both enjoyment and robustness of freedom and its robustness. It is presumably 
possible for individuals to be dominated, but for that domination never to be used invasively. Such 
invasions may fail to frustrate; it seems reasonable to suggest that preventing me from eating mint, 
when I loathe the taste of mint, is domination and invasive but not particularly frustrating. It is 
certainly not as bad as forcing me to eat mint, which would be frustrating indeed (Pettit 2012, 29). 
Vitiation may deprive one of options, and lead to the same circumstances (for example, there may 
be nothing to eat except mint). Therefore, such resources should be provided if possible, certainly 
for basic resources like food and shelter. There is a catch, however; if you are dependent upon 
another for the sake of such resources, then you are dependent upon their goodwill (Pettit 2012, 70). 
This will be vital when it comes to discussing Pettit’s preferences in the distribution of resources. 
 
For now, another important question is worth considering. The distinction between vitiation and 
invasion seems clear enough. Yet when exactly are we subjected to an alien will? Returning to the 
previous example, a threat to break our legs, if the one issuing the threat could carry it out, seems to 
subject us to his or her will. Does the offer of money do so? What if neither threat nor offer were 
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probable, or effective – if the offer is made by someone known to be broke, for instance - are we 
subject to an alien will then? 
 
Pettit argues that threats and offers work in different ways:; interference removes a choice 
altogether, or presents us with a decidedly inferior choice, or a penalty for adopting it. In his 
nomenclature, x, y and z, becomes either x and y (removal) or x, y, and z-minus 
(penalty/replacement) (Pettit 2012, 50-53).  The nature of the penalty and the degree will affect how 
much a given option diminishes our freedom (Pettit 2012, 53). An offer, by contrast, does not affect 
our freedom unless the offer or reward is enforced upon us (Pettit 2012, 54-55). This is rarely the 
case with most offers, but it could occur; a promotion into an unwanted management position would 
qualify. There is another dimension to consider in misrepresentation, however. 
 
Pettit argues that misrepresentation, either in terms of manipulation or deception, always results in 
an interference, although that interference may not always be negative. Outright falsehoods (bluffs 
or lies) would be negative and unacceptable, but not in all cases of “nudging”, or presenting data in 
a palatable light (Pettit 2012, 55-56)18. Assuming Pettit is correct, what instances of removal, 
replacement, and misrepresentation count as uncontrolled interferences? 
 
In part this can be answered by returning to the principle of avowable interests. It is easy to consider 
when the former and latter count as such on that principle: if an option is removed, it must be 
according to our stated interests. If something is misrepresented, it must not involve any intent to 
harm or defraud our interests19. Some interests can be assumed, such as health and happiness; 
removal of non-harmful options or lying with the intent to see someone harmed must be considered 
 
18  This may seem unconvincing, as it allows for a wide array of possible deceptions. However, the wrongness of these deceptions may be 
unrelated to whether they are invasive and dominating. There may exist good reasons not to deceive on other moral grounds. 
19  One consideration for this view would be the line to be drawn in advertising or evangelism – an ad which sells something that the 
possessor does not strictly need is only acceptable if it does not lead to the sacrifice of something he or she does need, vitally. Likewise, religious or 
political proselytising would have to be honest about its beliefs and policy goals. 
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uncontrolled interference in any circumstance. Replacement is more complex. It may be that a 
replacement is viewed as directly tracking to our interests, but whether it serves them depends upon 
how they are conceived. For example, a doctor may note a patient’s withdrawal from a highly 
addictive drug as being exceptionally unpleasant. He may therefore propose a more gradual retreat 
from addiction, in opposition to the stated will of the addict, which is to rid himself of said 
addiction as quickly as possible. This does not, inherently, seem to be against our interests despite 
being against our will or immediate selfish concerns. It may therefore be acceptable to replace 
options which would be recognisably detrimental to our long-term interests. 
 
Pettit is however highly opposed to any position, for any person, which leaves them potentially 
dependent upon goodwill entirely (Pettit 2014, 29). If he is right to be so concerned, then a 
replacement’s legitimacy would have to depend upon a: direct and prior agreement (as in the 
Ulysses and alcohol cases), or b: the direct and pre-committed authority of the individual to dictate 
such replacements, as in the case of a doctor. To return to the terminology of “alien will”, such 
actions are either in direct accordance with one’s will, respect its intent while temporarily 
overruling it, or ignore it entirely. The question thus becomes if respect suffices for control. 
 
The thesis will argue that, for Pettit at least, it does not. The reason for this is because is that Pettit is 
so concerned with the potential for manipulation or coercion in his discussions regarding non-
limitation (Pettit 2001, 127). Respecting the addict’s intent and then overruling him on the basis of 
his health is still overruling him, though it may be for an extremely good reason. Exceptions are 
solely reserved for those cases where the individual’s interests are unquestionably served – stopping 
someone from walking into an open manhole, overdosing, and the like. 
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Considering the examples given, uncontrolled interference is any action which interferes without 
the subject’s awareness and prior consent (even if that consent is later denied, as with the alcohol 
and Ulysses examples), or which places us in a state of subjection or subservience to another (Pettit 
2012, 59-63).  Only cases where consent could be assumed by default would be excepted, and this 
category is extremely limited. As was earlier established, there can be different degrees of such 
interference, which may be more or less unobjectionable, or may represent complete denial of our 
interests, following the vitiation/invasion distinction. 
 
As an alternative view, threats and offers are also prominently discussed by Steiner, who argues, 
contrary to Pettit, that they are much the same; they provide differing options available to us. 
Steiner then assesses exactly what these mirrored options do: they change our evaluation and 
assessment of our potential actions. They do not differ in practice. If an offer does not constitute 
interference in changing how we consider our choices, how can a threat? Neither of them interferes 
in the realisation of a given action, unless they come into effect before or during the action. In the 
same way, living under the implied threat that a man may come and kill me for no reason at all does 
not diminish my freedom (Miller 1991, 124-134 & Steiner 1994, 22-33) – although it may be rather 
disturbing. 
 
Although counter-intuitive, there seems little fault in the logic. Indeed, social custom works as both 
threat and offer through dictating proper and improper conduct, and rewarding them with esteem or 
disgust respectively. Our freedom to murder is not affected by the law, but our willingness to do so 
assuredly is. If we really want to try to murder people despite the law, we will. Laws and customs 
will only be a limit on freedom when they are observed and effectively enforced, and not simply by 
their presence. They may change our evaluations and choices, but this seems to be an intrapersonal 
element. If Steiner is correct, then either all instances of removal, replacement and 
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misrepresentation must count as uncontrolled interferences, or none of them will. Neither outcome 
is acceptable for Pettit. 
 
Although Steiner’s arguments are directed by what Pettit might call non-interference, they hold for 
Pettit’s assessment of non-domination, if it is held that discursive control is not a value we can 
usefully demand as a political ideal (Pettit 2001, 126-129), and this is the element at risk in the very 
presence of a threat or offer. It might be objected that many threats will by dint of being effective 
and immediate constitute a threat to non-domination, or that such a threat may place us in a position 
of subservience. But it suggests that a meaningless or toothless threat provides no real threat, nor 
does a very unlikely one.  
 
Pettit acknowledges this problem in part by specifying that protection against invasion must 
“maximise expected non-domination” (Pettit 2012, 70). It is not enough simply to reward people for 
not making use of invasion, or to ensure that it is relatively unlikely domination will occur. One 
way to resolve this would simply be to argue that Pettit is mistaken to discount autonomy; that 
discursive control is something that we absolutely must protect. This could thus coherently explain 
the problem between threats, fraud, and offers. The first two deliberately undercut our ability to 
make our own choices and judgements. They may not interfere with our freedom, but they always 
interfere with our autonomous decision-making. An offer, despite being the same in terms of mental 
results, has a distinctly different means – it adds options, rather than removing or replacing them20. 
 
Another argument against Pettit’s views on uncontrolled interference is raised by Gwilym Blunt21. 
Blunt argues that Pettit’s arguments fail to encapsulate “the use of arbitrary or alien 
 
20  These points are revisited in section three, in response to criticism levied at Pettit by Ian Carter and Matthew Kramer. 
21  Blunt’s paper has two halves. For reasons of structure, the thesis addresses his arguments about the source of domination (structural or 
personal, etc) in section two, chapter two. This section focuses on the latter half, about the site of domination, first. 
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power to establish these relationships and broader social institutions” (Blunt 2015, 12). He makes 
use of an apartheid-like example wherein a majority is excluded from power on a systematic and 
impartial basis. He gives a similar and more specific example of a religious minority excluded from 
a university based on stringent rules. That these rules are being enforced by an individual 
admissions officer is no demonstration of domination on his part, but the prospective student is 
dominated all the same. He suggests that Pettit ought to revive a notion of “antipower” and to 
consider if “a social relationship or institution is dominating if X, an agent, possesses the capacity to 
arbitrarily interfere arbitrarily, either interactionally or systemically, in the choices available to Y, a 
dependent agent.” (Blunt 2015, 2). 
 
If correct, this has considerable implications for the Ulysses case when writ large. The most 
important such implication, for the purpose of the thesis, is that individuals must be protected from 
any uncontrolled interference, whether this is on a personal or societal basis. Setting the specific 
nature of systemic and structural domination aside for now22, and Pettit’s own discomfort with it, 
protecting against invasion and uncontrolled interference must account for the possibility of 
unforeseen interferences developing through societal ills like irrational prejudices (racism, sexism, 
etc). To this end, we might rely on something similar to Mill’s principles against the tyranny of the 
majority; that uncontrolled interference can never be allowed on grounds of paternalism or 
disapproval, but solely to prevent greater or more harmful uncontrolled interference on the part of 
another. Pettit makes a similar suggestion of this kind (Pettit 2013, 212-214).  
 
At the same time, this could become too limiting. Part of Pettit’s required social framework for a 
free society is loose material equality; it is plausible that a difference of status could arise that could 
threaten this without ever engaging in uncontrolled interference of any kind, nor violating the 
eyeball test, etc. One example would be a privileged social group which, while possessing no 
 
22  The thesis returns to this point in chapter two. 
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inherent authority and ability to dominate, frequently manages to receive better education23. Over 
time, this could grow to create an imbalance of status and disrupt the loose material equality Pettit 
desires. Fixing it at that point might be more difficult, or even impossible; surely it would be better, 
and almost as justifiable, to correct it before it becomes a problem, even if the solution involves 
some impositions which were a: targeted, and b: not subject to the control of the group, who would 
presumably be reluctant to accept them. 
 
To answer this, two potential options are immediately apparent. Firstly, we could argue that while 
this remained an imposition on liberty, liberty is not the sole good to consider. Other principles, 
such as justice and equality, might compel us to act contrary to liberty. Secondly, we could argue 
that violating their liberty in a small but significant sense was better than giving up the cause of 
liberty, which the loss of the loose material equality might cause. The thesis will argue for the latter, 
following Pettit’s own consequentialist logic. To prevent this from imposing an alien will on the 
minority, however, two safeguards would be needed. The first of these is, as Pettit lays out in Just 
Freedom, the presence of support for minorities which ensured they were treated equitably, not 
merely equally. This is covered in chapter two. The second is to ensure that any such interference is 
controlled and undertaken, as noted previously, solely to preserve liberty or to apply similar 
republican first principles, like the loose material equality. 
 
 Pettit makes numerous arguments (Pettit 2001, 156-174, Pettit 2012, 179) to the effect that 
interference on a government level can be controlled and, through democratic methods, be 
legitimised and applied fairly, in the same way we might agree to set rules for debates, even via 
collective rather than individual agreement. Two parts of the rationale for such rules are particularly 
important. First is what Pettit calls the “corruptibility assumption” (Pettit 1997, 210-212), in that 
while it would not be plausible to assume all exercise of power, and all positions of power, 
 
23  A useful example is the privileged status of public school pupils at Oxford and Cambridge colleges (Sutton Trust, Access to Advantage). 
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inherently led to a corruption of the individual and must therefore be condemned24, there is always a 
possibility that corruption and abuse will occur. Two precautions are again required. The first is a 
combined set of civic norms, embedding laws dependent upon those norms. To put it more simply, 
politicians must be capable of being taken to account legally, and the republican state must be 
prepared to do so. Second is the principle of “tough luck”, that no action of democratic government 
can be seen as malicious against any portion of the population, even though they may lose out; they 
can consider it as simply misfortune, rather than a deliberate invasion of their wills. 
 
If these two things can be guaranteed, or at least made highly probable, then the election of 
politicians to a working democracy provides the opportunity for individuals to generally to obtain 
the results they desire, though not all laws and actions will favour them. Laws thus become ways 
for the population, as with Ulysses, to agree to the general course of democracy without agreeing on 
every individual point – provided, of course, that they (as individuals or as groups, such as 
ethnicities, certain professions, etc) are genuinely not subject to unwarranted malice – following the 
tough luck principle. 
 
But what Blunt makes clear, and which differs from Pettit’s view, is that our Ulysses – the 
democratic populace – may find itself arbitrarily disadvantaged by entirely unintended 
consequences. Pettit sees these laws as a way to commit one’s self to interference on a general scale; 
this can be compared, on a smaller scale, to a clause in a contract becoming transparently against 
our interests over time. For interference to truly remain truly uncontrolled, we must have a regular 
opportunity to challenge such distorted clauses. In On the People’s Terms, Pettit offers a potential 
solution in democratic legitimacy and control; non-domination is not overly demanding in terms of 
 
24  This, by the same token, explicitly rejects anarchism. 
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government duties per se25,  but Pettit is very demanding when it comes to its composition. This is 
discussed in greater detail in chapter two, but an important point to consider here is what renders 
such a government legitimate and allows the exercise of its power over its populace to be controlled, 
rather than uncontrolled.  This is relevant not only to the example of unknowing subservience below, 
but in Pettit’s attempts to address unexpected interferences (which, in theory, he does well) and 
bypass or eliminate systemic/structural interference (which, the thesis will argue in chapter two, he 
completely fails to do). 
 
Pettit contrasts legitimacy with justice; where the latter equalises the “horizontal relations” of 
citizens, legitimacy is vertical: it prevents the abuse of the citizenry by the state. In much the same 
way as the earlier alcohol and Ulysses examples, a state will be controlled when people have 
foreknowledge of the state’s actions and intentions26, when any coercion and uncontrolled 
interference is justified on the basis of the “tough luck” principle or the need to be equally coercive 
to all citizens (Pettit 2012, 162-163), and where popular control is equally accessible to all, 
unconditioned, and effective. This is a demanding list. 
 
Foreknowledge is required for legitimacy on the relatively simple basis of laws as pre-commitment; 
without a keen awareness of what those laws are, and how the government might legislate, there can 
be no hope of control on the part of the citizenry as a whole. They might still exert some form of 
influence, but it will be effectively random and disjointed, unable to allow for a particular result, let 
alone a systematic set of results (Pettit 2012, 153-157). 
 
Coercion and the “tough luck” principle are required for the legitimacy of a state by dint of 
avoiding the earlier problems we raised for minorities, but also on the simple notion that any state is 
 
25  In practice, the requirements for preserving non-domination are very extensive, even more so than Pettit allows for. But there is a 
distinction to be drawn between a government’s obligations and what those obligations entail practically. 
26   Pettit uses this to contrast between consent and control; the former does not require the same level of awareness and observation. 
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inevitably going to need to punish individuals who do not wish to be punished, and to institute 
decisions that a group of people (possibly a very large group ) do not like, but which may be vitally 
necessary or otherwise justified in being enforced, despite their being in opposition to the people’s 
immediate will, again citing pre-commitment. 
 
As for Pettit’s requirements for popular control to be enjoyed, anything less than his listed 
requirements is inevitably flawed in its responsiveness to one or another of its citizens; non-
domination is then not accessible to individuals, to a greater or lesser extent. Of course, this is a 
non-ideal world; no system of government will be perfect. But it is proper to aim to maximise non-
domination and the resources necessary to enjoy it. 
 
Pettit’s stated view on the means of accomplishing this is via a democratic system, but a highly 
specific one. It is not enough simply to have an election and consider the task ended. The most 
important elements are that the electoral system must enable equal access; because the electoral 
system alone cannot account for this when there may be varied minority interests who, because they 
are minorities, will never be able to make their voice heard effectively; it must allow for 
contestation by various popular means. Likewise, if the electoral power of the citizenry is at the 
behest of any other group, this renders their control highly conditional. To solve this problem, Pettit 
offers the solution of independent authorities selected by elected representatives, but not answerable 
to them, such as an independent judiciary, electoral commissions and ombudsmen, etc. Efficiency 
cannot be compelled, but Pettit argues that government’s own failings may – if the citizenry is 
active, responsive, and can make their feelings known – provide an effective response, by forcing 
legislation to respond to those failings over time. Thus, in the long run, governments will respond to 
the norms their citizens promote (Pettit 2012, 269-279, 307-310). 
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The thesis will, for the sake of the argument, agree with Pettit on all accounts. Any state which the 
thesis recommends to safeguard non-domination in civil society must be both legitimate and just by 
Pettit’s criteria.  
 
This leaves subservience. Both Skinner and Pettit offer useful insights into its nature; both agree 
that someone is subservient when their exercise of discursive capabilities is dependent upon the will 
of another, although Skinner puts it in terms of “the jurisdiction of someone else” (Skinner 1998, 
41). The eyeball test serves as an adequate shorthand in day to day life, but other variations deserve 
some consideration. Skinner concludes that any colony or tributary state is in itself un-free, as noted 
above, but also that no individual within such states should consider himself free either, as they lack 
any meaningful way to contest their laws or establish their own lives. This implies that there may be 
cases in which people may unwittingly be subservient: when someone or something has power over 
an individual, organisation or state, and does not, yet could, force the individuals or groups into a 
state of subservience. For if that power was exerted subtly, as it might be with government pressure 
on a colony, they could find themselves unable to control this interference27.  Pettit offers a 
recurring point of the mutual, and possibly general, awareness of relationships which reinforce 
superior/inferior social status. Part of the reason that a few can keep a vast many in line is this 
constant reinforcement and social awareness of their own perceived inferiority. Certainly, if all 
acted in concert, then it would not be enough to keep them in check. Providing each individual 
perceives a great risk in standing up for themselves, however, and so long as they know that they 
are, as an individual, unable to effect meaningful change, the dynamic may prove stable, pervasive, 
and ripe for domination. A secondary point from Pettit is to note the absurdity that leaving 
subservience out entails; if one could become freer by avoiding interferences, then toadying up to 
those in positions of power would render one freer. But this is absurd; freedom remains continually 
predicated on their whims, and not our own. 
 
27  This point is crucial for the discussion of corporate domination later in the thesis. 
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Subservience thus may be subtle or blatant, and it relies in a great extent on the relationship of 
power28 between individuals. One who is subservient is always at the risk of uncontrolled 
interference by the nature of that relationship; any power-relationship wherein one party possesses 
the power to thwart another’s interest, without internal or external limitations, qualifies. A useful 
example is that of verbal chastisement by one’s employer. It is one thing to receive unpleasant yet 
constructive criticism, and another to be subjected to a vicious diatribe, intent only on reducing 
one’s self-worth. If the nature of your relationship is such that one cannot stand up for one’s self or 
redress the abuse, then one has become subservient to one’s employer. One may be subordinate, 
without being subservient. 
 
Thus, subservience is always sufficient for domination. It may not be necessary for domination; 
subservience, as it is a quality of a relationship, makes no comments about actions or contexts. For 
example, I may not be in any relationship where I am subservient to another’s will, but they may 
nail me inside a locked room by some mistake, to revisit the previous example. I am still interfered 
with, by another’s action, with no semblance of control. 
 
Freedom as non-domination thus is much more demanding than non-interference in practice, not 
only in what identifying actions become worthy of prohibition, but in the institutional demands of 
government and society around it. It additionally builds in requirements and concepts that freedom 
as non-interference does not, such as the need for a loose material equality and equal citizenry in the 
eyeball test, and the entire concept of subservience. On the other hand, as Pettit notes, such 
demands justify much greater claims for redistribution and resourcing, as well as individual 
recognition. These claims are the subject of the next chapter. Before this, the thesis will answer 
objections from those attached to liberal freedom, as non-interference. Without doing this, the 
 
28  The definition of power, in this case, is a Marxist one; justification can be found in chapter two. 
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superiority of non-domination as a conception of liberty remains in doubt; this would undermine the 
entire question of the thesis.
48 
Section Three – Negative Liberty, Autonomy, and Pettit’s Critics 
 
Pettit’s theory of non-domination and discursive control has thus been explained. As a theory, it is 
an attractive one to conceptualise liberty, for the reasons Pettit has already outlined. Some questions 
remain. A pressing one is whether non-domination can remain an attractive political ideal, as Pettit 
desires, without an equal commitment to autonomy as a political goal. The thesis must also consider 
potential counter-points from those who would prefer non-interference. Kramer and Carter argue 
that republicanism’s progression is illegitimate, and defend liberty as non-interference, what we 
might call a “pure” negative liberty following Steiner. At the same time, Kramer argues that Pettit 
remains wedded to a concept of liberty which is of a negative kind. This could result in difficulties 
for the thesis, as it will argue here and in the next chapter that autonomy (as discursive control) is 
worth accepting as a political goal for republican theory. Each of these arguments against non-
domination will be considered in turn. 
 
In section one, non-limitation was set aside. Autonomy of the individual is necessary for free 
agency, but it is irrelevant to non-domination; individuals can be politically free even if they are not 
free to choose or free to act (Pettit 2012 48-49), according to Pettit. His reasoning is twofold; first, 
he views a commitment to discursive control on the political level as overly demanding and 
nonsensical in a group focus (Pettit 2001, 126-127). Second, he acknowledges the potential 
difficulty in On the People’s Terms (Pettit 2012, 48-49) in navigating whether an agent was really 
willing or unwilling to do or be something/someone. He is not concerned with metaphysical or 
psychological free will, as he puts it, but “social free will”, the political freedom to act and be, 
however incomplete it may seem. He also argues that political pursuit of discursive control via a 
policy of freedom as non-limitation might lead to manipulation, tyranny, and disregard of the 
individual’s wishes in preference to those of some enlightened despot (Pettit 2001, 127-132), citing 
Berlin on positive freedom. One potential rebuttal would be to argue that this arises out of his 
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consequentialist ethos. A state that sought to prohibit all actions that would lead to the loss of 
discursive control, and therefore undertook none of them, would presumably aid considerably in 
fostering autonomy and Pettit’s own political ideal of freedom, but this has its own costs. A full 
discussion of Pettit’s consequentialism will be outlined in chapter two; for now, the thesis will 
proceed on the assumption that the state is empowered to attempt to maximise individual freedom. 
 
Autonomy and non-domination are still not incompatible on such grounds provided that autonomy 
is also established as something to be maximised whenever possible: we ought to ensure that each 
individual is acting in accordance with their own will. But this could again return to Berlin, where 
one might assume that anyone who is acting in accordance with “false consciousness” or contrary to 
their interests is lacking in autonomy and must therefore be protected from losing it – by interfering 
with their autonomy. Clearly, this would not be ideal. 
 
A solution to this is to consider non-limitation from the perspective of minimising the harm to 
autonomy as opposed to maximising the “real will” of those suffering from various delusions. On 
this account, while the liberty of individuals in terms of resources and the removal of obstructions 
should be maximised, threats to autonomy should be minimised. Of course, various intoxicants 
might interfere with the autonomous will of the individual. But this may be solved by regulation to 
prohibit their consumption when, say, operating heavy machinery or voting in a general election. 
They need not be permanently forbidden. 
 
Such a minimising approach would maintain that autonomy remains necessary, but as we cannot be 
certain of the psychological will of each individual, the best course of action is not to enforce a 
particular conception or schema that each individual might embrace – not least because this would 
be tyrannical in the extreme – but to ensure freedom of agency in Pettit’s sense.  
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As regards the liberal-egalitarian counterpoints, both Kramer and Carter concisely outline their 
views in Republicanism and Political Theory, setting out their critique of republican freedom (or 
unfreedom). While their views are distinct, both take umbrage with Pettit’s earlier characterisation 
of negative liberty, and both are unconvinced by Pettit’s view on the prospect of domination, in no 
small part because they view the exercise of power as being one of probabilities; the freedom of the 
subordinate party is limited by the probability that power will be used against them (Carter 2008, 
70-71). Where the views diverge is in their recognition of power. 
 
Carter outlines a negative theory of freedom which acknowledges the relationship of power, where 
it is contingent, rather than necessary (Carter 2008, 68-69). Again, it becomes a matter of 
probabilities, and Carter does not think that an un-exercised power represents real obstruction. To 
his “pure negative liberty”, freedom is the absence of prevention (Carter 2008, 67); no obstruction 
means no prevention. For Pettit, the mere presence of an opportunity to obstruct suffices. Carter 
also characterises freedom as an absence of dependence, but dependence as a “relation between 
actions” rather than a “relation between wills” (Carter 2008, 80). To elaborate on this, Carter argues 
in a way similar to Steiner that the nature of an action has no bearing on its freedom-limiting or not, 
against Pettit’s view that a: non-arbitrary interference suggests no loss of freedom, and b: a hostile 
and above all invasive will (Pettit 2012,59-60) matters and is toxic to freedom even if it does not 
effectively apply itself. His challenge thus splits in the same way: republicanism must answer why 
only certain forms of power or hostile will constitute dependence (Carter 2008, 74-80) and it must 
answer Carter’s challenge on probabilities. After all, the conception of pure negative liberty agrees 
that many such forms of power are “inimical to freedom” - but, it seems, by degrees. 
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Kramer is even more sceptical. He views the negative conception as far broader than the republican 
one, yet criticises the republican viewpoint as both impractical and nothing more than a truncated 
version of negative liberty29. Again, the probability objection surfaces; not only does he believe that 
republicanism can never entirely eliminate domination, and thus is reduced to the same probability 
concerns as negative liberty, a simple matter of “alternative foci” - Pettit focuses on avoiding the 
power to dominate, the liberal-egalitarian on minimising the chances it is used (Kramer 2008, 46). 
They may even consider the same methods and routes. Kramer’s most important criticism relates to 
time, however, in that the status of a dominator may not remain constant. The ability to interfere 
may differ from moment to moment, may be subjected to penalties at one time and not at another, 
and an individual who lacks the “ascendancy” of a dominator may nonetheless be able, by sheer 
luck, to dominate even when they lack the effective power Pettit would ascribe – or the will to do so. 
Or they may, by individual steps which are not dominating, end up in a position to dominate. To 
Kramer, this places Pettit in an untenable position – it seems highly inaccurate to describe such 
individuals as dominators, yet they can acquire power over others. It also seems impractical, even 
impossible, to prevent such instances from occurring. 
 
A noteworthy point is that Carter and Kramer both pay little attention to the prospect of autonomy 
and discursive control as a necessary condition for and part of freedom. Were this more emphasised 
by Pettit, they might find his theory more distinctive, though perhaps less persuasive; its inclusion 
would certainly point to a more positive conception of liberty than Pettit deems fit. Accepting 
autonomy as a resource provides another useful way to distinguish between threats and offers, as 
 
29  Two of Kramer’s arguments miss the mark entirely, however, and merit little discussion. Kramer criticises Skinner’s conception of 
republican freedom on the grounds that a: Skinner claims that unfreedom arises when one is aware of it, solely, and this clearly seems clearly absurd 
(Kramer 2008, 38-39). It is absurd, which is why Skinner corrects himself (Skinner 2008, 98-99), but even then, Pettit’s account does not require 
awareness for it to be the case. Secondly, Kramer makes the point of a “gentle giant” who holds dominating power but rarely exercises it, perhaps 
even refusing to do so, and asks what makes the individuals in subservience to such a giant unfree. Kramer is in extreme error, because either the 
giant cannot interfere at all (possibly via voluntary choice or contractual arrangement, as one might define many laws), or can and chooses not to, in 
which case the prospect still exists for the giant to abuse his authority if sufficiently vexed, at which point the individuals are still dominated (Skinner 
2008, 99). 
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noted in the previous section. This will be expanded upon shortly to aid in answering Carter’s 
critique. 
 
 Pettit responds to their criticism in both the same book of collected works and in a slightly different 
form in On the People’s Terms; the notion of “alien will” or “alien control” as an answer for 
Carter’s distinct criticisms, along with the clarification regarding threats and offers which was 
outlined earlier. In regards to probabilities, Pettit agrees on the necessity of maximising “expected 
non-domination”, but his own response seems insufficient; therefore, the thesis will present a more 
developed viewpoint and consider potential rebuttals from Kramer and Carter in this vein. As for 
Kramer’s distinct criticism of time, Pettit again offers a reply; the thesis will deal with each of these 
problems in turn, as the concept of “alien control” informs the answers to the other two. 
Pettit defines alien control as any control which has a negative impact on freedom of choice. He 
clarifies that the free person is not one who simply avoids alien control, but who does so in the right 
way, e.g.: one who does not avoid it simply by toadying up to the powerful (Pettit 2012,49-65, 69-
73). 
 
Threats and offers therefore constitute different approaches, as outlined earlier, because one adds 
breadth to the freedom of choice, and the other restricts it. Carter’s challenge on dependence can be 
partially answered in the same way, though not entirely; it is reasonable to suggest that a will which, 
while it acted contrary to your interests in some ways, expanded your freedom in many others, is 
ultimately a net benefit. It must still “track to your avowable interests” (Pettit 2001, 155-160) 
overall. This clarification is necessary, because otherwise republicans might allow for a kind of 
enlightened despotism, rather contrary to intuition and their political doctrines. 
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This does not, however, explain why only some forms of dependence or interference are freedom-
limiting. Certainly, it means there is a distinction in what constitutes interference, or at least that 
some forms of interference might be controlled and thus less objectionable than other kinds, but it 
shows little difference qualitatively. 
 
Alien control and dependency of the kind Pettit criticises have little respect for the will of the 
individual. An individual may place themselves in a dependent situation, of their own volition, as 
part of a contract or scheme. In the same way, a threat – even an ineffectual threat – by its very 
nature disregards the autonomy of the individual in a way that an offer – even a malicious offer – 
does not. Carter’s concern remains focused on the purely negative conception of freedom – what 
obstructs an individual. On that account, any interference has to be justified. There may be cases, 
however, where the interference is a reasonable one; e.g. to rescue an unconscious body from a 
burning building. Perhaps they were willing to lie down and die, and in that sense, this represents a 
disregard of their free will. But the action was taken, not knowing this, without any such intent. 
 
Carter might reply that even in a case where we wish to prohibit interference, there may be other 
moral reasons to pull someone from a burning building. It is still interference, but justified due to 
the circumstances. The distinction is one of an alien will; not knowing the individual’s wishes, the 
interferer sought to act in accordance with those wishes as they could conceive of them, e.g.: 
removing them from the flames. It would be absurd to say that this was sufficient in all cases; one 
cannot simply fantasise about someone’s beliefs and act accordingly. But there clearly seems to be 
something in the way of justification, to act as another would want us to act, as opposed to against 
their wishes. Pettit’s concern is to ensure that no interference of this kind is possible, because for it 
to be possible suggests the power – as a relationship between individuals – to ignore their will. 
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Pettit’s response on probabilities is to note that the decrease in probability of interference does not 
remove alien control: “A decrease in the probability of interference will only provide a reason for 
consolation with respect to…the sort of interference actually practised. It will provide some relief 
from fear…but it will not reduce the level of alien control and the associated unfreedom” (Pettit  
2008, 124). This seems plausible as an explanation as to why a slave is perpetually unfree, and 
distinguishes Pettit substantially from negative libertarians. 
 
 Carter still has room for criticism, however. Carter’s supposition was is that a trivially low chance 
of actually exercising power – thus, alien control – does not actually affect freedom in any 
meaningful way. An example might be a large snake with the power of hypnosis, allowing it to 
hypnotise and eat prey. Suppose that one is forced to confront this snake, day in and day out, but the 
snake has a mere 0.0000001% chance30 of actually succeeding in its hypnosis. Call this the Kaa 
argument. Why should we worry, and what threat does the “alien control” actually pose to liberty? 
We surely cannot be obliged to protect against the trivial possibility of such interference, and the 
actual harm seems then to be in the interference, not the alien control. 
 
A defence from Pettit might begin by noting that most cases of exercising alien control are much 
more likely, but that still leads simply to quibbling over probabilities. A 1% chance may seem high, 
but not if the opportunity for that alien control comes once a century. Drawing the line, as a 
discussion, is impractical because it will undoubtedly run into the sorites paradox – moving a 
percentage here and there is useless. As noted in the prior footnote, I invite the reader to supply 
their own definitions. 
 
 
30  Pettit’s definition does insist on a “negative impact on freedom of choice”, so if this number is too low, the author invites the reader to 
replace it with the lowest percentile chance they believe would actually matter. 
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Instead, Kaa can be addressed via a variation on Pettit’s concept of insulation. In Just Freedom, 
Pettit outlines a case for an intricate criminal justice system to prevent the abuse of the more 
nuanced republican theory (Pettit 2014, 93-98). The snake will remain a source of alien control if 
there is nothing to penalise or prohibit its actions. If it should attempt its low chance of hypnosis, 
the snake must be punished, or there must be an effort to minimise the prospect of attempts to begin 
with; laws, direct obstruction, or the removal of the snake entirely. 
 
This can be aided via establishing just norms and just laws in support of those norms (Pettit 1997, 
241-246), society as a whole can allow individuals to be limited and restricted from exerting alien 
control, as a promise that alien control will not be exerted on them31. Carter is correct that in 
practice such a low probability means little, but the presence of an unchecked alien control more 
symbolises the prospect of subservience or danger than it does actual interference. Pettit argues in 
On the People’s Terms that a false danger which still serves to restrict one’s personal choice – if we 
do not know the absurdly low probability, for example – is still an impediment to freedom. Thus in 
cases where the power-relation is known, and toxic to discursive control, but the probability is not 
known, one will be deprived of freedom to the extent that one is subject to interference and to the 
extent one believes one will be subject to interference. Intimidation must be counted as toxic to 
liberty; so too must the prospect of government or corporate abuse, however unlikely, because of 
the obvious discrepancy in the power-relationship between an individual and government32 (Pettit 
2012, 50-56, 209). It is for precisely this reason that Pettit is so anxious to establish strong 




31  This may strike one as a little too close to an explicit social contract, but it is more of a kind of reciprocity that Rawls would recognise. 
32  Or an individual and a religion, an individual and a trans-national corporation, an individual and another individual with drastically greater 
wealth, power and influence. 
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If probabilities are seen in this way, and one accepts the idea of alien control, then Kramer’s 
criticism is mostly misplaced. The “individuation” of the individual options will be changed at any 
given point in time (Pettit 2008, 121, & Pettit 2012, 66), provided that an individual is in position to 
make use of that power and exercise those options against you. It may be that the individual will at 
certain points not be able to do so, or will be harshly punished, and this changes the profile – the 
meaning, even – of those actions. But the actions themselves remain illegitimate, due to the option 
of exercising alien control over your decisions. It is reasonable to suggest that Kramer is right that 
not all individuals will exercise these actions. And if they do not, they should not be punished. But 
the option to do so should be removed, precisely so there is no “door-keeper”, in Pettit’s example, 
who might opportunistically interfere. 
 
Where Kramer has a point is that ensuring this is exceedingly difficult. To prevent all instances of 
alien control is all but impossible. If republican freedom demands this, it is inherently unachievable, 
save for the isolated hermit or some godlike being, who may ensure he is never placed in such a 
position. Far better to focus on the cases where that interference is used. Minimising such 
occurrences is sufficient, however, and well within our capabilities. In the example of the bully, 
ensuring such a situation could never arise is impossible. Correcting it and ensuring that the bullied 
individual has opportunities for recourse would do much to prevent it arising, and these are entirely 
practical. 
 
Even if this is accepted, Kramer argues that if the bully can still act with impunity, he remains a 
dominator, even after the apple is obtained (Kramer 2008. 55-56) and that this status of domination 
can thus be explained by non-interference even though that non-interference has been applied, thus 
once again intending to suggest that Pettit’s version of liberty is not distinctive. But if he will be 
punished, as with the minimising case, he is not a dominator. To say this, however, misjudges Pettit. 
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The point of republican freedom is not merely one of lacking uncontrolled interference33. It also 
addresses the exercise of power over others, or being subject to that exercise of power. It is a 
distinct state of relations. It is plausible that an individual could, for a very brief time, end up in a 
dominating position they otherwise would not hold. Kramer would not describe that person as 
dominating; it is more accurate to say that they were in an unequal relationship which permitted the 
use of power to dominate, even if they themselves never exercised it, never realised it, and never 
conceived of themselves as dominator. Pettit may or may not be correct in this, but he is certainly 
distinct from the negative libertarian, as the prospect of the actual interference occurring – which 
may be a minute possibility – is not the fundamental issue of the relationship. It is the relationship 
itself34. 
 
In conclusion, Pettit’s understanding of liberty differs considerably from traditional negative liberty 
conceptions, and its implementation differs from the liberal-egalitarian model in far more 
substantive ways than mere “alternative foci”. Autonomy seems far more integral to the coherence 
and strength of Pettit’s theory than he himself acknowledges, and so the thesis returns to it again 
now. 
 
By better emphasising autonomy, Carter’s critique might not have found purchase to begin with, 
and emphasising discursive control and a theory of free agency and personhood as much as a 
“politicised” freedom (Pettit 2001, 125-128) serves to distinguish republican freedom still further. 
Many of Pettit’s arguments tacitly rely upon the notion of subservience or impinging upon freedom 
 
33  Or, by Kramer’s logic, lacking interference which is not itself interfered with. 
34  Shnayderman offers a counter-argument about effectively the same relationship: a malicious villain who can succeed in making people do 
what he wishes 50% of the time, and a hero with the same power who elects to never use it, but could do so 50% or 100% of the time. Shnayderman 
argues it is implausible that the villain and hero place others in the same situation with regards to negative liberty, and that the hero with 100% is in 
fact more dangerous to freedom (Shnayderman 2012, 150-151). He misses the mark entirely, however, for in such a circumstance, the people’s 
freedom is indeed dependent on his goodwill The eyeball test is violated; hero or villain, your willingness to stand up and disagree is predicated on 
the likelihood of them not killing you for it. His second argument (Shnayderman 2012, 51-56) is less useful with Pettit’s more developed view in On 
the People’s Terms. 
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without direct action. These arguments rely upon some form of autonomy to give them persuasive 
force. 
 
Drawing upon Skinner, one might also question the denial of autonomy as a political and collective 
value in Pettit’s arguments. Pettit writes in Just Freedom that when “a people as a whole are (be) 
dominated...the individual members of that people are (will be) dominated.” (Pettit 2014, 154). 
Such a view is not necessarily incoherent without autonomy, but its absence suggests that the fault 
is purely external, that the state is imposed on from without. This is not the case; to revisit the slave 
example, consider a polity whose internal affairs were left untouched, but from whom a tribute or 
tax was regularly demanded. We should rightly consider that an infringement of their freedom, as a 
nation, but equally importantly, though the external suzerain did nothing by their own action to  the 
internal politics or policies of the tributary, the tributary must respond to the wishes and concerns of 
the suzerain, must live in perpetual fear of increased tribute or displeasure. Such a view has notable 
implications for political policy, especially if we expand the range of suzerains. If a state is 
beholden to its creditors, outside its ability to control, does it remain free? What of a state whose 
populace is overcome with loyalty to an external religion, such that that religion wields immense 
socio-political power? Perhaps Pettit might respond that these too are instances of domination, as 
opposed to a loss of (collective) discursive control. The distinction seems increasingly muddied. 
 
To re-examine Kaa, one might also note that autonomy seems particularly injured by the prospect of 
abuse, no matter the likelihood. Consider the prospect that, having presented a paper at a conference 
of some kind, some abusive individual will charge onto the stage and begin lecturing you at length 
on why you are wrong in considerable detail. Pettit notes, and I concur, that we cannot make 
allowances for timidity (Pettit 2012, 84-85) Suppose however that you have good reasons, or even 
good but ultimately false reasons, for thinking this might happen, rather than being a paranoid fear 
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brought on by stress or anxiety. One might take reasonable actions – informing conference staff, 
leaving the stage briskly, etc. Yet this will undoubtedly have damaging effects on one’s confidence, 
goals, and purpose. 
 
This seems contrary to Pettit’s intentions, especially as he notes we must guard against possible 
abuse (Pettit 2014, 105) and a loss of democratic influence and effective control (Pettit 2012, 239-
240, 303-310). There may be very good reasons to place autonomy as a political goal as part of 
liberty, and thereby to protect it.  In the next chapter, the thesis will begin not simply to defend 
Pettit’s arguments, but to move beyond them. A key change will be the protection of autonomy and 
thus agency as a distinct goal for Pettit’s political apparatus. The next chapter therefore begins with 





Section One – Pettit’s political requirements 
 
In the prior chapter, the thesis discussed liberty, and concluded that it is best characterised as non-
domination: individuals are free to act if and only if they are not subject to uncontrolled interference, 
based on Pettit’s theory of discursive control: we may say someone is freely acting if and only if 
they have the capabilities and protections necessary to contribute to a discourse. Despite some 
criticisms, it was established that non-domination remains preferable to the alternatives as a 
conception of liberty.  But there are more factors to consider if non-domination is to be of use as a 
theory. This chapter will focus on many of Pettit’s preferences for understanding and implementing 
non-domination. The first to be covered, via this section, are his implementation of non-domination 
in consequentialist terms, and his prerequisites for government, especially his specific demands for 
the democratic government in any society based on republicanism. This is particularly relevant, 
because the demands Pettit outlines necessitate a great deal of political stability and democratic 
support – which the thesis will go onto argue are directly threatened by capitalism as a system. 
 
Pettit’s view is broadly consequentialist (Pettit 2001, 129, Pettit 2012, 123-127, Pettit 2014, 213), 
although in a constitutive, not causal sense, as he notes in On the People’s Terms. This approach 
has numerous benefits, in terms of what it justifies and permits, and in the ways it refutes traditional 
objections against utilitarianism. As Pettit notes, a consequentialist approach allows for flexibility 
in the organisation of society, not only in its overall blueprint, but if a small denial of liberty in one 
place provides far greater gains in another (Pettit 1997, 97-102). Consequentialism also justifies the 
practical implementation of Pettit’s views, however. If we were to adopt a deontological approach 
to non-domination, never violating it, it remains unclear how any democratic state could arise from 
a despotism or oligarchy. For once the despotism had been set in place, the rights of the despotic 
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would surely have to be violated. This does not necessitate violence: Pettit mentions a general strike 
and mass unionisation as the imposition of the majority’s will upon the minority (Pettit 2014, 105). 
 
As for the denial of traditional objections, to give one example, it is unclear how a utility monster 
(Nozick 2013, 41) would work in such a schema; one could not justify an infinitely free person (or 
class of people) by reference to their freedom being so much better than everyone else’s. 
Utilitarianism is not consequentialism, but even so. One might be subjected to worse and worse 
privations of freedom (Pettit 2012, 44-47) and of increasingly worse kinds – vitiation, invasion, 
vitiation and invasion – but non-domination is the absence of any invading kind (Pettit 2012, 59-64). 
There may be ways to expand the range of non-domination (Pettit 1997, 97-99) but we may say 
only that someone is dominated or un-dominated. There are no degrees of non-domination, just 
areas where it does and does not exist/apply. 
 
In the same way, Pettit suggests three basic rules of thumb in Just Freedom. To restate the eyeball 
test, no-one should be so far above or below any other person that they cannot look them in the eye 
and have a discourse in disagreement (Pettit 2012, 84-87). The tough luck test holds that citizens of 
a state should be reasonably convinced that any decision against their interests is not the result of 
malign will, or a state hostile to them, but simply an unfortunate occurrence, to be expected on 
occasion as a result of the democratic process (Pettit 2014, 142-144). Thirdly, the straight talk test is 
that individuals, and the governments that represent them, should be neither deceitful, nor 
overbearing, nor timid and deferential in their approach. They should be able to discuss their 
business plainly and honestly, with their statements at face value. These more general principles are 
upheld above more specific axioms because Pettit takes there to be no iron-clad rule about when 
“enough is enough in providing for justice, democracy, or sovereignty” (Pettit 2014, xxvii). 
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Pettit imposes further shape on how a government should be but this will be discussed later in the 
chapter. Note, however, that these goals – while somewhat nebulous – are significantly less abstract 
than utilitarian notions like happiness or pleasure. Pettit does not mandate whether they should be 
individual actions or general rules, sidestepping that particular dilemma. 
 
This is not to say that consequentialism of Pettit’s kind is without disadvantages or critique. Set this 
to one side for the moment; what implications does consequentialism have for republican action? 
Pettit argues for consequentialism in general in the Inescapability of Consequentialism (Pettit 
2012b), in which he proposes a specific kind of consequentialism in response to the hostility 
levelled against it by critics. The right action is that which promotes (ideally, maximises) the good 
(Pettit 2012b, 51), but by predisposition/nature as well as complex deliberation. It is equally valid to 
want to be a good friend and help a friend out, as it is to weigh up the pros and cons of my actions – 
and possibly more so, as such deliberation is complicated35. More importantly, Pettit defends 
consequentialism’s inescapability by arguing it is necessary to judge competing social arrangements 
(Pettit 1997, 100). 
  
In On the People’s Terms and in Republicanism, he defends its specific good for republicanism by 
several methods. In the former book, he notes that such a theory “associates justice with 
approximation to a certain goal” - passing the eyeball test, in this case. This gives it a certain 
flexibility that permits many broad variations on methodology, and because it similarly does not 
require a “transcendental” ideal of justice (Sen 2009), nor does it lapse into ideal theory (Rawls 
1993, 281-285, Kulicki 2010, 1-6), it can accommodate and assess many different forms of 
distributive justice. Much as with the general principles (eyeball test, etc) above, Pettit refuses to 
endorse a specific solution for a specific time and place. 
 
 
35  Lest this be considered hyperbole, Bentham’s felicific calculus is undoubtedly a simplification, and it’s still unwieldy (). 
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Republicanism offers more specific arguments, with the two strongest being a: that permitting a 
lapse or failure in non-domination in some ways (Pettit uses the example of a parliament with 
specific, unfettered powers) which enhances non-domination overall seems rather more compelling 
than to seek an idealised form of constitution or government which may never yet be realised, and 
which in the attempt would make matters worse;36 and b: that a deontological approach to realising 
non-domination would render it difficult to discern which institutions optimise freedom, and 
deprive the state of empirical testing to see what might work (Pettit 1997, 97-102, Mill 1974, 95-99). 
 
One may thus form the impression that Pettit is overly vague: because of the teleological nature of 
his arguments, almost anything could be permitted, provided it advances the cause of non-
domination. That this resembles the supposed manipulation of non-limitation, which Pettit found 
unacceptable (Pettit 2001, 130-132) may suggest a certain hypocrisy. This is only the case, however, 
if Pettit imposes no restrictions upon such maximisation of non-domination. Pettit does, however, 
impose restrictions via highly specific requirements for a government to be legitimate, also 
requiring that any such interference be controlled by the individual(s) in question (Pettit 2001 159-
174, Pettit 2012, 300-303), this being accomplished via numerous democratic and judicial 
mechanisms. Pettit’s consequentialism therefore has a hard core of deontological principles, which 
seemingly cannot be violated. As he notes in Republicanism, if maximising non-domination 
required efforts which were entirely repugnant (such as brainwashing), then one would question the 
point (Pettit 1997, 102). 
 
Republican government’s wide-ranging mandate can be contrasted with the narrow requirements 
Pettit sets for legitimacy. In A Theory of Freedom, Pettit outlines the danger of government 
overreach and exerting inescapable power (Pettit 2001, 152-156), proposing that the only way to 
avoid non-domination in society is to maintain a democratic state which tracks to commonly 
 
36  This is similar in thrust to the objection to utilitarianism that the best way to guarantee the maximisation of happiness is to not attempt to 
do so (Williams 46-48, in Scheffler 1988). 
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avowable interests. It does this by providing authorial and editorial control – the ability for people 
to consider and propose many avenues of policy, and then to eliminate those which insufficiently 
track to the common interest (Pettit 2001, 156-161). Finally, for editorial control to work in a 
representative democracy, there must be additional democratic safeguards – procedural resources, 
such as formal separation of powers and a bicameral system; consultative resources, such as the 
British parliament’s requirement to discuss a petition signed by enough members of the public (); 
and appellate resources, such as the United States’ doctrine of judicial review ( Encyclopedia 
Britannica, “Judicial Review”, Bodenhamer 2018, 37,  Pettit 2001, 161-172). 
 
This is expanded upon in his later works, but it is worth discussing the notion of common avowable 
interests in more detail. Pettit defines a common interest as a certain good, the collective provision 
of which is dependent upon whether it is supported by “co-operatively admissible considerations”. 
These are “(considerations) that anyone in discourse with others about what they should jointly or 
collectively provide can adduce without embarrassment as relevant matters to take into account. 
They are not selfish or sectional considerations” (Pettit 2001, 156-158). Importantly, this includes 
redistributive measures, as well as simpler but important considerations like what side of the road 
should be driven on. The avoidance of collisions, and the support of the infirm, both work as a 
common interest because even those who are both healthy and do not drive have may yet 
conceivably have reason to need them. Pettit suggests this may extend to specific support so that 
some may enjoy a commonly accepted good; if we accept that all individuals have a right to take 
pride in themselves and their cultural heritage, ethnic minorities may need subsidising to continue 
their traditions in the face of an indifferent, or even hostile majority. These points will be revisited 




Democratic legitimacy and the adequate provision of distributive justice are related, but distinct, for 
Pettit (Pettit 2012 130-131, Pettit 2014, xviii-xxiii). A state may display one, both, or neither; a just 
but illegitimate state (such as an authoritarian socialist state) could provide exceptional resources 
and preserve full material equality, but allow minimal political influence. Pettit phrases this as 
horizontal and vertical control (Pettit 2012, 140, 299-300). To restate briefly, a state is 
democratically legitimate when citizens can a: attribute any decisions against them to pure “tough 
luck”, and b: have unconditioned, efficacious, and equally accessible influence (and thus control) on 
government policy and actions, as they might with any other agent (Pettit 2012, 300-303). 
 
For a state ordered on republican principles to be just, conversely, the first and foremost 
requirement is that its citizens be treated as equals (Pettit 2014, 4, 118-119). But this does not mean 
that all citizens must be treated equally; instead they must be treated equitably. This distinction is 
important for two reasons. First, such a policy is consistent with the account of common interests 
noted above. Second, Pettit permits a degree of economic inequality that does not violate the 
eyeball test (Pettit 2012 84-85, Pettit 2014 80-84, 99-101, 104-105), which allows for a system of 
progressive taxation, while simultaneously enshrining certain property rights37. 
 
For the three basic tests to be met, Pettit suggests that large-scale government action is the sole 
effective remedy. Philanthropy or private charity is insufficient. The power that this gives a 
government is extensive, but if a government is democratically elected and legitimate as outlined 
above, then the potential for dominating power is minimised. The requirements may in fact seem 
radical by the standards of the liberal, democratic state: Pettit demands what he calls infrastructure, 
insurance, and insulation.  
 
 
37  As chapters three and four make clear, this is not a position the thesis adopts. 
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Infrastructure consists of material and institutional infrastructure, with the former being things like 
roads and sanitation, and the latter being things like education, access to political and legal 
information, and market functions. Pettit explicitly rejects both anti-property and anti-taxation 
arguments, arguing for a robust series of property developments, including in “novel ways”. 
Insurance encompasses the provision of medical care, shelter38 and nourishment, but also judicial 
and financial security, police services and carefully regulated banks. Lastly, citizens must be 
“insulated”, both from the potential legitimate control of others (employers, spouses, unions, etc) 
and the potential illegitimate control of others (crime, mainly). Just as with democratic legitimacy, 
many democratic states will not meet these ideals. It is easy to conceive of a legitimate democracy 
that due to historic debts is unable to supply proper education, healthcare, police, etc. Likewise, an 
illegitimate democracy that (perhaps out of paternalism) provides all or most of these requirements 
is both plausible and possible (Pettit 2012, 140). 
 
Most importantly for Pettit, these requirements must be extended equally to all citizens, although as 
noted under the equity/equality distinction, this principle may result in different treatment in 
practice (Pettit 2014, 80-81). 
 
Pettit’s requirements are consistent with non-domination; if properly implemented, they would do a 
great deal to extend freedom by protecting from vitiation, and also domination from both private 
individuals and the state. Some concerns remain with his views on non-domination per se, however. 
One such concern is that Pettit’s definition of non-domination is incomplete on two grounds. First, 
without guaranteeing discursive control, Pettit’s lengthy list of requirements is ultimately 
meaningless. Second, it lacks an understanding of structural or systemic domination, e.g.  where 
individuals or groups might find themselves dominated not by any specific entity, but by structures 
 
38  This arguably places Pettit in support of socialised housing, but this leaves individuals substantially dependent upon the state’s goodwill, 
which could allow for domination. Some form of right to buy may be necessary. 
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and systems like laws, economic practice, etc.. This latter ground is discussed further in section two, 
immediately following.  
 
Equally important problems are his views on corporate power and material inequality, but the thesis 
will argue that Pettit’s response to both are insufficient. Corporate power is discussed in far greater 
detail in chapter three, as it is most effective as a criticism once structural and systemic domination 
have been acknowledged. Material inequality, however, is more self-contained as a critique, and 
will be discussed briefly before we turn to the more complex problem of discursive control. 
 
Pettit acknowledges the necessity of resources to enjoy freedom (Pettit 2012, 85-92) and the 
corrosive effects of material inequality (Pettit 2012, 90). He outlines a number of proposals for 
accomplishing the desired equality, sometimes quite radical by modern standards (Pettit 2014, 104-
106). He errs, however, on the side of caution. Quite apart from the matter of corporate power, 
Pettit fails to consider just how easily inequality can arise out of private property. Consider the 
stock market. It is possible, although implausible, to achieve considerable wealth from passive 
investment. £50,000 becomes £5,000,000. At that point, no domination of a personal nature has 
taken place. Stretching probability still further, the investments may not even have relied upon 
businesses where domination is used as a tool. In any capitalist system there will be winners and 
losers; progressive taxation and social security only does so much to mitigate this. 
 
This is not an insurmountable difficulty for Pettit, but it is one on which he seems loath to give 
ground. In Just Freedom, he suggests that some form of private property be retained, although he 
gives little guidance about its exact form; he seems more concerned with the prospect of union 
coercion than with that of large-scale swings in private finance. The latter, however, is a far greater 
threat to the eyeball test and loose material equality; at extremes, it seems utterly indefensible. Pettit 
of course distinguishes between the power of dominium and imperium; private property offers the 
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former, not the latter, and those within their power can depart it at any time, and – in a society 
adhering to non-domination – fight abuse of that power (Pettit 2001, 152-154). This is contingent 
on society operating as it should, however. In an imperfect society, which Pettit acknowledges will 
almost certainly be the case, it is distinctly possible for such power to be de facto inescapable and 
unanswerable.  
 
The thesis will therefore argue, contrary to Pettit, that private property39  should be tightly regulated, 
if it is to be permitted. The exact form of these regulations will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter four. For now, it is enough to note that any such regulations should protect the right of 
individual exit, establish a ceiling on private wealth, and not permit vital industries to pass outside 
of the control of a democratic state. This will be referred to as strict material equality, in contrast 
with Pettit’s support of loose material equality. Before moving to the discussion of systemic 
domination as a problem, it is necessary to revisit autonomy in the context of Pettit’s political 
practice. 
 
Discursive control, and non-limitation, were initially rejected by Pettit on the grounds of potential 
overreach. Requiring it as a “political ideal” would have been overly demanding, and possibly 
totalitarian (Pettit 2001, 127). In the previous chapter, its importance in guaranteeing free agency 
was discussed, as was the way it aided in distinguishing republican freedom. Its absence, however, 
renders one of Pettit’s main demands for democratic legitimacy far less coherent. A nation 
comprised of many non-autonomous individuals might go through the motions of democracy; it 
may even, by some happy accident, serve non-domination. Although the individuals have the 
formal means to influence government effectively, however, they either do not do so, or they do so 
blindly, without actual understanding or knowledge of its workings. They are incapable of joining 
 
39  Private property in the Marxist sense is discussed later; as it is used here, this includes personal property for consumption, but it certainly 
applies to the means of production. Given the power private ownership of factories, tenements and transportation enterprises confers, we may ask if 
private ownership of any of these things is tolerable. 
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or comprehending political discourse. Acting to minimise its deprivation is necessary for Pettit’s 
political requirements to be sustained, while averting concerns about overreach. 
 
Four additional reasons recommend the inclusion of autonomy as a “political ideal”; autonomy 
must be supported and protected, as liberty is, by any republican state. First, autonomy provides an 
important distinction between republicanism and negative libertarian theories, and not to make use 
of it renders Pettit’s distinction between non-interference and non-domination less coherent (Pettit 
1997, Pettit 2001 133, 136, Pettit 2012, 26-28), as outlined in chapter one.  
 
Second, Pettit’s arguments for rejecting discursive control are unpersuasive (Pettit 2001, 126-128). 
His concerns about psychological improvement can be answered by taking an approach of 
minimising influences upon autonomy, instead of promoting it; autonomy and agency may not be 
improved by environmental action, but the quality of a discourse clearly could be, and individual 
autonomy should indeed be all that a government concerns itself with, as opposed to the collective. 
But this means a narrowing of scope, not an abandonment entirely. 
 
Third, autonomy seems inherent to the value of liberty in itself. This does not mean that it is an 
element that government can usefully support, which is Pettit’s claim. But it still has a strong value 
towards the resources needed to effectively utilise freedom effectively. Pettit may assume a more 
robust economy and discourse which would aid in the effective provision of autonomy absent 
government intervention; that people would be able to educate and protect themselves, thereafter 
engaging in active civic participation and contestation (Pettit 2012, 226-229). It is feasible that 
individuals may find themselves in a position where a great many environmental and interpersonal 
impositions on their will persist and will continue to persist – they may not even be aware of these 
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impositions – without external assistance40. A democratic government seems the only justifiable 
entity with both the power and legitimacy to offer said assistance. 
 
Fourth, autonomy seems to be a key component of individual relationships. One may be subservient 
without the loss of psychological autonomy, but consider the case of otherwise equal individuals 
where one, via psychological manipulation, undermines the other’s very self and creates 
dependency where none was originally present. Techniques like gaslighting, “negging” etc (Dorpat 
1994, 91-96) seem to create instances where autonomy and discursive control have been lost, but 
the majority of actions undertaken as part of that relationship do not constitute uncontrolled 
interference. Indeed, the abused individual may leave safely at any time, but do not consider 
themselves able to do so. To not encapsulate this sort of threat within republican freedom and its 
guarantees seems indefensible. Which is precisely why Pettit objects to a very similar example in 
Just Freedom (Pettit 2014, 42-43); it would take little to change the example to one which 
threatened autonomy, not liberty. 
 
 The protection envisaged can be done without psychological revelation or making grandiose claims 
about what an individual’s mind “should” be. Indeed, all it requires is that an individual should have 
the sufficient internal capabilities to contribute to a discourse, and to be held responsible for their 
actions. A good way to envisage autonomy of this kind is to borrow Maslow’s term of self-
actualisation (Maslow 2013, 19). For Maslow, self-actualisation is the highest potential need to be 
achieved. It consists in the realisation of one’s fullest potential, unhindered by anything else. This is 
far too demanding an ideal, but the pursuit, and the idea of such self-actualisation, is not. In the 
same way we might compare freedom to the rights, duties and capabilities inherent in a discourse, 
autonomy can be compared to the pursuit of self-actualisation as a useful shorthand. When an 
individual can clearly examine clearly their own desires and skills, can elaborate on what drives 
 
40  Such as alienation might bring. The thesis examines alienation shortly, in section three. 
71 
them and what they desire, and can speak in ways that they might change themselves, and how that 
change might be accomplished, they have all that they need to be considered autonomous 
individuals. It is this autonomy that republicans must support and, where possible, protect.
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Section Two – Moving on from Pettit, and structural domination 
 
In addition to presenting and holding to his democratic requirements, the proposals of the thesis 
have undergone a substantial departure from Pettit in advocating the tight regulation of private 
property (strict material equality) and in the promotion of discursive control as a political goal (self-
actualisation). A further issue is worth considering in detail, and this is the notion of structural (or 
systemic41) domination. The thesis’ definition of structural domination is where the structure of a 
given group – whether that group is a state, a private club, or a corporation – entails the domination 
of (some of) the individuals comprising it. Systemic domination refers to those cases where it is not 
a matter of organisational structure or policy, but where social norms or unofficial practice entails 
the domination of (some of) the individuals in said structure. The distinction is a fuzzy one, and 
often overlaps – one example would be the highly racist customs and beliefs to which the Jim Crow 
laws and segregation lent official backing, in the United States (Fremon 2015, 9-33, Shelby 2016, 
43-46, 196). One kind of domination informs and supports the other. If structural domination were 
accepted, further political change would be necessary to ensure non-domination, as well as greater 
protections on the systemic level. 
 
Pettit notably does not advance an account of domination which allows for structural or systemic 
domination. While he is acutely aware  of the prospects for large material or social inequalities to 
court domination, and he is aware that a seemingly democratic government can be perverted to 
become non-representative (Pettit 1997, 167-170 Pettit 2012, 232-238), he seems to consider the 
individual as being in a state of personal domination and subservience in each individual instance. 
To use the example of the Jim Crow laws again, Pettit might argue that a black or mixed-race 
individual who was stripped of important freedoms and protections to allow for non-domination 
may find himself in circumstances that are extremely conducive to domination, but the 
 
41  The two will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis, as they are highly similar, if not identical strictly speaking. 
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circumstances (and the system that perpetuates them) are merely a backdrop to the individual power 
relations42. They do not dominate in themselves. 
 
This may seem a spurious distinction. Just as Pettit is concerned with large material inequalities, so 
he is with large social ones (Pettit  2012, 262). These circumstances qualify as vitiating hindrances 
(Pettit 2012, 38-40) at least and should be eliminated on that account alone. It may therefore appear 
that any case of systemic or structural domination is simply an egregious case of vitiation, or a 
failure of legitimate, democratic government. In the latter case, the domination is still one 
entity/agent exerting its will upon the other; it is merely a group agent against an individual one43. 
For the distinction to be useful, a paradigm case is necessary. An obvious case arises from the work 
of Engels, The Conditions of the Working Class in England. At the time of writing, most of the 
workers in question did not have suffrage. Their status of subservience and the domination from 
above had little to do with their lack of political representation, however. Nor was there a clear case 
of aristocratic privilege, as there had been with the yeomanry and peasants. There was certainly a 
bourgeois privilege, in violation of the eyeball test, but this would rarely occur directly – when the 
owner of their factory toured it, perhaps. Much like the slave example from Skinner, they were too 
far removed to exercise that power, although their representatives – foremen and the like – might 
have been empowered and subjugated by it at once. 
 
Instead, it is the system as a whole which degraded the workers’ sense of worth, ruined their health, 
and forced them into a state of dependency and misery. They were not dependent upon the goodwill 
of any individual capitalist, but upon the fickleness of the system in which they existed and to 
which they were enslaved, a system over which they had no control whatsoever. No individual 
 
42  Pettit uses a very specific definition of power, which is expanded on in the next section. The important point for this argument is that his 
definition of power necessitates an agent (Pettit 1997, 78-79). 
43  An alternative take would be that one group agent (supposedly accountable democratic government) is dominating another group agent 
(any given ethnic group). The actual logic changes very little. 
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agent held their chains, or profited from their effective enslavement. The system as a whole could 
not survive without their subjugation (Engels 2005, 127-157, 278-292.) 
 
This is closely related to certain arguments by Gerald Cohen, who argues for a case of “collective 
unfreedom” (Cohen 2011, 156-163) on the part of the working classes, comparing this to a situation 
wherein many individuals are locked in a room – one can get a key and escape, but if he leaves, he 
dooms the rest to remain. While Cohen couches this argument in terms of non-interference, it is no 
weaker for non-domination; it is in fact stronger, because his original argument makes no mention 
of subservience. In such a circumstance, absent enormous solidarity on the part of the locked group, 
anyone who can offer a key (or even the possibility thereof) wields tremendous power, of a kind 
which demands deference if one’s goal is not to be thwarted. 
 
To say that it is still merely one agent dominating another misses the point. It is not simply a lack of 
resources which results in a vitiating hindrance; the hindrance, although caused by no obvious 
person (as is the case with the widespread poverty in the modern world), is an entirely invasive one, 
because it opens one up to desperation; from desperation, to manipulation and coercion, because of 
the need to escape. 
 
It is at this point that the thesis turns to Fabian Schuppert44. Schuppert writes of republicanism’s 
need to embrace “social equality”, which he writes as being concerned with social relationships; 
seeking to eliminate those that are negative, or create a hierarchy of some kind (Schuppert 2015, 
443-445)45. In this, there is considerable overlap with republicanism, but the two are not identical. 
In particular, Schuppert identifies three major issues facing Pettit’s account of non-domination, in 
 
44  Other authors have noted similar concerns – see also Alex Gourevitch (Gourevitch 2013, 602-610), Michael Thompson (Thompson 2013, 
282-294), etc, for discussions of structural domination. 
45   Two important caveats for the thesis when dealing with Schuppert: first, he focuses primarily on social, rather than economic, inequalities. 
This causes certain problems in his definition of alienation, which is dealt with in the next section. Second, Schuppert states that social egalitarianism 
does not focus on exact principles of material distribution (Schuppert 2015, 444). The thesis is concerned with both relationships and economic 




that it fails to account for social vulnerability, unintentional domination through social-cultural 
practices, and the complexity of social inequalities (Schuppert 2015, 446-448). 
 
Schuppert’s critique comes from the position of “social egalitarianism”, whereby a society cannot 
be equal on the basis of distribution alone, but must allow for socio-economic relationships which 
are (broadly) fair and equal. Republicanism, per its concern for social dynamics, is perhaps better 
equipped than traditional egalitarians to support and respond to such a critique. However, the bulk 
of Pettit’s methods focus on a just distribution or upon top-down, governmental apparatus to 
accommodate such relations, while social egalitarianism focuses on everyday life as much as 
anything else (Anderson 2017, xix-xxiii). Given that the thesis is primarily occupied with the highly 
inegalitarian distribution of wealth capitalism creates, and from there its adverse effects, the thesis 
does not commit itself to a strict social egalitarianism, and remains focused upon the republican 
perspective. This does not mean that social egalitarian critiques are invalid, only that the thesis is 
committed to a solution that satisfies republican principles, not social-egalitarian ones. Clearly, 
Pettit’s “expressive egalitarianism”, as he defines it, is insufficient by such a critique. 
 
Each of Schuppert’s concerns illustrates the problems of structural and systemic domination as the 
thesis has defined it. Acute social vulnerability consists not only in the expected material 
inequalities and failures to meet the standards of the eyeball test (which Schuppert discusses briefly), 
but in individuals or groups being deprived of self-recognition; they are unable properly to exercise 
what Pettit would term discursive control, what Schuppert calls the “inner conditions of free agency” 
(Schuppert 2015, 446-447). Schuppert acknowledges Pettit’s awareness of the danger to freedom 
such disruption poses, particularly if one takes the position, as the thesis does, that discursive 
control must be supported. But such vulnerability may not be the product of specific, personal 
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domination; it can equally be cultural, economic, or even linguistic “misrecognition” (Schuppert 
2015, 447). 
 
Unintentional domination is an insidious development of such vulnerabilities; it is easy to display 
bias accidentally, even unconsciously. When such biases result in dismissal, in keeping others in 
their “rightful place”, they become toxic to non-domination. Yet they are systemic, not personal, 
although they may be used in the context of personal domination. Citing Krause, Schuppert points 
out that an authoritative woman may be seen as “strident, overly demanding, nasty – even to other 
women.” (Schuppert 2015, 448). A woman may therefore conform to the “proper” behaviours and 
find herself slowly forced into silence, entirely unconsciously on her part and the part of those 
around her46. She might, on the other hand, find her non-compliance used as a pretext for holding 
her back, while men demonstrating the same behaviours are promoted ahead of her. Likewise, it is 
possible for unintended consequences to result in domination (Schuppert 2015, 449). Without intent, 
it is difficult to state that it is subservience to, or domination by, any specific individual. 
Such problems are unsurprisingly complex, both in presentation and in potential solutions. Pettit – 
according to Schuppert at least – is ill-equipped to handle such complexity, especially in cases 
where “socially constructed illegitimate inequalities are perceived as unobjectionable natural 
inequalities and differences” (Schuppert 2015, 449). 
 
Structural domination thus seems a useful amendment to Pettit’s arguments, one which ties in 
neatly with the prospects of subservience and loss of discursive control. One major implication of 
its acceptance is to tie liberty to equality even tighter; while republican freedom, especially as Pettit 
argues it, necessitates social, political and some degree of economic equality (Pettit 2012 78-92, 
Pettit 2014, 80), adopting social egalitarianism’s critique of republicanism would make such 
 




equality even more demanding. Pettit’s proposed solutions, while helpful, would ultimately be 
insufficient. Lovett makes use of a similar criticism against Pettit, wherein he points out that any 
just economic distribution reduces personal and systematic non-domination, and hence distributive 
justice instrumentally serves the cause of republican liberty. Therefore, we are obliged to adopt “the 
operation of those political and social institutions or practices most likely, given our present 
knowledge and expectations, to minimize domination in the long run.” (Lovett 2009, 823). 
 
Lovett argues for universal basic income as a solution, in part because he views justice as 
procedural: “Notice here that the justice of a distribution is strictly procedural: it is a question of 
what the ‘ground rules,’ so to speak, of society should be, not the actual pattern of holdings arising 
from those rules per se.” (Lovett 2009, 823). Universal basic income would not, however, solve the 
problems social egalitarianism raises. It would be palliative, and certainly an improvement, but it 
would not be an effective solution in itself. Any such solution would need to secure stricter socio-
economic equality, following the logic of the previous section. It would need to prevent 
concentrations of power or socio-economic inequality that could threaten an individual’s status as a 
“free and equal person” (Schuppert 2015, 450-451), which is wholly incompatible with corporate 
power47. Lastly, such a solution would need to protect an individual’s status as a free person, in that 
it would need to address the potential loss of discursive control. Schuppert emphasises this prospect 








47  The relevance of this will be established shortly. 
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Section Three – Non-alienation, Marxist alienation, and the Socialist Critique 
 
Schuppert’s critique of non-domination does not end with structural or systemic domination. He 
also offers an account of alienation, which he holds that Pettit’s own definition of non-domination 
cannot address effectively, and which still seems to be a distinct problem for autonomy, if not 
liberty. As the thesis established in the first section that autonomy is a critical component of liberty, 
and we must maintain discursive control as optimally as possible, alienation of any kind is a 
considerable problem. This section discusses alienation, and in doing so, highlights numerous other 
concerns in the same vein, following a Marxist critique of Schuppert and the accompanying 
structural elements necessary to sustain it. It will be argued that the Marxist analyses of class, 
exploitation and power are not incompatible with a republicanism that allows for structural 
domination.  
 
Schuppert’s definition of alienation is as follows: 
 
“Alienation from oneself means that an agent fails to see herself as a legitimate source of claims 
and reasons, that is, the agent does not realize her capacity for freedom because of a range of 
autonomy-undermining experiences of misrecognition, powerlessness, voicelessness and exclusion.” 
 
He is keen to contrast this with non-domination, because an individual may be dominated but not 
alienated, or vice versa. Alienation attacks autonomous reasoning and self-respect, denying the 
basic agency – the fitness to be held responsible, to act with a clear goal and real identity – that 
Pettit rightfully recognises as a pre-condition for freedom (Schuppert 2015, 447). 
 




‘The principle of non-alienation holds that a society should protect all its members against social 
relationships and structures in which inequalities in power, status differences, institutional 
mechanisms, social practices or cultural artefacts lead to a person’s loss of self-respect or alienation 
from herself through the explicit or systematic disrespect of the affected person’s (or group’s) status 
as socially free and equal.’ 
 
(Schuppert 2015, 451) 
 
His reasoning for this partially descends from Pettit’s own eyeball test, and partially from various 
critiques of Pettit, most notably Garrau and Laborde, “namely, that misrecognition and structural 
forms of disrespect can impact on the vulnerable self” (Schuppert 2015, 451), and thus leads to a 
collapse of discursive control and individual autonomy; the agent is unable to actively to exert 
discursive control, or to return to Pettit’s earlier terminology, they will be unable to live up to their 
own legacy, as they will be constantly estranged from their own person (Schuppert 2015, 447, Pettit 
2001, 86-87). The thesis has already accepted that in order for a republican ideal of freedom to be 
coherently applied, society must allow for individual autonomy, as well as removing interpersonal 
and impersonal restraints. Pettit’s lack in this regard has also been established. Therefore, it makes 
sense to accept Schuppert’s critique here, as with structural domination. A distinction could also be 
usefully drawn between self-respect and self-esteem (McBride 2013, 63-67, 72-75, 128-130, Shelby 
2016, 98). We are not alienated if we are not socially honoured and lack public worthiness and 
advantage because of it. We are alienated if we no longer see ourselves as having any value at all. 
 
There are, however, certain problems. One of Pettit’s major concerns with non-limitation was the 
potential for coercion or manipulation if overall limitations for all were reduced (Pettit 2001, 131). 
Schuppert gives little indication as to how this principle should be expressed in society. Assume a 
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society with deep racial divisions manages, against probability, to elect a government eager to 
employ republican principles, and that this government has enough power to enact and enforce any 
new laws it wishes48. Some protections will be obvious – a ban on racial discrimination and 
segregation, the right to sue in cases of such discrimination in the workplace, the removal of old 
laws and stronger support for the social identity of the marginalised. This will do a great deal to 
protect against such alienation. Other elements of racism will be harder to remove. There may be 
unspoken assumptions of criminality, subtle but critical differences in treatment. Over time, these 
attitudes may lessen, but persistent racial tensions and conflicts within America – to give but a 
single major example – suggest otherwise. 
 
If we are to maximise non-domination and non-alienation, this presents us with three problems. 
First, the two may come into conflict, as the above paragraph’s example suggests;  in order to 
correct such sentiments and protect individuals from a constant encroachment of alienating social 
norms (Pettit and Brennan 2004, 268), the most effective methods involve both controlled 
interferences in the forms of laws and policy, and uncontrolled interferences such as requiring an 
individual to support practices they may find morally objectionable. These need not be mere racial 
prejudices, either. One may consider the example of a Cuban exile whose distrust and distaste for 
the communist regime leads them to reject almost all government intervention, no matter how well-
intentioned. 
 
Second, it is often unclear whether an action results from prejudice or not, and the threshold at 
which expectation becomes disrespect or condemnation of someone’s status as free and equal. For 
example, at what point does a stereotype of behaviour become a disrespectful one, and when should 
we be obliged (by the principle of non-alienation) to correct or suppress it? 
 
 
48  To forestall a potential objection, assume any law not consistent with republican principles would lack the internal support to be passed. 
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Third, Alvarez highlights a potential issue of “persistent minorities” in Democracy for Idiots 
(Alvarez 2016, 960-965). A group may be alienated in some way without it being obvious, or 
without any risk of accompanying domination. It is almost impossible to bring this into mainstream 
political debate; the legislation to address it would no longer be of a general and broadly 
“reasonable” (in the Rawlsian sense) kind, such as that already outlined, but highly specific. This 
situation may actually be worse when a minority is well-integrated, as their voices are dispersed, 
rather than acting as a singular bloc (Alvarez 2016, 960-965), creating tension between their 
identity, and presumable self-respect, and the ability to participate effectively in the democratic 
process. 
 
Schuppert’s view must therefore be carefully moderated. Alvarez’s solution is to accept the 
presence of those who wish to self-alienate49 as a distinctly political move. Such political idiocy 
would enable minorities to preserve their own self-respect and self-identity, at the cost of political 
capital and acknowledgement. 
 
A means of answering the first and second problems can be found in Lukes, with a nod to Rawls.  
(Lukes 2005, 134-151, Rawls 1999 140-148). Lukes argues that a great deal of prejudice and 
illegitimate claims are in relation to “false consciousness”, and the inability of individuals to 
articulate their interests in a clear manner. Rather than assuming their interests or the validity of 
their prejudices, we should reconcile individuals with the need to recognise and respect impartiality; 
transcending their immediate self-interest. Lukes suggests this can be done via  assessing one’s 
 
49  To ensure there is no confusion, Schuppert, Alvarez and later Marx all use alienation in substantially different ways. Self-alienation here 
means the adoption of permanent residence and “political idiocy”, rejecting “mandatory citizenship” (Alvarez 2016, 972). It will be referred to 
hereafter as political idiocy, in the sense Alvarez uses it, to avoid it being conflated with either Schuppertian or Marxist alienation. 
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opinions and personal self-interest as “a function of one’s explanatory purpose, framework, and 
methods, which in turn have to be justified.” (Lukes 2005, 148 & Thompson 2015, 450-459)50. 
In the context of Schuppertian alienation, Lukes’ justification argument can assist in two ways. 
Firstly, any policies, legislation and so on must be justified so they are impartial and reasonable 
(again, in the Rawlsian sense), ideally through consensus and discourse as favoured by Pettit (Pettit 
2001, 157). To be both impartial and reasonable, any policy must treat all individuals equitably, 
respect discursive control, and, provided individuals respect these first two conditions, refrain from 
interference that would be uncontrolled. In such circumstances, there may be rational reasons to 
distrust government legislation, or political support of some minority group, but it is easier to 
identify and disavow illogical or irrational objections. 
 
Secondly, it allows the consideration of individual conduct along similar lines. If an action would 
result in inequitable treatment or the disrespect of discursive control, then it should not be 
permissible. The threshold is not one which mere individual disrespect crosses. Even vile, 
unflattering stereotypes or racial slurs do not qualify, but the practical implementation of such 
biases would, as would language used to incite or dehumanise. 
 
This still meets Alvarez’s worry, however: persistent minorities, by their very nature, may find it 
difficult to promote such impartiality, and may be ignored in widespread debate. While political 
idiocy may serve in part, there are doubtless socio-political, sexual or racial minorities that have no 
desire to remove themselves from the common society; they wish to be embraced, not kept at arm’s 
length by their own doing or someone else’s. It is difficult to see how such idiocy could be 
sustained by a sexual minority, for example, but the prospect of being dehumanised and alienated is 
a definite risk for them. 
 
50 This also has the benefit, if accepted, of supporting Pettit’s logic re: Ulysses. For interference to be condemned as arbitrary or uncontrolled, 
it must be demonstrated that one’s interests are not wholly selfish and/or irrational, which is not a particularly stringent requirement. It certainly 




To this end, the thesis will accept the somewhat unpalatable conclusion that certain rights to free 
speech may be impeded to protect the self-respect of others, thus preserving overall discursive 
control. Ideally the rights and duties inherent in doing so could be enshrined in a constitution or 
legislation, but there is always the prospect of revanchism or uncontrolled interference. Should this 
be the case, political idiocy might be an effective remedy for certain groups, and one which could  
be acknowledged as a right in the same way. 
 
Another criticism of Schuppert is that his concept of alienation is incomplete. In particular, his 
definition lacks a: the possibility that a person could be alienated from themselves without being 
aware of it, and b: an understanding of alienation whereby the individual is alienated not by a lack 
of respect, but by a degradation of their very existence as a person. Rather than being cast as 
something inferior, the individual loses something vital about their humanity. If Schuppertian 
alienation entails an inability to live up to one’s own commitments (Pettit 2001, 82-90 ), then this 
kind of alienation entails that one cannot become a meaningful person in the first place – one is 
reduced to the status of an animal, with no goals beyond subsistence. Schuppert’s definition 
necessitates awareness of one’s plight. 
 
Marx’s definition of alienation includes both a and b. According to Marx, alienation arises out of 
the economic conditions in which mankind labours as a result of private property51 (Marx 1844). 
Because of the privation of these conditions, and especially because these privations only increase 
as an individual works harder to remove themselves from them, mankind are first alienated from 
their labour. Marx puts the point succinctly: “My work would be a free manifestation of life, hence 
an enjoyment of life. Presupposing private property, my work is an alienation of life, for I work in 
order to live, in order to obtain for myself the means of life. My work is not my life.” (Marx 1844, 
 
51  As opposed to personal property; see the explanation below. 
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Comment on James Mill.) While Marx gives this more seeming spirituality than the thesis might 
necessarily adopt, the concept is not intrinsically spiritual – human beings have a psychological 
need for accomplishment and productivity, a sense of creating or doing something of worth, that 
can easily be adopted in the same context (Hsee et al 2010, 928-929, Hsee & Yang 2019, 15-17, 
Norton et al 2012, 16-19). Labour purely to survive robs us of this vital feeling of accomplishment, 
of worth. While this is not a problem for Pettit’s definition of autonomy per se, it exacerbates the 
problems which come after. 
 
The second element of alienation more closely resembles Schuppert’s – because of so much of what 
we do is labour or work of some kind, when it is alienated from us in the above way and further 
estranged by being done for another’s behalf, it becomes repugnant to us - “mortification”, in 
Marx’s words. “As a result, man (the worker) only feels himself active in his animal functions – 
eating, drinking, procreating or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc;” (Marx 1973, 111). 
We might extend this “feeling himself” to leisure time, in the modern day. Still, says Marx, this 
estranges us from ourselves, devolving into mere producers and consumers. It is this aspect of 
Marxist alienation that deprives us of meaningful coherence in what we are, for our existence has 
no content. 
 
The third element of such Marxist alienation is that we are estranged from other men. Not only do 
we focus over-narrowly upon our “individual life” as opposed to our “life existence” and “species 
being”, but the fact that “man’s species nature is estranged from him means that one man is 
estranged from the other, as each of them is from man’s essential nature” (Marx 1973, 112-114). 
Thus, each person regards others not as beings like themselves, but competition, oppression, and 
hindrance52. This sense of competition is mentioned only briefly in Schuppert (Schuppert 2015, 
 
52  The traditional Marxist critique of rights and duties, a core component of republican thinking, has also criticised rights-based theories for 
encouraging individuals to focus on their individual roles and practice to the detriment of solidarity; a focus on their own gain and circumstances 
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449-450), and even there he mainly focuses on its indirect effects. This is surely a problem for him 
as well, however,  insofar as it makes the task of solving alienation still more difficult. 
 
The end result of such alienation is that the average worker is bestial in appetites and sentiments, 
locked in a perpetual state of competition with his peers and with those above or below him in the 
economic structure he inhabits. Such alienation is as toxic to discursive control as Schuppert’s loss 
of self-respect. It also seems to be an alienation in which those who are subjected to it may or may 
not be aware of their alienated status.  
 
Unlike Schuppert, however, Marx’s concept of alienation is highly dependent upon his 
understanding of class and private property, and his concept of exploitation. If it is intended to  
amend Schuppert’s definition of alienation, then the thesis must give an account of class, private 
property, exploitation, and the power that accompanies them. Such an account must not only 
support Marxist alienation, but it must also prove coherent when dealing with republican theory. 
The thesis will tackle this issue of compatibility throughout the remainder of the section. 
 
Marx’s views on private property inform his theories on class and exploitation, so it is sensible to 
begin with it. Marxist theory draws a distinction between personal property – individual goods or 
commodities for consumption – and private property, the latter consisting in the means of 
production, land, and capital. The means of production are things like tools, factories, and raw 
resources in bulk; land accounts not only in terms of the actual physical land itself but in the rent 
due on such land; and capital consists of liquid wealth, shares, loans and other such financial assets. 
Human capital, in terms of skills and people alike, is merely another commodity to be bought and 
sold,  (Marx 2008, 18-20, Marx 1867, etc). While Pettit supports the ownership of private property, 
 
over the common good. This thesis takes no particular stance on the issue, and the Marxist conceptions of alienation, private property, and class 
need not be attached to any communitarian critique of rights. 
 
86 
he does not make a distinction between the two as Marx does (Pettit 2014, 67-72, 85). For the sake 
of clarity, the thesis will adopt the Marxist terminology. Thus, it may be possible for individuals to 
have a very large amount of personal property but no private property. 
 
Marx’s understanding of class is closely related to his theory of historical materialism, but the latter 
need not be accepted for the former to be coherent. The thesis will, to avoid a digression, discuss 
the former and take no particular stand on the latter. Marx argues that in the post-industrial society, 
class arises out of the ownership of private property. Those who own it have social, political, and 
economic power; those without are forced to sell their labour, resulting either in a precarious 
existence, or outright wage-slavery (Engels 1847, Sections 7 & 8). Thus, the great masses of the 
people become the proletariat; those with capital or land become the bourgeoisie. There are other 
classes, in Marx’s view, and there is the prospect for stratification: the lumpenproletariat and 
aristocracy are examples of the first, and one can readily distinguish between the interests of a 
foreman and the workmen he oversees. But these are insignificant in the long run, from Marx’s 
viewpoint. 
 
In the more modern era, such sweeping class distinctions only make sense under considerable strain, 
although Piketty argues that we are rapidly approaching similar socio-economic conditions to 
Marx’s own time (Piketty 2014, 20-27)53. Even so, a large proportion of the United States’ 
wealthiest gain their income from wages, not just capital and the management thereof. Stratification 
of the labour market has resulted in a dizzying array of jobs, payments and interests. The globalised 
nature of the world economy has introduced further complexity. It is plausible to speak of a global 
proletariat; it is also plausible to speak of wage-slavery on a grand scale. 
 
 




The term predates Marx, and hearkens back to older, “labour republican” (Gourevitch 2013, Claeys 
1994, 252-257, etc) texts. Marxist and republican usage differ, by time as much as anything else. 
For such labour republicans it is a loss of economic independence, and submission to the will of 
another – wages represented a threat, one to be fought off with co-operation, averting structural 
domination (Gourevitch 2013, 595-598, Anderson 2017, 35-36). Marxist usage draws upon this in 
spirit, but Marx’s concern is twofold. First, by being placed into a position whereby their labour is 
sold for survival, the worker’s labour becomes a commodity. He is thus less well-treated even than 
a slave, who is a paradigm case for subservience and domination, because a slave is property, and 
represents to some degree an investment. The worker is replaceable from day to day, and is owned 
by the entire spectrum of those he would bargain for (Marx 1847). This is a key component of 
alienation, to be discussed later. It also broadens the conflict to one of class antagonisms, as 
opposed to individual workers or groups thereof. Second, Marxist wage-slavery accurately denotes 
that the division of property and the division of labour guarantee this in perpetuity. It is not possible 
to oppose it by trade-unionism or the like alone, nor does an improvement in living conditions 
which does not secure for the workers the opportunity to work on their own terms actually remove 
it; even the cooperatives Gourevitch suggests (Gourevitch 2013, 597) are palliative.  An illustrative 
example of their distinctions can be shown in attitudes towards self-employment; under the labour 
republican account, self-employment would avert their concerns, in the main. For Marx, it is mostly 
irrelevant – the self-employed remain in a position where their labour must be sold, and even an 
enlightened employer is, in some way, exploitative. 
 
The Marxist usage is probably more accurate to a post-industrial revolution capitalism, but the 
republican usage does highlight a particular republican difficulty with the wage economy. No man 
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can be the ruler of himself when he is dependent upon the good graces of another simply not to 
starve54. 
 
A more insidious problem, and one which the republican tradition emphasises over the Marxist one, 
is that of social status. For Marx, economic power confers status.  Yet in the modern day, there are 
no small number of people for whom the reverse is true; by amassing rapid societal approval, it is 
possible to market and monetise one’s own self. Celebrity culture allows personalities like Arnold 
Schwarzenegger to turn a film career into business capital and finally a political position. He is by 
no means the most egregious example. 
 
We might therefore be more tempted to refer to Max Weber. Weber’s account of class and power is 
very different; indeed, he notes that “the emergence of economic power may be the consequence of 
power existing on other grounds” (Weber Archive, 9.6). Class situation remains “ultimately market 
situation”. But no true sentiment or class interest or class consciousness arises; what arises are 
reactions, which may share common trends in forms of “mass behaviour” (Gane 2005, 215-217, 
Weber Archive 9.6), but which give no sense of belonging or group identity. He distinguishes this 
from status, contrasting the American and German approach of businessmen towards their (class) 
inferiors; “it would be considered strictly repugnant – wherever the old tradition still prevails – if 
even the richest boss, while playing billiards or cards in his club would not treat his clerk as in 
every sense fully his equal” (Weber Archive, 9.6), to be contrasted with the German’s socially 
conscious (and paternalistic) benevolence55. Weber also differs by suggesting that status comes first; 
from this, social and economic monopolies soon spring:  
 
 
54  Both republican and Marxist wage-slavery are exacerbated by the “Great Money Trick” (Tressell 1914, chapter 21); when wages, rent and 
jobs all depend on the same class, who also profit from the sold goods and squeeze the workers at each stage, the sheer hypocrisy of claiming 
markets embody freedom, or that freedom to sell one’s labour is a guarantee of freedom (Nozick 2013 149-174, Mises 1998, 238-244, 279-285) 
is even more acute. This is discussed further in chapter three, section four. 
55 He also discusses party affiliations, but these are of relatively little interest to the arguments here, save to note their theorised and 
observable tendency to turn bureaucratic (Gane 2005, 220). 
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“For all practical purposes, stratification by status goes hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal 
and material goods or opportunities… With an increased closure of the status group, the 
conventional preferential opportunities for special employment grow into a legal monopoly of 
special offices for the members. Certain goods become objects for monopolization by status groups, 
typically, entailed estates, and frequently also the possession of serfs or bondsmen and, finally, 
special trades.” 
 
(Weber Archive, 9.6) 
 
Setting power to one side, to be discussed later, Weber offers a more complex theory, but one which 
helps to explain the more complex nature of modern society, and thus may appeal more than the 
orthodox Marxist viewpoint (Burris 1987, 67). As Burris takes pains to explain, however, the 
Weberian account exists primarily as a theory of social action (Burris 1987, 69-72), and this too 
seems incomplete. Burris’ account of later Marxist thought suggests a synthesis is possible, where 
both the structure of society – and its accompanying demands – and the “fractional divisions within 
classes”, the narrower details, must be considered (Burris 1987, 86-87). 
 
The end result is to consider “class” as much a matter of socio-political primacy as economic, and 
for the possibility of there being subdivisions within the Marxist proletariat and bourgeois based on 
these divisions (Olin Wright 2015, 13-14). One might consider the distinction between the 
“Nouveau Riche” and “Old Money” as being exactly this sort of social snobbery, despite effectively 
identical economic identities. But this does not mean we must embrace the Weberian apparatus 
entirely. Weberian analysis does not focus on class antagonisms, and instead focuses upon 
distribution and its effects on life-outcomes. Moreover, Weber does not believe such classes, and 
their interests, must perpetually be at odds (R Breen 2005, 32-24), nor does he account for 
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exploitation. There is a distinction in their views on the “long term trajectory” of capitalism (Olin 
Wright 2015, 38-39). 
 
For, again following Piketty and the vast swathes of evidence available56, inequality in many 
modern societies ensures that these divisions are mere taxonomies of the proletariat. There is an 
overwhelming majority who owns nothing, a smaller, rising gradient who own a little, and a 
handful who own increasingly vast amounts. The varying status differences mean very little in this 
context. Marx’s own definition of class lacks much account of social power. This does not mean 
that he was fundamentally wrong, merely incomplete. On this account, favoured by the thesis, 
economic class defines one’s position in society as the first and fundamental step. But social 
statuses of race, orientation, personal property and income, old money vs nouveau riche, etc, stratify 
and run through  the class structure like veins of ore through rock. These divisions transcend class, 
and need to be taken into account. Fundamentally, class is about where one stands in relation to the 
means of production, and not distribution. Piketty’s analysis is troubling not simply because of the 
problems of distribution, but because it makes it clear that society never achieved control of 
production even during the “belle epoque”, etc. Because social status intersects with class, it can 
lead to problems Marx did not consider; Weber’s example of American businessmen and labourers 
is exactly this. And the need for recognition can obscure the need for redistribution, besides, which 
the thesis discusses now. 
 
This understanding of class and status can shore up a particular facet of Schuppertian versus 
Marxist alienation. In Redistribution or Recognition, Nancy Fraser argues – in contrast to 
Honneth’s view in the same book – that unjust distribution and unjust recognition go hand in hand, 
although the two are not the same. She argues for a perspectival dualism, where each instance of 
 
56 OECD data (OECD Inequality), UN data (UN 2018) CIA world factbook, (CIA.gov, World Factbook) and so on. 
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such must be unpacked into its separate components (Fraser & Honneth 2003, 60-94, 218 )57. This 
can be readily applied to alienation and class in the same way – almost every element of Marxist 
class struggle also involves some element of struggle for recognition, and his account of alienation 
is at least as much concerned with the dehumanising nature of the work as its complete severance of 
the rewards and fulfilment due to the worker. Weber’s concept of social status works in reverse; 
social status is at the very least helpful to amassing economic privilege. Schuppert’s view of 
alienation is concerned mostly with this lack of recognition and respect. If Marxist concerns about 
class and distribution are addressed simultaneously with Schuppert’s concerns about self-respect 
and republican concerns about discursive control, then both recognition and redistribution are 
achievable for the new theory58. This would seem ideal. 
 
Power and exploitation, for Marxist theory, go hand in hand. Unfortunately, Marxist exploitation 
has come under severe criticism to the point that there are not only competing definitions of what 
constitutes exploitation (Marx’s original view, Cohen, Roemer, Reiff etc – the Stanford 
Encyclopedia page (Stanford, Exploitation)  has quite the range) but that it simply does not exist in 
a properly run economy (Hoppe 1993, 86-90), a view which is not endorsed by the thesis 
(Zafirovski 2003, 462-684). Defining it in traditional Marxist terms additionally requires an 
understanding of the labour theory of value (Whitaker, 22-32, Marx 1912, 145-202), which remains 
contested and is considered disproven (von Böhm-Bawerk 1949, etc), at least following most 
modern economic theorists. To cover the intricacies of this topic in sufficient detail might take an 
entirely separate thesis. 
  
Understanding alienation without some view of exploitation is difficult, however. It is precisely 
because the worker, in Marx’s view, is deprived of the value (both in economic and in self-
 
57  This argument is revisited in chapter five, section two. 
58  It should also be noted that Fraser’s correctness is not entirely necessary for this to be intelligible; it merely helps to explain the seeming 




realisation terms) of his labour that he is alienated from it; it is by the process of exploitation that he 
is so deprived. A different approach may be required; does republicanism have a concept of 
exploitation? 
 
Pettit offers no such account. Vrousalis, however, offers a definition of exploitation that – while 
differing from the standard Marxist accounts – makes use of the same terminology and very similar 
principles, which he states in the paper Exploitation, Vulnerability, and Social Domination 
(Vrousalis 2013, 8). Vrousalis argues that material inequality and exploitation are distinct; 
exploitation is when one’s economic vulnerability is utilised to obtain one’s labour, or the fruits 
thereof (Vrousalis 2013, 6). He does not use Pettit’s account of domination (Vrousalis 2013, 7-10) 
but his account is entirely compatible with it. Vrousalis concludes that exploitation is itself a kind of 
domination (Vrousalis 2013, 11), which may be individual or class-based. This distinction is worth 
drawing because a class-based exploitation/domination, which is systemic in nature, may lead to an 
individual, personal alienation, although the individual may not be personally dominated59.  The 
thesis will endorse Vrousalis’ account, amended for Pettit’s definition of domination, as an 
understanding of exploitation. While not explicitly Marxist, it allows for a class-based account of 
exploitation and domination (Vrousalis 2013, 10-11) which Pettit lacks and which is necessary for 
an intelligible account of Marxist alienation. Usefully, it also continues the “Neo-Marxist Synthesis” 
between Weber, Marx, and Pettit (Burris 1987, 79-82), as Vrousalis draws upon and expounds 
concepts mutually intelligible to all three. The end result is that the understanding of domination 
and class outlined here is explicitly Marxist, in that it focuses upon “patterns of exploitation and 
domination” as opposed to simple distribution and life chances (Olin Wright 2005, 23-28). 
 
Two further points are worth considering. To forestall any objections in that vein, the thesis argues 
that just as collective subjects can be free or un-free, dominated or un-dominated, collective 
 
59  Without such a distinction, any case of alienation would be a case of domination, and no additional principle would be necessary.  
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subjects can also be exploited. It is unclear whether they can be alienated, but if all members of a 
given group are alienated – if to be alienated is a pre-condition of being part of the group – it would 
seem absurd to argue that the group as a whole remains un-alienated. Following Pettit’s logic (Pettit 
2001, 115-123), such a group can be exploited in the same way as an individual60. Some collectives 
are, equally, fit to be held responsible for their actions (Pettit 2017, 1-23), especially if they are 
what Pettit calls conversable61. 
 
Additionally, this kind of exploitation and ensuing domination should be of particular concern to 
republicans, as it allows for greater and greater distortions of economic power, privilege, and 
(in)vulnerability. Without some form of redistribution towards the poor – a redistribution that 
unfettered capitalism and a totally deregulated62 market does not provide – social mobility becomes 
crippled, wealth becomes stagnant and inherited, and domination easily ensues between those with 
wealth (and the power to match), and those without. 
 
What then is power? For Marx, all political power springs from economic power, from the 
“dominant material relations” (Marx 2007, 64). Any “ruling ideas” spring from the same source 
(Marx 2007, 64). Depending on the division of property and labour, the class with the greater sum 
inevitably exerts socio-political power, and this translates to legal and  ideological power. And this 
power is inevitably protected and sustained by the class structure about itself (Palermo 2007, 548-
556), and parts of its apparatus (Miller 1984, 106-108). Later writers in the Marxist tradition have 
extended this further. Gramsci argues for a cultural hegemony, in that the ruling class not only 
exerts power in structuring society, but maintains power through presenting an ideology where 
 
60  This is separate, but compounded by, Cohen’s arguments regarding collective unfreedom: if it is possible for any given individual to 
become un-exploited, but their un-exploitation requires that the remainder (or the vast majority) remain exploited, the group of individuals as a 
whole remains exploited, to recap. 
61  A Marxist argument could be made at this point for the conversability of classes, arguing that bourgeois political parties speak for the 
ideology of the bourgeois as such, but this is not necessary for the thesis’ arguments. A class may not be a free agent in Pettit’s sense, even on a 
collective level, but such a class could still exist and still be a major component of systemic domination, which obviously requires no particular 
agent to occur. 
62  There has never been a market without any regulations or rules whatsoever, but the presence of government or social regulation has a 
demonstrable trend towards controlling inequality (Calderon & Chong 2009, 65-79,  Doerrrenberg & Peichl 2014, 1-21) 
 
94 
these structures are natural, beneficial for all, etc. Such ideological justification helps to obscure the 
true nature of these structures – that they are artificial, primarily beneficial to the ruling economic 
class, ruling social group, etc. It is not as straightforward as the ruling class simply handing values 
down to their “inferiors”, although they do provide “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gramsci 
1999, 212).  
 
 
Instead, unlike Marx, Gramsci argues for an “organic ideology” (Ramos 1982, S1-2), disparate 
elements are wedded into the ruling class’ interests and unified – not coerced, but co-opted. Thus 
Gramsci’s view is better able to explain the many divergent schools of thought and what seem to be 
political setbacks for the bourgeoisie. Useful opinions are not handed down but rather brought into 
the fold; defence of the status quo becomes praiseworthy and quietly claimed as their own (Ramos 
1982, S2). Thus, we cannot simply think of the state – and its interests – as handing down their 
ruling ideas onto civil society, which will instead be influenced in part by their ideas, with others 
arising spontaneously. Of these ideas, the ruling hegemony will corrupt whatever they can into 
additional defences and justifications. Consider editorial decisions towards media from their 
corporate owners, scholarships offered by millionaires for anti-taxation economic research, or even 
the “prosperity theology” popular in the United States. Gramsci makes use of a metaphor of ditches 
and earthworks wherein the state is merely the outer and most difficult defence. This metaphor 
seems perhaps confused, but the overall sentiment remains valid:  the hegemony as a whole must be 
overcome to  enact revolutionary change and society provides considerable socio-political support 
to the state, by justification and otherwise (Egan 2014, 522-523, 532-535). Political power therefore 
does not simply spring from economic power, but from the ability to parlay that into greater and 
greater social control, which in a vicious cycle, justifies the economic power and status quo63.  
 
63  The Marxist account described here is not uncontested. Weber himself defines power as “ the ability of an individual or group to achieve 




Lukes argues that there are “three faces of power” - the making of decisions, the deliberate non-
making of decisions, and ideological power in a similar fashion to Gramsci (Lukes 2005, 28-48). 
The two views are thus complimentary. Each of these three faces of power can be applied 
economically, or socio-politically, to achieve a culture – “an ideological unity of a whole social 
bloc” (Bates 1975, 351) favourable to the rulers without them ever lifting a finger. 
 
They do this by exerting themselves in the “iron hand” of political organisation and state apparatus 
(Pettit & Brennan 2004, 246, 255-256) when necessary, but more frequently in intellectual and 
media control64 whereby their interests are defended as natural, eternal, and justified. Hegemony 
directs one to the invisible and intangible hands (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 245-246, 255-257) which 
have much the same effect. The “free marketplace of ideas” and communication in general is easily 
captured, because as a marketplace, those with the greatest economic power to support their ideas 
tend to win. In the intangible hand, it is easy to cast those unfavourable to the status quo as 
unfavourable altogether. The individuals who support this are not necessarily part of the ruling class, 
but are propped up by them and given a platform. They thereby “secure the “free” consent of the 
masses” (Bates 1975, 353). 
 
For clarity, one should avoid thinking of current capitalism and the thinkers who support it as a wall, 
which must be knocked down or climbed over by new ideas, and which the bourgeois class will 
defend – possibly through violent means. Instead,  it would be better to think in terms of constantly 
shifting webs or nets, which are produced by many different intellectual positions. As soon as one 
 
definition (Lumen), which again means  a conflict with Marxist thought. Lukes points out in his discussion of  Marx and Gramsci’s concepts of 
hegemony that Gramsci’s account relies on “privileged access”, that Marxism does not explain how its thinkers are able to see “real interests” when 
others do not (Lukes 2005, 144-145). Lukes also points out the “dogmatism” inherent in Marxist accounts. Lastly, there are concerns that by 
conflating the ruling class with the ruling government of a given state, Marxism obscures the often substantial differences between the two (Miliband 
1983, 63-76). This may only be more pronounced in an age of global capital, absent a global state, though one might claim in turn that this only 
shows a “triumph” of capitalism. To attend to all such challenges is beyond the scope of this thesis – indeed, a proper account of the concept of power 
in Marxism might require several volumes more. 
64  An issue to which the thesis returns in chapter three, in support of this exact point. 
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net is torn apart, another is cast over the individual (Bates 1975, 353-354). This is combined with 
the sheer exhaustion and futility of daily life: when one is concerned primarily with survival, one 
has little time to think about change. When one is systematically disrespected, one also loses the 
will to change things. This is why many dispossessed or disrespected groups are still further ground 
down, despite having the most reason to seek to change the current hegemony, thus fuelling 
Schuppertian alienation. 
 
This can be adjusted in accordance with the previously adopted views from Weber and Vrousalis; 
there may be multiple, overlapping “ruling ideas”, which may come into conflict. An example may 
be the tensions between evangelical Christianity and financial interests in the United States. 
Likewise, there may be social movements which do not threaten the ruling status quo per se, and 
which can therefore be accepted. This is not enough, however, because as Gramsci notes (Lears 
1985, 574-578), these ideas simply result into a divided, compartmentalised consciousness. Without 
opposition to the ruling hegemony as a hegemony, the discourse is inevitably rerouted to favourable 
ground, or even taken into the opposing ideological “space”, resulting in contradictory ideas. No 
sooner has opposition arisen than it is co-opted, with rare exceptions (Lears 1985, 577-579, 581), or 
else crushed. Disparate ideas serve little chance of genuine change, and as such, they only need to 
be opposed with great force when they show such signs. Otherwise, a benevolent neglect, a quiet 
scoffing of impracticality, is sufficient.  
 
Ideological power must therefore be distinguished from economic power. It would not be sufficient 
to address the former alone, because ideological power A: props up the current economic power 
(Fontana 1993, 27-44, esp 32-33), and B: would serve as a method for the ruling classes, if 
displaced, to return to a position of influence, if not checked.  To put it another way, social status 
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provides opportunities to become part of the true, economic elite65, and ideological power is the 
expression of that status. 
 
Marx’s original critique would have posed something of a problem; because the thesis has already 
argued that class is not purely a matter of economic position, the theory would become somewhat 
incoherent. However, with the addition of ideological power, the view of class in the thesis is 
compatible with the more developed Marxist view on power which follows Gramsci.  On such an 
account, while economic power is of primary importance, the social power exerted is still 
problematic because it can accomplish numerous ends for the status quo – especially backed by said 
economic power66. Worse still, it obscures the artificial nature of that economic and social power, 
by acting as justification that may seem detached from it. 
 
Pettit, by contrast, has a much more contained view. In Republicanism, he includes an appendix 
which contains a schema relating to power; he states that conceptions of power make different 
decisions at different choice points in the schema. 
 
 “1: Power is possessed by an agent (person/group/agency) OR by a system. 2: so far as that entity 
exercises OR is able (actually or virtually) to exercise. 3: intentional OR non-intentional influence. 
4: negative OR positive. 5: in advancing any kind of result whatever OR, more specifically, in 
helping to construct certain forms of agency OR shape the choices of certain agents” (Pettit 1997, 
79). 
 
Pettit defines dominating power as an agent (individual or corporate) that is (actually) able to 
exercise intentional influence of a negative, damaging kind, in shaping what other people do (Pettit 
 
65  Or at least to suckle and feed upon them like a parasite (Galbraith 1992). 
66   The criticism of “millionaires being paid by billionaires” to propagate ideas favourable to them (Talking Points 2019) is of just this kind. 
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1997, 79). Two points merit attention. First, with Schuppert’s critique of structural/systemic 
domination, the conception of power Pettit should endorse, and which the thesis endorses, involves 
an agent and/or a system on the first choice. Second, the Marxist conception of power would, if run 
through the same schema, thereafter neatly match up to this new conception with one important 
disagreement, this being number five67. 
 
This disagreement is not irreconcilable. It would be reasonable to concede that there may be many 
forms of power which are not a concern on normative grounds. For example, control of the means 
of production signifies that one has the power to destroy such means of production. Such a power 
dominates no-one in the process, but it is still a kind of power and authority.  The concern for the 
thesis is clearly limited to power which results in domination. 
 
The thesis will endorse a view of class as fundamentally Marxist with acknowledgement to social 
status as an important “trump” in conflicts, of private property in the strictly Marxist sense, of 
exploitation following Vrousalis, and power in both the broad (Marxist) and narrow (dominating) 
senses. Such are intelligible both to republican and Marxist theory. The thesis’ principle of non-
alienation is therefore the following: 
 
“A society should protect its members against socio-economic relationships and structures in which 
inequalities in power/wealth/property, status differences, institutional mechanisms, social practices, 
cultural artefacts or economic competition lead to a person’s loss of self-respect or alienation from 
the value of their work, humanity or discursive relationships through the explicit or systematic 
disrespect of the affected party’s status as socially free and equal, or through the attendant economic 
vulnerability such relationships and structures permit.” 
 
67  There may be an argument as to whether Marx, or succeeding Marxist theories (Gramsci, etc) allow for non-intentional usage of power. 
This is somewhat hamstrung, however, by the assumption of class-based domination and control, and in Gramsci’s case, cultural hegemony. The 
bourgeois are unlikely to be unaware they are bourgeois, and the systems they construct (or support the construction of, following Gramsci) are 




Armed with a philosophically thicker concept of alienation, and the quasi-Marxist conceptual 
framework to support it, the thesis will now consider if there are any inequalities in power, 
differences in status, etc, which plague, as but one example, the United Kingdom. A moment’s 
reflection suggests that there are a legion of such alienating factors, but they are not all equally 
pressing. In an ideal world, all such factors would be removed, but lamentably, we do not inhabit 
such an ideal world – as with government power, any given society will be more or less alienating, 
and preferable to the degree in which it is less so. 
 
With that in mind, the most alienating factors should presumably be addressed first, to minimise the 
harms involved, following Pettit’s consequentialist logic (Pettit 1997, 97-102). This can be judged 
in much the same way as Pettit argues; just as domination with interference and frustration is worse 
than domination with interference, but no frustration, which is in turn worse than domination 
without either (Pettit 2012, 68), an alienating factor will be more harmful to the extent it allows for 
more kinds and more severity of alienation. Exact precision is unnecessary; where a given factor 
falls may differ from person to person, but an overall picture can be constructed that serves to 
address a majority of alienating factors and/or entities. 
 
This picture is incomplete, however, without considering the effect of power. Pettit distinguishes 
between dominium and imperium, private and public power. Both must be safeguarded against 
(Pettit 2011, 2014). Following Gramsci, one may often inform the other, and both are troublesome. 
Most alienating factors will have private power, but presumably, all other factors of severity being 




The thesis will focus on one factor of alienation in particular. It is severely harmful – it accounts for 
both the Marxist and Schuppertian ideas of alienation, in many different ways. It also makes use of 
public power, both in terms of drawing upon actual government power, and in exerting power akin 
to a government’s, being inescapable, coercive on a broad and institutional scale68, and being 
dominating to the extent that individuals have no voice, no authorial or editorial control over it 
(Pettit 2001, 153-156). This factor is what Hegel called “the rabble rich” (Hardimon 1994, 236-250, 
note footnote 8 on page 238), those whose wealth and power have arisen through the capitalist 
system, and who have parlayed that wealth and power into control, coercion, and domination. 
 
Further detail is required for this view to be coherent. Pettit acknowledges material inequality’s 
harm, as previously mentioned, and highlights corporate entities as potentially troublesome for 
freedom (Pettit 2014, 90-93), given their rights and powers. Pettit’s solution will be discussed later 
in the thesis, but his discussion of such corporate domination is incomplete. He is right to be wary 
of corporate domination and power: corporations have corrupted governments and their apparatus 
(Caro & Ortega 2012, 48, Lawrence 2018 2-20), waged what amount to private wars in the 
developing world, sometimes via proxies (Montague 2002, 103-117), sometimes not (BBC 2012, 
Rajak 2016),69 trampled the rights of indigenous populations (Jenkins & Yakovleva 2006 275, 
Miranda 2007 651-672) and so on. It is clear that a vital restraint is needed, and that government 
authority currently does not provide it to a sufficient degree. This too will be discussed later. If 
Vrousalis and the Marxist tradition are right, however, there may be systemic exploitation, and thus 
domination, on a larger and more general scale. Private interests, such as Pettit identifies, produce 
significant individual domination, and it is this that he has correctly identified as a threat. Such 
private interests also further the goals of a protected and entrenched class, however, creating 
privileges of wealth and power, and generating class-based antagonisms which are inherently 
 
68  Though also, as with government power, allowing for conditions ripe for personal domination, e.g.: a politician using government funds to 
silence critics, an executive abusing his position in his company to dominate a secretary. 
69  This is without Anderson’s account of most capitalist enterprises as authoritarian dictatorships themselves (Anderson 2017, 40). 
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against the principle of non-alienation as the thesis defines it, being hostile to discursive control and 
self-respect, and exploiting economic vulnerability (Marx 2007, 52-57). 
 
A much more extensive discussion is needed, and supplied in chapter three. A recap of chapter two 
thus far would be helpful before we proceed. Beginning from Pettit’s own discussions of discursive 
control, autonomy, and his proposed system of government and just distributions of wealth, it was 
argued that non-domination, to ensure freedom, requires the socio-political support of autonomy, 
and its lack was considered sufficient for un-freedom, despite Pettit’s concerns about overreach. It 
was then argued that Pettit’s theorising failed to account for the possibility of systemic or structural 
domination, and that a form of social egalitarianism, following Schuppert, would be more desirable 
and better preserving of individual autonomy, allowing each individual to have security and 
“insulation”, to use Pettit’s terminology (Pettit 2014, 89-98). Schuppert’s own understanding of 
alienation was critiqued in this last section, necessitating a mixed conception of both Schuppertian 
and Marxist alienation. The latter was then supported via a mixed theory of class and class interests, 
and a theory of power and exploitation following Vrousalis, Pettit and Marx. Finally, it was argued 
that if such class-based systemic domination is possible, then the greatest threat in terms of 
alienation, domination and economic exploitation is that of private economic interests – not only in 
terms of corporate domination as Pettit terms it, but in terms of the system as a whole, as it is far 
more equipped to take advantage of ideological power. 
 
Alienation thus is best understood as a blend of Schuppertian and Marxist kinds, both highlighting 
the loss of discursive control through the means of socio-economic inequalities and especially the 
coercive power of certain social relationships. In particular, those from authority – the prospect of 
institutional prejudice and societal coercion from Schuppert, and employment and the system of 
capitalist labour from Marxist. It would be a mistake to think that this blend must apply in each and 
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every instance of alienation. Rather, they are closely connected and one often informs the other. 
Individuals are alienated when subjected to either kind, and one’s situation is particularly awful 
when subjected to both. 
 
The most important element of the chapter’s overall conclusion thus far is that republicanism must 
be expanded if it is to fully realise freedom. It must allow for autonomy as part of said freedom. It 
must account for all the myriad ways of domination. And it must especially allow for the Marxist 
critique of wage-slavery, alienation and abuse of power, springing from inequality. It is clear that 
Pettit’s theory is insufficient. Instead of expressive egalitarianism and loose material equality, the 
thesis proposes that a “neo-republican” theory should incorporate the critique of Schuppert and the 
Marxist tradition and impose the aforementioned strict material equality. Doing so, and allowing for 
the equitable treatment of citizens, would do much to support the principle of non-alienation. As 
such, the thesis will draw a distinction between the republicanism of Pettit and Skinner, and the 
neo-republican theory that it proposes, drawing upon socialist and egalitarian thought. 
 
The next chapter will focus on corporate power as Pettit presents it, and make a much more detailed 
case for its systemic domination as briefly sketched here. Before that, however, there is another 
potential departure from Pettit to consider. Pettit’s arguments, and those of the thesis and Schuppert 
following him, have followed the mostly implicit consequentialism outlined by Pettit. Section four 
considers arguments against that consequentialist ethos.
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Section Four – Consequentialism and the Priority of Liberty 
 
Earlier, the thesis noted Pettit’s consequentialist approach for the implementation of non-
domination. If a new republican theory of freedom is being advanced, one which considers 
structural/systemic domination and the need for a built-in egalitarianism, then Pettit’s 
consequentialism should be critiqued. It is also worth considering the republican approach of liberty 
holding priority on all other “primary goods” (Rawls 1973, 62, 92-94)70.  
 
To recap, Pettit requires that a government generally try to produce and protect freedom, although 
not at any cost; the requirement is not of maximisation, but the guidance of a specific goal, over a 
specific methodology (Pettit 2001, 129, Pettit 2012, 123-124). Likewise, the principle of non-
domination is supposedly well-served by consequentialism (Pettit 1997, 101), as it allows the state 
to “promote (by) those means, whatever they are, that prove empirically most effective.” One might 
draw comparisons to Mill’s remarks in On Liberty that a mingling of free thinkers was better 
precisely because individuals, governments and groups could experiment and debate towards the 
best possible outcome, resulting in better societies overall (Mill 1974, 94-100). Pettit is thus broadly 
consequentialist, subject to certain ironclad rules which ought not to be broken, e.g.: to give citizens 
equal value and respect by the law, and so on. It is consequentialism with a hard base. 
 
Pettit’s consequentialism has further use, with one argument that he embraces, and another that I 
think he has overlooked. Pettit also notes that “as a consequentialist philosophy, republicanism is 
not dogmatic or doctrinaire.” (Pettit 1997, 147). This might be considered a mere continuation of 
the former argument, but that would misjudge Pettit’s point. He remains steadfastly committed to 
general principles, not specific requirements. This too can be found in his expressive egalitarianism, 
which does not insist on any particular pattern (Pettit 2014, 100). While as argued previously there 
 
70  Rawls’ position is worth noting because he too insists on a “serial order” whereby liberty takes priorities even over “greater social and 
economic advantages” (Rawls 1973, 61).This too has been subject to a great many critiques, as helpfully listed by RS Taylor (Taylor 2003, 247). 
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are reasons to be more specific in its approach, republicanism allows for the incorporation of other 
elements as they serve its normative goals or political aspirations. This flexibility allows us to speak 
intelligibly of a republican socialism, or even a republican polity that draws on Marxist aspirations. 
Marx may criticise the errant focus on rights and “bourgeois freedoms” (Marx 2008, Ch 2) that 
republicanism encourages, but Marx himself established a conception of freedom and justice, and if 
each can supplement the other, it would be better to avoid such dogmatism (Van der Veen 1984, 
106-123, Blackledge 2012, 71-78). 
 
Another argument for a consequentialist approach lies in justifying the scale of change required. As 
the thesis examines in detail in the last chapter, Pettit’s democratic requirements are extensive, and 
not observed in full by any democracy on the planet. A democracy should not have to conform to 
all of them perfectly to be free, and the expressions of them will change and shift, with different 
rules and policies. This is well within the limits of experimentation. Testing such policies and 
norms will  require potentially quite extensive political change. Experience has shown that such 
change can lead to instability and a reactionary backlash. An example of such can be seen in the 
immediate history of France after its revolution in 1793; a repeated cycle of liberalisation and 
authoritarian coercion can be noted. To change a government which, may appear to be perfectly 
democratic, effective, and legitimate, yet which undeniably fails to protect the individual liberty of 
its citizens, may not be achievable without an approach outside the democratic norms and methods 
Pettit espouses as a result. The alternative would be to cling to these norms on a personal level 
while remaining ineffectual in accomplishing societal change, making the philosophy somewhat 
self-defeating. It would be ideal to remain within the boundaries of democratic discourse, but if it is 




One potential criticism was raised earlier in the chapter, in that a deontological approach may prove 
more secure, e.g.: a government should act such that it never permits or increases domination, and 
wherever possible, ensures that no domination occurs, rather than specifically promoting freedom. 
Directly against the pragmatism argument, this objection holds that granting large-scale powers 
must always be considered carefully, as the potential harms involved outweigh the gains. For 
example, if the state is obliged to support non-domination at any cost, does this justify the use of 
coercive tactics and intimidation against an (internally) repressive minority, for the “greater good” 
of individual liberty? The thesis will refer to this as the restraining objection. In part, this was 
accepted with regards to autonomy; due to major issues in identifying the “real will” of the 
individual, instead external and unchosen impediments were to be, ideally, pruned away. 
 
Against the restraining objection, freedom and autonomy are not identical, though both have 
relational elements under republican theory (Pettit 2001, 177-179, Railton in Scheffler 1988, 108). 
The relationships in question, however, are very different. Discursive control can be threatened in 
either case, and non-domination from it. But the hostile relationships towards autonomy are 
frequently much harder to determine, often due to their ambiguity, one of the key reasons Pettit is 
sceptical of autonomy’s value as a political ideal. Acting to expand autonomy inside the individual 
requires psychological guidance that it makes little sense to speak of in maximising terms. 
 
If this is insufficiently persuasive, one might also draw upon Pettit’s concerns for practical political 
guidance and point out that minimising threats to autonomy is quite feasible; one need address 
deliberate efforts to obfuscate, deceive, or stifle political debate. Legislation to this effect could be 
enacted. To maximise autonomy would require a vast commitment to psychological infrastructure, 
however; quite apart from the difficulties in envisaging this, the end result would be a classic case 
of a tyranny of the majority. It would be impossible, to form an agreement on a desired end result 
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that upheld Pettit’s requirements of equal and equitable treatment. Freedom, following Berlin’s 
characterisation of the absence of obstruction, and Pettit’s as the absence of invasive and alien 
interference, along with subservience71, is more easily defined, and the limits more cleanly drawn 
with less psychological confusion. 
 
There are other criticisms, however. Two key objections are raised by McBride: first, that Pettit 
could be equally well served by a Kantian contractualism, and second, that freedom as a sole 
consequentialist value may be “too narrow in focus”. 
 
McBride is sceptical of Pettit’s “expressive egalitarianism” found in Just Freedom, best represented 
by the eyeball test. He compares it unfavourably with Kantianism, on two grounds. First, he 
remarks that the eyeball test and similar qualitative measures of freedom (as opposed to quantitative) 
could be easily embraced by a Kantian metric, since it already draws close to treating individuals as 
a “kingdom of ends”. Second, he worries that taking a Benthamite, freedom-at-all-costs approach 
may ultimately be self-defeating, and that Pettit’s commitment to realism may be harmful in 
normative approaches, as opposed to his efforts to offer realistic policy and goals; it is acceptable to 
have an ideal which is exceedingly difficult to fulfil (McBride 2015, 358-368). The thesis discusses 
these before turning to the second criticism of narrow focus. 
 
The latter concern with Bentham-esque utilitarian thinking can be somewhat mitigated by Pettit’s 
own comments and a distinction from Railton, who argues for a subjective/objective approach to 
consequentialist decision-making, the former being to act from a consequentialist point of view, and 
the latter to act in accordance with the overall ambition of consequentialism. Thus it is not that we 
must act to maximise freedom in each and every instance, and to relentlessly to go through our lives 
 
71  McBride also notes that Pettit’s concern with vitiating hindrances “open(s) the door to giving some formal version of positive freedom” 
(McBride 2015, 366) 
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– or at least our political lives – with a hopelessly narrow viewpoint. Pettit’s consequentialism can 
be of this objective kind, where sometimes an action may inadvertently or even deliberately foster 
domination because it is being done in an attempt to “perform the most beneficial overall sequence 
of acts” (Railton in Scheffler 1988, 102-121). 
 
Pettit’s comments elsewhere support this. He argues against the classic letting-an-innocent-be-
lynched moral case partially by reference to moral catastrophes – that is, sooner or later there is a 
case where the consequences truly are sufficiently abhorrent to justify the immoral act – but more 
usefully by noting that there is a “severe limit” on “breaking roles” because of the harm involved in 
so doing to the overall value, again following Railton. Individuals should be on “automatic pilot”, 
“self-restrictive consequentialists”. He notes there are values which require the individual to act in 
accordance with them, without fixing them stalwartly in their mind. Presumably, freedom is not one 
of these, but the various norms that foster freedom might be. For example, civility is rather 
undermined when everyone is making a conscious effort to be civil (Pettit 1997, 154-163). 
 
As for Kantian contractualism as an alternative, Pettit himself declares “a stalemate” with regards to 
Scanlon and Williams’ proposals as moral guidelines, while dismissing the Kantian categorical 
imperative with the traditional apprehension over its applicability (Pettit 2012b, 58-59). But he 
attempts a rebuttal of Scanlon’s arguments as a political theory by suggesting that any contractarian 
argument ultimately breaks down into consequentialism itself (Pettit 2012b, 63-64). 
 
One might plausibly question if this is entirely fair to the contractualist approach, or whether Pettit 
is right, and the distinctions grow increasingly narrow. One point would be to rephrase the original 
critique; we might well accept the inevitability of a teleological approach but maintain that Pettit’s 
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particular formulation of it is inadequate (McBride 2015, 368). After all, the neo-republican thesis 
has already included much within freedom that Pettit himself does not. 
 
McBride is on firmer ground with the second criticism, that Pettit’s freedom is too narrowly focused. 
The thesis has already taken on board numerous socialist and social egalitarian concerns, most 
notably the more developed view of structural domination and alienation, in both the Schuppertian 
and Marxist sense. McBride cites Scanlon, who notes that there may be “only honor or the 
opportunity for a more pleasant and rewarding life” as a result of inequality, but that this is still 
intuitively unfair and problematic (McBride 2015, 368). If the focus is purely on domination, and 
not on other factors that may contribute towards it, Scanlon’s concerns have considerable merit. 
 
It is not necessary, however, that “freedom as non-domination must exclude a number of traditional 
egalitarian concerns” (McBride 2015, 368). Freedom and equality go hand in hand, as Lovett notes, 
and in the same way, Fraser’s point that each instance of misrecognition implies a case of 
misdistribution and vice versa, undermine this distinction. Absolute freedom with absolute 
inequality is brittle; all it takes is the slightest push to become corrupt and for freedom to be lost. 
Absolute equality with no freedom is simple tyranny. 
 
It might be objected that Pettit wraps loose material equality into his definition of freedom, and 
therefore to make a claim for strict material equality as a semi-separate value, as the thesis does, is 
against Pettit. But this is not so. Strict material equality supports freedom as non-domination 
precisely because it is extended further; the claim is that Pettit underestimates the resources 
necessary and thus is unwilling to commit to equality in and of itself. The argument remains the 
same: individuals must possess resources and respect, again following Fraser’s point, to avert 
domination and alienation in equal measure. This does mean a commitment, as McBride puts it, to a 
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“formal version of positive freedom” (McBride 2015, 366), or at least that Pettit must also 
incorporate autonomy into non-domination. And this may make the argument more intricate; it also 
commits Pettit to promoting secondary values such as McBride outlines, as part of the overall 
consequentialist thrust. It could be objected that this would no longer be non-domination; it would 
be discursive control. Either way, it seems a worthwhile project. 
 
An additional republican concern is if the desire for equality could then go too far. Scanlon’s 
argument could be applied to many instances of social and economic gain, wherein an individual 
might profit and then be able to dominate those around him. If consequentialism of Pettit’s kind 
were to direct us to restrict all such actions, then it would clearly be a very drab, tedious philosophy, 
one which might well make life not worth living. Against this, the point is that these various 
activities be neutralised, not condemned outright; they should do no harm nor develop so as to 
cause harm. The potential for exerting domination in and by acquiring fame and success is not low72, 
but it is equally reliant on acquiescing to it; it relies on the absence of a robust framework of 
legislation and norms to combat it. It is precisely this framework that republicanism and strict 
material equality offers, especially supplemented by a renewed concern on the effects of class and 
alienation. 
 
Thus Pettit’s consequentialist ethos, while necessitating a stronger framework around it following 
McBride’s criticisms – in particular, a much stronger commitment to equality than expressive 
egalitarianism – remains morally justifiable and practically necessary to accomplish republican 
goals in practice.
 





Section One – Corporate Power and its threat to democracy 
 
Chapter one set out the case for conceiving of liberty in republican terms of non-domination. 
Chapter two set out the case for how non-domination should be understood – namely, that it also 
requires the protection of autonomy and protection against systemic domination – and laid out a 
framework of Marxist and egalitarian critique which concluded in on two major points. Firstly, 
strict material equality must be preserved in order to allow for liberty to be maintained. Secondly, 
inequality and in particular the private control of the means of production, which necessitates 
exploitation of a Vrousalian kind and class antagonisms of a Marxist kind, represent a massive 
threat to non-domination. In particular, this is due to the violation of the eyeball test and the 
establishment of immense corporate power. This chapter examines this in greater detail. 
 
 Despite potential concerns, the thesis holds that domination of any kind must be minimised. Thus, 
it asks how this can be achieved within our current society. There are many individual concerns 
within individual nations, whether the voting suppression tactics in the United States (Manheim & 
Porter 2019 213-224 & 228-230, Epperly et al 2019, 7-10, Ravel 2018, 1020-1042, 1056-1061, Karl 
2019, 165-185)73, government corruption (Ravel 2018, 1027-1028, Shleifer & Vishny 1993, 3-20, 
Pettit 1997, 210-211, 216-219), or the previously mentioned use of corporate violence. Addressing 
all such concerns is beyond the scope of this thesis. One universal concern in modern civil society is 
the role of free market economic systems, and the thesis will concern itself with these. In the 
modern day, such systems are characterised by an increasing (Piketty 2014 435-447, BBC 2017) 
quantity of corporate and commercial actors with enormous power. Such actors present a vital 
threat to non-domination. They contribute to both alienation and an overall structural domination 
 
73  This is but one pertinent example of many. Modern research is used to highlight that this is not merely a theoretical concern. 
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that threatens freedom. This is combined with inequalities and – due to said structural domination – 
an environment and culture of social norms that promote personal domination. 
 
Each of these claims must be established in full. As regards alienation in the Marxist sense, the link 
is obvious. Each agent in a free market economy must be competitive. This does not mean they will 
always act competitively, or always make rational decisions. However, those that do will have a 
decisive advantage. This naturally diminishes altruistic sentiments, and only encourages 
cooperation when useful to each individual. Arguably, any system where profits and losses are 
possible will result in such alienation. The thesis will discuss in greater detail later whether this is 
the case. What would be more profitable is to ask if there are degrees and kinds of alienation, or if 
there are systems which result in more people being alienated. Consider a hypothetical socio-
economic state that ensured each person’s labour was highly rewarding and personally associated to 
them, but in which they were set aggressively against each fellow competitor, and indeed their 
employers. Consider another hypothetical state wherein strong union or syndicalist support ensured 
that the workers were full of solidarity and fraternity of one another, but where their work was 
menial drudgery, performed solely for the benefit of others, with no regard to their own aptitudes. 
Lastly, consider a state wherein public opinion rapidly shifted about various ethnic groups, 
frequently resulting in the devaluation and disrespect of their culture and lives. 
 
Such thought-experiments show clearly that different kinds of alienation are possible, although it 
may not be in terms of degree – it may be that any alienation at all is sufficient to be fully alienated. 
Presumably a society or socio-economic circumstance is more or less alienating according to how 
many kinds of alienation it allows for, and to what degree they are easier or harder to succumb to. 
Modern capitalist society may not be the worst possible society where alienation is concerned, but it 
cannot be far off. Marx points to many reasons in his own writings – estrangement from others, 
estrangement from work, estrangement from one’s own self-identity, estrangement from 
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government – controlled as it is by bourgeois interests – and estrangement in the form of class 
antagonisms. Such alienation frequently, though not always, overlaps with domination. Of 
particular interest to this thesis74 is estrangement from government, and why this remains the case. 
 
In many ways, governments have become less susceptible to outside influences and should, in 
theory, be more applicable to the voice of the people than in Marx’s day, thanks to developments 
like universal suffrage. This has not always proven to be the case, however. In the United States, for 
example, it has been demonstrated that there is almost no correlation between the opinions and 
desires of the electorate, and actual government policy (Gilens & Page 2014, 570-574), though the 
two may sometimes align. 
 
This can be explained. Piketty notes that in the modern day (post 1980s), accumulation of capital 
and wealth by the very wealthy has grown to heights not seen since the early 20th century (Piketty 
2014, 375-376). This has benefited from75 a drastic swing towards neo-liberal ideology in the 1980s, 
not just in states such as the United States and United Kingdom, but in bodies like the IMF (Ian 
Taylor in Boas & McNeill 2004; Clift and Tomlinson 2012, 481-495). This ideology has prioritised 
globalised free trade, removal of restrictions on capital flows, and reduction of taxation, to 
encourage investment and utilisation of more efficient market systems; conceiving of government 
practice and nationalised industries as bloated, corrupt, and inefficient (Friedman 1990, etc). 
 
At the same time, however, many of the states had social welfare and/or military commitments. The 
United Kingdom, for example, had the NHS for the former, and the United States, who undoubtedly 
have the largest military commitments overall, continued to soar in military spending, especially 
past the millennium. Even with a decline in funding, it remains exceptionally high and protected by 
 
74  Examining each instance of alienation, domination and their overlaps would require far more time and space to do justice to than the 
thesis has available. 
75  Whether the political changes were the cause of the economic or vice versa is irrelevant for the thesis; the two are interconnected and 
addressing both is necessary for any solution. 
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political interests. (Wikipedia, Military Budget of the United States, Fullfact, NHS Spending, 
Walker 2014). Decreased tax revenues necessitated spending cuts, but removing too much would 
result in political agitation (Streeck 2014 80-90, Galbraith 1992, 25-29). This necessitated political 
sleight of hand, or the doctrinal (and absolutely unsupported) assertion that deregulation and 
privatisation was good for everyone. 
 
Increasing globalisation and lax control of capital investment76, meanwhile, produced a class of 
what Marx might call rentiers: unconnected to any country, save as would produce the most profit, 
storing much of their wealth in offshore tax havens (Lenin 1916, S8, Marx Capital Vol 3, 776-777, 
Henry 2012, 5-42) to avoid paying tax, despite the tax reductions offered by governments and the 
global decrease in tax overall (Bunn 2018, Markle & Shackelford 17-34). Such unfettered investors 
would invest in a country only if they could be certain of profit, and a “business-friendly” attitude 
(Streeck 2014, 60, 67-87). 
 
Governments were running out of money, which the aforementioned rentiers had in abundance. 
Thus, argues Streeck, post-war governments and the promises of post-war capitalism collapsed into 
the “debt state”. Balancing tension between their citizens (staatsvolk, in Streeck’s terms) and their 
creditors/investors/financial experts (marktvolk, to Streeck), governments were stuck with the 
unenviable position of deregulation, financial austerity, and selling this to their voters as a good 
thing77. It has not been (Streeck 2014, 81). Wages have stagnated, internal inequality has risen, and 
the wealthy have more social, economic and political power than at any time since the Victorian era 
(Piketty 2014 458-476, etc). On the systemic level, such austerity typically requires scapegoats or 
political manipulation from governments and marktvolk. The scapegoats are the usual suspects – 
 
76  Although most capital does have some affiliation to a given country (Chang 2010, 74-87) it is equally true that FDI (foreign direct 
investment), goes where the most profit can be found. 
77  Galbraith argues in The Culture of Contentment that it is a good thing, at least for the people who do  much of the voting; the wealthier 
classes, who need less of the welfare state, and thus do not complain about the undesirable parts getting cut. This theory has limits, but it would 
explain some of the continued enthusiasm for ideas that have long been absent of good practice (Galbraith 1992, 47-49). 
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immigrants, the poor and those unable to work – and stripping necessary protections from them 
qualifies as “acute social vulnerability”, to call back to Schuppert. 
 
This may conjure up a conspiracy theory of plutocrats and corrupt politicians hell-bent on 
establishing a new world order. This is not remotely the case, nor does the thesis advance this 
position. Rather, each element – a corporation, a millionaire, a political party – seeks its own 
advantage, where possible, and the average citizen has lost out in such struggles. The thesis can thus 
return to its earlier claims about domination. Inequality of capital, wealth, and power is now a 
constant, rapidly approaching the levels of Victorian England or “gilded age” America. 
 
Pettit notes that this is undesirable in On the People’s Terms, as on a personal level, it entirely 
violates the eyeball test: “The level of resources and protections required for undominated status – 
the threshold of provision necessary – is determined on a basis that takes into account the resources 
and protections available to others.” While Pettit is comfortable with “differences of private wealth 
and power”, these must not be allowed to grow excessively (Pettit 2012, 90). The key critique of the 
neo-republican thesis presented here is that free market capitalism readily enables the growth of 
these differences and, equally importantly, gives a tiny handful the wealth, power and privilege to 
exploit the vulnerability of others and corrupt democratic institutions. 
 
Structurally, the overall system is itself dominating because it has become functionally designed to 
keep individuals subservient.  Wealth translates to socio-political power and status, perpetuating 
extraction of wealth upwards from the poor to the rich, absent efforts of governments (or more 
rarely, unions) to achieve a more equitable distribution. Even in cases of high social mobility, a 
relatively tiny handful still exert undue socio-political power, and society remains highly stratified. 
The exact individuals comprising the strata may change more or less radically over time, but this 
means nothing in practical terms. In cases of low social mobility, stratification with the loss of 
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resources to the lower strata, as Streeck and Piketty indicate, the situation is basically hopeless. No 
one individual is responsible for their impoverishment; education, financial security and even 
nutrition are withheld, not out of any individual malice, but simply because they exist to an inferior 
degree, if at all. 
 
 The system is also structurally dominating because it facilitates personal domination. An example 
may be helpful. A foreman or manager is willing to extend or protect an individual’s employment in 
exchange for a bribe of some kind (financial, sexual, etc). Reporting such an offer is incredibly 
risky, as any misstep could see the individual fired, or even blacklisted entirely. While corporate 
power accomplishes a similar goal writ large, within each corporation are many individual instances 
where individuals could be subjected to the demands and desires of others, with no way to fight 
back or assert their own control.  
 
Related to this is the concept of wage-slavery. The thesis has already discussed the possibility of 
individuals becoming subservient or alienated through this, along with the Marxist and labour-
republican critique, but various thinkers posit that insufficient wages can trap individuals within a 
vicious cycle in simple economic terms (Marx 1912, 231-240,  Ellerman 2005 466-476). Because 
their wage merely meets basic living costs, they have next to nothing for emergencies, and no 
stability to move to other jobs78. Thus, even a perfectly amicable contract without any trace of 
personal domination, in which blatant systemic or structural domination does not occur, may cause 
individuals to be “bled dry” and in a position where they must work as hard as possible, never 
missing a day, simply to survive. This makes them acutely vulnerable to personal domination of the 
 
78  Pettit is aware of this and argues for medical insurance and some form of social safety net in Just Freedom. Lovett argues for an 
unconditional basic income on very similar grounds (Lovett 2009, 822, 825-828) 
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aforementioned kind, and it reduces their ability to cope with structural domination: they have the 
most to lose by protesting the current system79. 
 
A further prop against change comes from control of political debate and media discussion. As is 
discussed later, much traditional media is owned by corporate entities or backed by them. The 
United States’ media in all its myriad forms – save social media – is now controlled by six major 
companies. Australian media, as noted, is concentrated into similarly dense hands. 
 
This is problematic for several reasons, not least the economic disparity such oligopolistic 
competition invokes, but also for their role in what Chomsky refers to as manufacturing consent, 
especially with regards to traditional print media and news. By framing the conversation, by 
selectively questioning or presenting data, and by allowing for a very vibrant band of debate within 
a very limited spectrum (Chomsky 1998, 43), there is an illusion of strong debate and discourse 
where little of significance actually exists. Further, such media will selectively pursue or avoid 
certain topics, with an interest of course to the status quo as it suits them. This means there is little 
hope of anti-corporate agendas of any kind being discussed. Thus is Gramsci’s hegemony once 
more reinforced, not only by the media themselves, but by the creation of new social norms and a 
new “normal”. Media personalities are promoted because of their beliefs. 
 
On the systemic level, such media concentration is equally problematic, not only by blunting access 
to positions outside of the desired norm and thereby diminishing the prospects of genuine political 
change, but by allowing for impersonal corporate influence. Said influence extends into politics and 
civil society, which has deleterious effects on the quality of public discourse. As the media, 
rightfully, becomes less trusted and its overall sincerity comes into doubt, it ceases to have any real 
 
79  Marx predicted that capitalists would be unable to resist paying wages that would prove insufficient to live on. While part-time work and 
the “gig economy” (Friedman 2014, 172-174) rarely provide a living wage without other support, salaried work does allow a survival wage in general, 
and often more. Thus, capitalism has yet to follow his dire predictions and collapse outright. 
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meaning save for entertainment.  This can create an atmosphere where politics is little more than a 
team sport. This too places further power to the “contented” and marktvolk,  and diminishes the 
influence available to the remainder of the citizenry. This is problematic for, due to Pettit’s 
democratic requirements. 
 
This may seem closer to the conspiracy theories that were denounced as inaccurate and misleading. 
Not only this, it may seem odd that corporate power is so extensive – into media, governments and 
everyday life – and yet frequently governments still seem to exert power over them, and life does 
not resemble one of the many works of dystopian fiction where corporations rule unopposed. 
Different corporations have different interests, but this still seems a partial explanation. One might 
also wonder why corporate capture would aim at media, rather than just regulations or governing 
bodies (Bó 2006, 209-223). If corporate interests already run the world, what is the point? 
 
One rationale, following Gramsci, is that multiple defences are stronger – to borrow an expression, 
diversifying the defensive portfolio. Corporate-run media is unlikely to argue against the corporate 
structure as a whole – empty phrases like “corporate social responsibility” (McWilliams et al 2006, 
4-8, Sklair & Miller 2010, 17-21) desperately struggle to put a bright gloss on ruthless self-interest. 
The more people who believe in the overall success of corporate capitalism, that it is the natural 
state of affairs, etc, the better its odds of continuing. Streeck writes of a tension between marktvolk 
and staatsvolk – far better that the latter believe their situations to be ordained by some divine 
economic law, than that they be allowed to change, or that they even consider widespread change 
possible (Streeck 2014, 81-83). Corporations, whilst independent of each other, share an interest in 
preserving the status quo, and especially the current socio-economic system. Some may argue for 
reform or compliance so as to prevent revolution, but it would be a mistake to conflate this with 




In summary, corporate power is insidious, and almost everywhere. It is drastically underestimated 
by current republican scholarship, who at least acknowledge the problem in social terms. To address 
it, an effective response is needed. The thesis now considers Pettit’s.
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Section Two – Pettit’s response to corporate power and corporate 
domination 
 
Corporate domination thus constitutes a considerable threat to republicanism. In chapter 
two, Pettit’s response was briefly mentioned. In this section, it will be explored in more 
detail, and will be argued as thoroughly inadequate. Before proceeding, note that Pettit’s 
response does not include any of the changes the thesis has argued for thus far. This is 
particularly relevant for two changes. First, the thesis’ acceptance of structural 
domination might cause Pettit to reconsider his views on the sheer danger corporate 
domination poses, because – as argued in the prior section – much of the domination is 
systemic or systemically compatible with personal domination. Second, as Pettit does not 
embrace any concept of exploitation or power exerted by non-agents, the thesis’ post-
Pettitian view is much more critical of current capitalism than Pettit is. Therefore, the 
section will first consider if Pettit’s response to corporate power is insufficient on his own 
grounds, before seeing if it can be amended by referring to the changes the thesis has 
already mandated. 
 
Pettit’s response to corporate domination has two strands. The first is via the eyeball test. 
Because large material inequalities are inherently toxic to the eyeball test (Pettit 2012 85-
90), Pettit argues for a comprehensive set of economic resources to support “basic 
liberties”. Given that his (non-exhaustive) list includes the right to change one’s 
employment (Pettit 2014, 76), this suggests at the very least an end to wage-slavery and a 
strong social safety net – and this is but one of such liberties. Unlike Rawls, which Pettit 
takes pains to point out, republican liberty pre-supposes a certain amount of equalisation 
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of resources, which is why a Rawlsian principle of justice is not required (Pettit 2014, 
102-103). He gives a more extensive listing of potential features in Just Freedom (Pettit 
2014, 103-106), which specifically includes financial, medical, judicial and social 
security. He notes, with some self-praise, that his list is more extensive than the “run of 
the mill programs political parties provide” (Pettit 2014, 107). It certainly compares well 
to the trimmed-down governments of neo-liberal policy. 
 
Pettit’s logic thus far seems sound. Naturally, his list is an ideal, so practical 
implementation can only succeed to the extent it conforms to said list. The measures 
proposed would greatly curb personal domination, as they remove much of the leverage 
individual employers have, and if applied on an individual rather than familial level, 
would also help considerably to prevent cases of domestic abuse, debt-based domination, 
etc. Pettit does not, however, give specific advice as to how equal the distribution of 
income should be, besides his frequent notes that strict, deliberately patterned material 
equality is not the intention, and that it should comply with the eyeball test. Such 
measures could aid in eliminating the current, massively disproportionate distribution of 
wealth outlined in the prior section. Problematically, the securities he offers might not 
eliminate the unfair benefits of such wealth entirely. An element that Pettit does not 
discuss in Just Freedom is that of education and health. Even a casual imbalance of 
wealth permits private tutors, greater ease in the selection of work, potentially private 
healthcare – the list continues. None of this is impossible to correct, but it suggests that 
preserving non-domination may require more intervention in private economic life than 
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Pettit allows in the argument. It would certainly require a more robust commitment to 
equality of opportunity, which he does not explicitly offer. 
 
Pettit’s second strand, his discussion of corporate power in Just Freedom (and fragments 
in other works), is less helpful. He notes that corporations80 can become vehicles for 
enormous personal power, without proper accountability; the legal fiction of corporations 
as persons81 shields owners from legal and financial repercussions. The concentration of 
wealth in the hands of a few is obviously a problem, but equally harmful is their ability to 
silence dissent.  
 
He admits outright he has no easy solution to offer (Pettit 2014, 91-92), suggesting two 
avenues of attack: making corporate entities subject to criminal proceedings with greater 
ease and regularity, and making use of bad publicity, the fear of which deters such 
corporate bodies. In support of the former view, Pettit also published a paper in The 
Moral Responsibility of Firms (Pettit 2017, 1-26), where he argues that corporations are 
“conversable agents”, and have the same status as individual persons to be held 
responsible, following from his arguments in A Theory of Freedom about collective 
agency. Corporations already have the legal rights of persons, but thus far, they have not 
been legally penalised as persons, though they have been financially penalised. 
 
The solution of publicity is, unfortunately, limited in scope. Research on boycotts has 
shown differing and inconclusive results. There is no long-term negative decline 
 
80  He includes organised religions, social movements etc, under the same banner. It is equally plausible to discuss limiting 
the power directed by Islam in Malaysia, for but one example (Martinez 2001, 475-500), but the thesis primarily focuses on economic, 
corporate interests in discussion. All corporate bodies are capable of exerting great power. 
81  The “corporate veil” (Investopedia, Corporate Veil)  is a related concept. 
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associated with boycotts (Tyran & Engelmann 2002, 13-22, White and Kare 1990, 63-70, 
Teoh et al 1999, 42-83, Koku et al 1997 16-20). Bad publicity can and has caused 
corporate decisions to be revised, but this has several major limitations and caveats that 
undermine it. The first is that corporate entities also control huge swathes of traditional 
and now social media, ranging from the near monopoly Rupert Murdoch has on 
Australian media, to the behemoths of Facebook and Twitter. None of these have any 
particular desire to publish content that is anti-corporate, though they might entertain 
criticism of one another. For bad publicity to take effect, it must first overcome this 
problem82. This is not always insurmountable, and iniquities such as Facebook’s 
widescale data-harvesting and selling (Andrews 2012) have come under widespread 
criticism. It is, however, a significant hurdle, and in the more extreme cases like Australia 
(The Conversation), may find itself shut out by an effective media monopoly. 
 
The existence of corporate monopolies and oligopolies also diffuses the impact of 
publicity. At a national level, there are relatively few true monopolies, but oligopolies are 
common. Many goods are sold83 by a handful of effective competitors, or as in the 
automobile industry, similar goods may be produced by competitors using similar 
techniques – monopolistic competition. Internet provision in the United States of 
America is a good example. Many areas have a single internet provider. Thus, despite 
repeated negative publicity about Comcast, many people are obliged to use their 
 
82  Government opposition has proven to be an impediment, at least – the EU’s cracking down on Google is a good start 
(Deutsche Welle 2018), but much more in this vein must be done. 
83  Again on a national level. A single large Walmart or Tesco complex may effectively be a supermarket monopoly in a 
given geographical area.  
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services84. There are countless other examples. Negative publicity works best against the 
vulnerable, and some companies are simply not. 
 
A third such problem is that much corporate abuse happens “somewhere else”. Most 
corporations are owned and operated from MEDCs85 (and increasingly, China). Their 
shareholders, likewise, are usually from similarly wealthy nations or the most elite 
citizens of LEDCs. Where public opinion might very easily condemn sweatshop labour in, 
for example, the UK, vast abuse of labour – even children’s labour – in the developing 
world is easily ignored. In countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
mining companies such as Glencore routinely make use of violence to support their 
economic intentions. Historically, entire coups have been engineered for the benefit of 
American fruit companies (Peyer et al 2014, 19 (see footnote 36), 47-69, Kinzer & 
Schlesinger 2005). The governments of such nations have little ability to hold 
corporations accountable, let alone persuade the “home nation” to take action against a 
parasitical relationship that benefits them. 
 
Last and notably, corporate and government power is frequently interlinked. The United 
States of America  gives an excellent example. Quite apart from its notorious lobbying 
laws, US senators and congressman (to say nothing of potential presidents) rely on 
funding from corporations and social movements like the NRA (National Rifle 
Association), ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), etc. Although lobbying serves as 
an effective way to communicate the needs of interests who might not otherwise enter 
 
84  To the point some cities have begun setting up municipal internet services (Vice 2018, Talbot et al 2017, 3, 7-14). This 
does not speak well for the provision from the market. 
85  MEDCs stands for “More Economically Developed Countries”; LEDCs stands for less. 
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political discourse, it can easily become little more than outright bribery. It is 
unsurprising that the United States’ government has been known to act in accordance 
with corporate interests, whether abroad (the previously mentioned United Fruit 
Company coup) or domestically, when ample “dark money” continues to be available 
politically (Mayer 2017) and wealthy donors demand “a return on their investment” 
(Public Integrity). 
 
Therefore it is unsurprising that corporate power remains mostly unchecked in many 
places. The effort and governmental strength needed to curb corporate power is mostly 
incompatible with modern liberal democratic practice. Moreover, the increasingly 
globalised nature of many national economies means the movement of capital has never 
been easier. Addressing corporate power thus necessitates large-scale opposition; the 
European Union, the United States of America, China, etc, who might all have the power 
to do so, lack the motivation. Negative publicity is thus toothless. It is even more 
ineffectual when one considers that no small portion of corporate domination is on a 
systemic and technical level. An illustrative example is the United States system of 
patents, which allows for extensions provided alterations to the design have been made. 
This has been used to extend patents on almost identical medical drugs and treatments 
(NBC 2018). While this has gained negative publicity when proven or demonstrated (The 
Guardian 2018),  it is harder to track or observe. Moreover, it again inflicts no particular 
misery on no particular person.  Thus, it must be suitably widely affecting or particularly 




Meanwhile, Pettit’s suggestion of criminal accountability fails for three major reasons. 
The first is a similar rationale to negative publicity: effective government aid is difficult 
to procure. The second is that Pettit, while he considers both the correction of material 
inequality and corporate power, does not suitably address the fact that corporate power 
fuels such inequalities. Besides the ways already outlined in the first section, the very 
nature of corporations and tax havens makes it easy for both to obscure the flow of 
money. This facilitates lobbying and the corruption of democratic processes.  Even 
without considering structural domination, it is entirely plausible for a pervasive web of 
corruption to develop that ensures the growth of personal power, and an accompanying 
ability to dominate. 
 
Capitalism by its nature compels corporations to seek profit86. Such profit is incompatible 
with the eyeball test above a certain and easily passed point. As soon as profit is 
sufficient to attend to all immediate needs (wages, administrative costs, taxes, etc) and 
allow sufficient reinvestment, there is a surplus. That surplus might be spent on 
consumption, or on greater reinvestment; it might instead be hoarded or politically 
leveraged. Whatever the form, however, a sufficiently large surplus directly threatens the 
eyeball test.  Because economic power so readily translates to socio-political power, any 
inequality of this kind has the potential to become a problem for republicanism. A five 
percent profit may not seem outrageous, but over a large enough period of time, it is 
leveraged into greater and greater wealth (Piketty 2014, 205-206). 
 
 
86  Whether this compulsion is all-consuming or is merely one of a set of such drives is irrelevant for the argument. So long as 
a motivator and drive for corporate profit exists, which is clearly true, the argument holds to a greater or lesser extent. A section 
on corporate motivation, while useful, is beyond the scope of the thesis, but would aid in addressing micro-economic policy. 
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Thirdly, obfuscation of wrongdoing is relatively easy for a corporate entity. There is the 
traditional trick of finding a convenient scapegoat, who becomes the face of everything 
wrong with the company and “leaves to pursue other interests”, or takes a relatively 
insignificant (Reiman 2004, 114-132) punishment vastly disproportionate to the harm 
inflicted.  Moreover, such crime is rarely considered as “true” crime, the sort of thing that 
must be stamped out at any cost. This makes it easy, except in cases of truly horrific 
malpractice87, to disregard and delicately sweep away. Corporate media has a vested 
interest in discouraging too much socio-political awareness. 
 
On the assumption there is some terrible harm, which cannot be disguised88, a secondary 
part of such obfuscation comes into play. With the benefits of tax havens, shell 
companies and similar tools, to say nothing of simple investment in multiple countries, 
actually enforcing a given punishment is a herculean task. Capital can be moved around 
and away from countries which do not pursue “business friendly” policies. If the problem 
is not with the “host” country, malpractice from direct investment may persist 
indefinitely. Lobbying, bribery and other tools may come into play to smooth out any 
remaining difficulties. 
 
Thus, Pettit’s suggestions are at best highly flawed and hamstrung by practical 




87  An example of this would be the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Wikipedia, Deepwater Horizon), which was both 
extraordinarily damaging and wasteful, and thus impossible to ignore. Even then, criticism rarely spun out into the practices of 
the crude oil industry as a whole. 
88  Or conveniently blamed on another company. 
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A more insidious problem is that corporations do not think and feel like persons do, 
despite the legal fiction. Any decision a corporation enacts is with a rational view 
towards its own profit, at least in theory – no entity is ever perfectly rational. While Pettit 
argues that corporations are conversable (Pettit 2017, 22), and thus capable of discussion 
and dialogue as persons are, it would be a mistake to consider them as identical to 
individual human persons. A critical difference lies in their continuity. Were an 
individual’s memories to fail, and their driving plans and motivations to alter radically, 
neither Pettit nor intuition would expect us to consider them the same. Yet this is no 
different from a radical reconstitution of a company; the same name and format may be 
present, but it is not the same “person”. In general, a corporation can never have the same 
interests as a human, and will tend towards profit-seeking. Pettit is correct that 
corporations need to be made further legally accountable; it would be a mistake to 
acknowledge them as having personal responses. 
 
This is without any reference to structural or systemic domination, either. While these 
compound the potential dangers of corporate domination and power, as well as the 
concentration of wealth and power, it is clear on the grounds already outlined that 
corporate power represents as strong a threat to non-domination as a hostile government 
might. Indeed, it is entirely possible that a corporation could wield power as imperium, 
not dominium: inescapable, coercive, and without any regard for our interests, avowed or 




Section Three – Markets and Domination 
 
Corporate domination is thus well-established as a problem, not only for enabling 
personal domination and contributing towards systemic domination, but in its corrosive 
effects on democratic control and legitimacy. Some examples of corporate power have 
already been given; transnational corporations, overbearing religions, and even social 
movements. These are relatively easy to identify. They can be considered fit to hold 
themselves responsible, free to act (Pettit 2001, 121), and perhaps even persons of a sort 
(Pettit 2017, 17-23). They have goals and agendas, although in aggregate, their decision-
making processes may not resemble individual human ones in any way (Pettit 2018, 257). 
 
An immediate issue to consider is the market system as a whole. This needs to be 
addressed from several angles. Firstly, one might ask if the global market (or indeed, any 
market of sufficient size and complexity) is itself a purveyor of personal or systemic 
domination, whether in creating dominating conditions or in creating conditions where 
domination is quicker and easier. Second, it needs to be considered whether the modern 
market system has a pernicious effect on individual behaviour and social norms; that a 
properly constituted market might avert some, if not all, of the problems raised far. Third, 
given the reliance upon certain elements of Marxist theory, most notably definitions of 
alienation and power (albeit with concessions to republican and social egalitarian theory), 
it would be remiss not to ask if markets are inherently reliant on unacceptable practices 
which, even if the markets achieved both complete material equality and caused no 
further harm, continued to result in alienation of either a Marxist or Schuppertian kind. 
Fourth, it might be objected to any or all of these points that markets and market 
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functions in fact oppose domination, and any attempt to “correct” markets would only 
result in a flawed and broken system. The inequity of modern day capitalism is due to 
distortions caused by such foolish, if well-meaning, attempts (Friedman 1990, Hayek 
1948, Bronk 2013 89-9189 etc). 
 
This last point will be covered in far greater detail in section four. Its strength as an 
argument is inversely related to the strength of the previous three. The remainder will be 
discussed in the order presented, thus beginning with the market-as-domination argument. 
 
According to Pettit, markets are not substantially dominating in character. He is happy to 
support regulation and observes that, just as with his ideals of contestatory democracy, 
the same scandal→pushback→reform loop can be observed and enacted within markets. 
It is possible for markets to be abused, and for the power within them to conflict with the 
eyeball test and loose material equality. The market in itself is not dominating, however, 
and does not coerce individuals (Pettit 2014, 19, 85, 140). One might consider the 
distinction between threats and offers once again; the market does not threaten, it only 
ever offers90. But this is Pettit’s view, unmoderated by that of social egalitarianism or the 
thesis’ commitment to autonomy. 
 
A relevant point before proceeding is to consider personal and systemic domination 
nesting. Nesting here means that entities which dominate may find themselves dominated, 
and that individual components of those entities may dominate in turn. Nothing in Pettit’s 
 
89  Bronk goes on to critique Hayek (Bronk 2013, 94-105) and expand on the role of government intervention, it should be 
noted, but he contends that “gross controls” are still actively harmful. 
90  In an ideal world; the lack of an ideal world is what regulation is for, and which distinguishes Pettit from the naive 
optimism of so many in the libertarian tradition. 
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writing suggests that his intent is that dominators cannot, in different times and contexts, 
be the dominated; consider a foreman who tyrannises his workers but must equally 
prostrate himself before his own employers. This is particularly relevant if the market is 
itself dominating, empowering corporations which dominate and may dominate in 
different ways, in different contexts. And this is precisely the position the thesis adopts, 
contra Pettit, which we turn to shortly. Their wealthiest and most influential shareholders 
may turn the corporation to their personal advantage, and this is not identical to the 
corporation doing so itself. Thus a subsidiary of Nestlé may dominate, Nestlé as a whole 
may dominate, and the systems in which they operate may dominate, simultaneously.  
 
On the more nuanced neo-republican account, the modern market in its entirety is 
undoubtedly dominating, on several grounds. First, it creates conditions which make 
personal domination easier and quicker. On the smaller national scale, gross inequality 
violates the eyeball test and ensures the perpetuation of some form of class system. On 
the global scale, practices such as sexual tourism are little better than modern slavery91, 
as are the use of illegal or semi-legal migrants as nearly unpaid labour, on which vast 
swathes of western agriculture rely (Martin 1985, 135-143, Rye & Scott 2018, 928-945, 
etc). Markets act to concentrate wealth and power into corporate entities, or smaller 
numbers of the ultra-rich; individuals are given little recourse or the prospect of 
opposition. 
 
Contesting these practices of personal domination, as one might contest democratic 
government by Pettit’s methods, is certainly possible. To do so on a global scale may be 
 
91  Modern slavery exists as well, of course, and directly feeds into such practices. 
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exceedingly difficult, however. One major problem is that different nations will have 
different interests and concerns, and unless a scandal is of sufficient moral disgust or 
scope to affect a company internationally, contestation is most effective on the national 
level, and sometimes not even then. For example, Nike was widely condemned over two 
decades ago when it became obvious that their products were mostly reliant on sweatshop 
labour, yet while there has been a documented response to this, the labour still remains 
subjected to these issues and lacks prospects for immediate change. (WRC (Hansae), 
McDonnell et al 2015, 3-37, Soule 2009). 
 
Another concern with contestation via scandal or oversight is that it is simply contrary to 
the interests of the consumer in MEDCs to look too closely at what occurs to provide 
them with cheap goods and commodities. Were genuine legal recourse available, were 
personal domination blocked, were higher wages available, etc, the costs of various 
commodities or services would undoubtedly increase. Individuals who are already 
impoverished, as the note of greater internal inequality above displays, are unlikely to 
welcome such an increase even if it means others are better off. So the enthusiasm for 
such accountability, on a scale that truly matters, is likely to be limited to idealists, as the 
Nike account implies. 
 
A last consideration is that changes implemented as a result of scandal may vary in 
impact. They are more likely to address hazardous or unpleasant working conditions than 
the cases of personal domination which may exist in a legal firm or a sweatshop with 
equal ease. This is not so much a rebuttal to Pettit’s point as an observation that what one 
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might rightfully criticise, such as a strictly hierarchical business design which ensures 
those at the bottom have little ability to articulate complaints, may be ignored in favour of 
correcting more obvious problems. While laudable, it leaves the subtler issues still in 
place. 
 
Second on the neo-republican account, it allows for systemic domination by its very 
existence. The economy of the world has always been global to an extent, but it has 
blossomed today to a degree previously unforeseen. Unfortunately, as with the barbarities 
of colonial empires in the 18th to 20th centuries, the system as a whole has wealthy and 
successful parasites drawing upon the labours of billions in LEDCs. This is a 
simplification and generalisation, naturally; if it were the exact, immutable case, China’s 
rapid economic development (and before it, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Brazil, etc) 
would not have occurred. . The modern global market is deeply inequitable, however, and 
this problem does not appear to have an easy solution. 
 
This is partly due to the liquidity and lack of nationality of capital. While capital has 
home countries, who benefit from having the “nerve centers” of transnational 
corporations and the potential of taxable profits (Chang 2010, 74-87), the global market 
relies upon the global liquidity of capital, to allow for investments wherever seems most 
efficient. This encourages either investment in enterprises simply too profitable to be 
untapped, despite heavy regulation, or the stripping of workers’ rights and other 
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regulations in order to tempt investment with fewer administrative overheads like “health 
and safety”.92 
 
Third, in the judgement of neo-republicanism, Pettit underestimates the coercive 
possibilities of the market. It is true that the market is, following a roundabout Hayekian 
argument, non-dominating and fair in the ideal; any misfortunes are tough luck. But in a 
non-ideal world, the line between threat and offer can blur, because of the knowledge of 
grotesque consequences for refusal. The personal domination arises purely out of the 
system, because the system does the punishment all on its own. Consider Pettit’s case of 
the toady. Without protection against poverty, the spectre of unemployment is much more 
of a threat. An employer who expects to be treated as an authority, who thus endeavours 
to gain revenge or otherwise maliciously inconvenience an employee who does not adopt 
a servile position, may gain far more licence for their boorish behaviour because of the 
unspoken implication: this work is worth the abuse, or more to the point, dignity can be 
abandoned for survival. Even a well-regulated market, if there is sufficient poverty and 
deprivation, could succumb to this flaw. Pettit’s range of protections would doubtless 
include unemployment benefit, protection against being fired without good reason, etc. 
But again, it is a question of underestimation – he fails to acknowledge the sheer disparity 
of power that the market can bring to an employer. 
 
How might a market be amended to avoid these issues? The first and most notable point 
is that it must be effective and appropriate regulation against personal domination. The 
legislation must be neither rooted in too much bureaucracy nor uneven in its 
 
92  Again, a generalisation. 
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implementation. Second, individuals must have the resources necessary to achieve the 
eyeball test no matter their life circumstances. Pettit suggests protections for vulnerable 
partners, workers, and even employers (Pettit 2014, 105-107). Mysteriously, the only 
financial security he mention relates to banking regulation and the guarantee of savings 
(Pettit 2014, 88-89, 105). Finally, the systemic domination of the market must be 
addressed such that individuals are controlled neither by wage-slavery, nor by 
exploitation in Vrousalis’, and the thesis’ usage. 
 
Solutions that might enable these things are discussed in great detail in chapter four and 
five; capital flight and its particular difficulties are also discussed in chapter five. The 
concern the thesis now turns to is one of scale. Despite the fact that capital is not 
perfectly liquid, and that certain markets require adherence to strict regulations (most 
notably the European Union), patterns of investment still tend towards the most profitable 
locations in the globalised economy, as noted above. The concern is thus that for many 
industries and many investors, it is far better to be unethical than unprofitable. 
 
To address this sufficiently challenges modern day economists as much as anyone else. 
Various policy proposals have been offered (Stiglitz 2019, 79-100, 179-208), yet they are 
counteracted by the disparate interests of different states and peoples. Hayek theorised 
that people of half a dozen countries were unlikely to come together and work for the 
common good93 (Hayek 2017, Sections 1-4),  and opined that the net result would be 
some form of free trade agreement and basic regulations and little else. While we need 
not share Hayek’s enthusiasm for this outcome, when two nations are on opposite sides 
 
93  Again, the European Union has outgrown Hayek’s expectations, so his argument should be treated with some scepticism. 
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of the world – yet it is cheaper to take advantage of low wages in one and ship fish the 
vast distances to the other (Daily Mail 2017) – there seems little hope for the kind of 
overarching and effective regulation needed to stop personal or systemic domination. 
 
The modern market is thus not necessarily dominating, but its complexity on the global 
scale makes it easier than ever for domination to occur without the prospect of challenge 
or punishment. In almost every circumstance, the market is a, or supports, dominating 
agent(s).  Moreover, the liquidity of capital ensures that a singular response is insufficient. 
Thus, the global market eliminates the capacity for domination to be corrected, even if it 
lacks the intent and ability to dominate, as it is not conversable in Pettit’s sense. It is also 
worth noting that the market requires far more substantial changes than Pettit envisages, 
let alone the proposals of all except the most “radical” egalitarians and socialists. The net 
result of this is that even if a suitable arrangement of a market was implemented 
successfully, with no prospect for domination, sustaining it would be nigh impossible. 
Therefore, the market is not necessarily dominating only in point of logic. In reality, it is 
and will remain dominating. Full change on a systemic level is necessary, ideally 
accompanied by socio-political change as well, on as large a scale as possible. This is, 
admittedly, a high bar to clear. 
 
As for social norms, it is obvious the modern market system will have some effect on 
what is considered permissible. But precisely because it is so obvious, such a claim lacks 
any content. Refining it further, the question is whether the behaviour is contrary to the 
social norms and behaviours republicanism wishes to inculcate, and whether this is a 
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particular feature of modern free-market capitalism. It could be that any system of 
voluntary exchange will have conflicting social norms. 
 
Republican social norms include such concepts as civility, respect for others (or at least 
other citizens), strong political awareness, etc. The norms that arise from capitalism seem 
at best tangential to these, and frequently stand in opposition: primacy of the self, trust in 
economic solutions and decentralisation, etc. Obviously, these norms are not logically 
necessary, but they seem compelled by the way capitalism operates; it does not take an 
economic genius, Smith aside, to notice that self-interest is rampant and even rewarded in 
modern capitalism. Greed, one might say, is good. The extent to which individuals really 
are rational, self-interested beings is hotly contested, in psychology, economics, and even 
political science (Marsh & Stoker 2010, 42-59), but that there is a strong measure of self-
interest at stake is not really in dispute. 
 
To accommodate this, and yet enable republican social norms to be inculcated effectively 
– without being subverted in any way – seems implausible, but not impossible. One 
would need to allow for the efficiency of the market underpinned by more laudatory 
motivations. This would probably reduce that efficiency; after all, profit is an excellent 
motivator. Additionally, one would need to present recurring social norms which actively 
regarded the selfish desires that capitalism engenders as morally wrong and, importantly, 




Allowing for this possibility, even on a national scale – let alone an international –  
would require inculcation of republican social norms on a scale Pettit barely 
acknowledges. And it would need to do so to an extremely strong degree. Confucius 
stated that one does not reform individuals by shame and punishment, one must lead by 
example (Confucius 2003, 8). Chapter five offers a way in which this might be 
accomplished nationally. 
 
A brief recap on alienation and power before the third argument. Two kinds of 
interconnected alienation are a considerable threat to discursive control and autonomy: 
thus non-domination also. The first, Schuppertian, emphasises alienation as a disrespect 
or loss of self-respect for a person’s status as socially free and equal. Marxist alienation 
occurs when an individual is divorced from their labour, from other human beings, and 
even from themselves, due to the competition, pressures and dehumanisation of capitalist 
work. They become little better than animals, in Marx’s view, and take no pride in 
themselves, regarding others purely as threats or tools. The net result of either is that 
individuals lose their capacity for free will and free action, losing autonomy, and 
frequently becoming subservient. 
 
To give the strongest argument possible, briefly imagine a republican state which held a 
completely responsible and legitimate democratic state, and utilised a controlled free 
market with voluntary exchange, with government oversight to ensure the miraculous 
accomplishment of complete non-domination and material inequality to the point that the 
eyeball test was not only passed, but that no individual or group could threaten to 
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overturn it ever again: a true utopia. Could the market still result in alienation of either 
kind? 
 
Schuppertian alienation would seem thwarted by the presence of total material equality, 
at least provided there was some element of social equality commensurate with the 
eyeball test. Marxist alienation, by contrast, is not solved so long as the system still 
necessitates any one of four things: personal competition for resources at the expense of 
others, rewards disproportionate with the value of their labour94, opposing interests 
between labour and capital, and power remaining in the hands of capital, rather than 
being shared. 
 
Of these four, the first may seem unduly demanding. If Marxist alienation is only 
thwarted in a post-scarcity society, then it is impossible to be adequately fulfilled, at least 
without massive technological or economic development. It may be satiated in part by 
directing resources based on need, or by ensuring a high threshold of basic needs (food, 
shelter, etc) but this is not a given. Still, if it cannot be guaranteed, then by the same 
token, there can be no normative or political obligation to fulfil it, merely minimise it. 
The market would thus need to minimise the harms inherent in such competition, and 
reduce the danger – as well as the meaning – thereof. The second and fourth are not 
dependent upon voluntary market exchange, but they do imply that a specifically 
capitalist market, by its very nature, is inherently alienating and can never be otherwise 
 
94  It must be noted here that, due to the clear inadequacy of Marx’s theory of labour-as-value, this is in some sense subject to 
the perception of their labour’s value. This might lead one to question if alienation is ever avertable if a sub-group of individuals is 
incapable of perceiving their labour as anything less than vital, no matter its actual value, especially in service or financial industries, 
as opposed to those where the final value of a commodity can be established by the market. 
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by definition.95 If that is so, then the third can be answered by organising the market 
along principles whereby labour and capital’s interests are one and the same. Whether 
this is entirely possible is considered in chapter four, section three, but in principle, this 
could be accomplished via some form of market socialism. 
 
Therefore, in order for a market system to be non-dominating and to not counteract 
republican social norms, nor to alienate, the market would need to be rather more tightly 
regulated than currently. In addition, the way in which it would function cannot be 
capitalist; it must be constituted so as to achieve neo-republican and egalitarian goals. 
This necessitates a distortion in the function of the markets. The worth of this proposal is 
considered in the next section.
 
95  This directly influences the decision between Rawls and the egalitarian system in chapters four and five, also. The former 
still allows for these problems to arise, although in a way that is far less damaging than modern or historical capitalism; the egalitarian 
system does not. 
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Section Four – Markets as Freedom 
 
The thesis must discuss a certain kind of objection at this point. Accepting markets’ corrosive 
effects, and the ethical/organisational problems inherent in capitalist society, it may be objected that 
this – while horrible – is entirely preferable to interference in a functioning market system.  There 
are many such arguments as a mainstay of what could be called right-libertarian or anarcho-
capitalist thinking, ranging from philosophical authors such as Nozick and Hayek to Friedman and a 
large selection of neoclassical economists. They differ in scope and fervency – for example, Hayek 
goes so far as to allow for Rawlsian redistribution of a procedural kind (Lister 2011, 1-5, 23-26), 
while writers such as Rothbard reject almost all government functions (Rothbard 1977). The thesis 
will therefore restrict itself to considering only the strongest arguments that remain compatible with 
non-domination. 
 
This naturally eliminates a few varieties of argument immediately. Those that rely on a pure 
negative conception of liberty can be dispensed with, because republicanism denies non-
interference, as established in chapter one, section three. As noted in the introduction, the proposed 
solution does not remove the system of voluntary exchange, so any variation on the epistemic 
objection – that markets act to transfer information, the absence of which drastically undermines 
central planning and/or market efficiency (Hayek 1948, Hayek 2001, 51-58, etc) – will remain valid, 
but not necessarily persuasive. And unless the proposed solution is inefficient to the point it would 
threaten non-domination96, the thesis will continue to follow Pettit’s logic and maximise non-
domination over economic output. This eliminates all but the most strident arguments over 
efficiency. Moreover, arguments such as Rothbard’s which decry any government functioning 
would be contrary to Pettit’s political requirements, and thus unintelligible to republicanism. 
 




What remains? The aforementioned efficiency arguments, if taken to extremes, become overly 
demanding and nonsensical. Government intervention has been demonstrated to be useful for 
market efficiency (Stiglitz 1992, 270-303, Chang 2010 125-136, etc). Even were this not the case, 
one would need to assert that only a market lacking almost any non-market (and especially 
governmental) interference would be efficient enough to serve as a worthwhile mode of economic 
organisation, which is ludicrous. Efficiency will concern the thesis only insofar as the preservation 
of the basic liberties Pettit envisages must be available to all; this necessitates basic securities such 
as food, shelter, and good health. This allows the thesis to work with many potential economic 
concepts. 
 
There are more normative arguments from the right-libertarians, and these seem worth considering. 
The first is that markets embody free human agency. To interfere in them at all would require 
illegitimate use of force or fraud, and might effectively be impossible without relying on 
interference that could not be controlled nor forced to track to the interests of individuals within 
society – even if it could, the empowerment of government agencies to engage in such interference 
would be a cure far worse than the disease (Gaus 2003, 65, Nozick 2013, 149-150,  169, Hayek 
2001, 59-104). The second is to argue that the kind of systemic and corporate domination outlined 
in chapters two and three would continue to exist under any planned or distorted market, and 
especially under any kind of socialism, and that the only way to achieve proper non-domination is 
instead to work hard to remove market distortions as far as possible. 
 
The first argument relies heavily upon a variant of Nozick’s arguments in Anarchy, State and 
Utopia. Nozick argues that liberty upsets and cannot maintain patterns, and attempts to impose such 
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patterns are doomed to failure, unless “capitalist acts were prohibited between consenting adults”. 
He combines this with an argument that what arises out of just steps is itself just. Justice, except as 
an instrumental value, does not concern the thesis, 
 
However, as stated, this is a variant upon Nozick’s argument. We might argue, per the goal of 
freedom maximisation, that it would be acceptable to upset some liberty in enforcing such patterns, 
so long as it was controlled and pre-committed according to consistent principles. Hayek, while 
completely opposed to socialism via a command economy, even conceded that Rawlsian principles 
applied in such a manner would be perfectly consistent with a liberal framework. Nozick might 
advance that no such principle can ever be fully controlled consistently, and that in order to allow 
for the variety of actions in the market, there would need to be retroactive amendments in service to 
some overriding principle, in this case, liberty as non-domination (Nozick 2013, 160-174). The 
thesis will examine Nozick’s arguments in some detail, before we proceed to a counter-argument, 
by way of Cohen. 
 
Nozick begins by referring to a state of nature and how a state might arise organically97, articulating 
the beginnings of various “mutual protection arrangements” and how they do or do not resemble a 
state. In particular, he regards an assortment of such arrangements or agencies, with both internal 
and external gaps, to be an “ultra-minimal state”. This is to be contrasted with a minimal state, 
which unlike the former does allow for some very small redistributive purposes, e.g., taxation to 
ensure coverage of all by such protections. Nozick asks, however, on what grounds we might justify 
this redistribution. He rejects consequentialism of any sort, specifically introducing what he calls 
“side-constraints”, moral constraints upon actions, rather than desirable moral or socio-political 
elements of our end goals. (Nozick 2013, 28-35). 
 




From this, he develops a morally justifiable reason to develop into the minimal state, relying upon 
the prohibition of private enforcement of law and justice, and a principle of compensation – rather 
than redistribution – to follow suit. “Any state more extensive violates people’s rights.” (Nozick 
2013, 149). He then discusses distributive justice by suggesting a theory of justice that is concerned 
primarily with holdings of property, and the transfer thereof. The former portion does not 
particularly concern the thesis, as the justice of an original holding seems exceedingly difficult to 
establish. Such a theory is “historical”, rather than end-state (Nozick 2013, 156-158); as with the 
prior idea, he rejects any appeal to the consequences, and is only concerned with justice in each 
individual action. Some transfers may be unjust – those forced upon an individual via uncontrolled 
interference, for example  – but the majority of actions are entirely just. In a rather famous example, 
he suggests that if many thousands want to see Wilt Chamberlain play, it is entirely just for him to 
demand a small charge from each person, and thus amass a vast quantity of money. This would be 
troubling for republican accounts of domination – it would seem very easy for Wilt to then parlay 
his economic advantages into domination, if he so chose (Nozick 2013, 161). 
 
However, much of this argument relies on drastically different assumptions to Pettit’s. While both 
Nozick and Pettit focus upon individual rights, Pettit is broadly consequentialist, while Nozick is 
stubbornly determined to stick to justification by actions, not results. Pettit’s concerns about 
government overreach are somewhat different to Nozick’s, as the latter objects to all but the most 
minimal state. If Nozick allowed for non-domination, could his arguments be coherently preserved? 
It certainly seems plausible to create the same account of freedom with Wilt Chamberlain, if the 




Rather than focus upon the end result of Chamberlain himself, the focus is upon two points: the 
individual (and entirely voluntary) transfers, and the potential domination Chamberlain’s newfound 
wealth buys him. For the sake of completeness, let it be assumed that Chamberlain’s fame and 
social status somehow increases in direct correlation to his wealth. Therefore, the wealthier he is, 
the greater his social standing (and ability to use it to his advantage in dominating others). 
 
The prevention of such minor exchanges necessitates an awareness of how much money is being 
spent, if one wishes to avoid banning “capitalist acts between consenting adults” (Nozick 2013, 
163). If the currency was primarily or entirely electronic in nature, tracking its flow would be easy. 
But who tracks this data, and who has access to it? Uncomfortable questions arise about the privacy 
of the individual. Offering a government complete knowledge of an individual’s transactions 
promises nothing good, as does the ability to approve or deny such transactions. A cap on such 
transfers – e.g., a cap on a person’s wealth – seems more plausible (Casassas & De Wispelaere 2016, 
2-22). Yet unless this cap is set at a very low level98, mandating near equality, the disparity may be 
sufficient to permit domination. 
 
As for the potential of domination from the newly famous and enriched Chamberlain, it is notable 
that the wealth and fame in and of itself accomplishes no domination, but rather what can be bought 
with it: silence, consent, individuals willing to obtain a measure of either in return for doing terrible 
things. If Nozick were purely interested in freedom at each “step”, however, it would be incoherent 
to dismiss the first act because of the potential consequences,  rather, one ought to ensure that these 
potential consequences were each punished (by dint of abusing the first towards force, fraud, and 
similar illegitimate methods). 
 




The problem becomes very much akin to that of chapter two, section four; it is far too easy to end 
up in a state which is philosophically and logically plausible, yet when exposed to the realities of 
life, results in something much worse. In the case of permitting his largesse, Chamberlain’s prestige 
and wealth may buy him effective immunity. In the case of tracking each transfer, the slippery slope 
of domination occurs not only in the potential for government overreach (negating privacy and 
resulting in widespread coercion) but in that of wealth transfers. Cohen argues that not only does 
patterned distributive justice preserve liberty (Cohen 1977, 5-21), but that Nozick fails to address an 
important distinction in what justice might mean (Cohen 2011, 126-131). He also explicitly argues 
for a consequentialist understanding of justice and liberty, as part of socialism. To paraphrase, the 
inviolability of a few leading to the massive practical violation of the many is incoherent (Cohen 
1977, 16-17); one of the areas in which republican and socialist political thought converge. 
 
If Cohen’s arguments against the just steps argument hold, then presumably a situation could arise 
whereby actions which were under no uncontrolled interference produced a situation that allowed 
for such, e.g. Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain example. This would be even more toxic to freedom than 
Cohen envisages. Wealth transfers of this kind seem to qualify, which supports the intuitive disquiet 
one might have about the acceptability of Nozick’s “just steps” arguments in the real world. There 
seems something terribly disingenuous about his claims when billions of tiny individual transfers 
can produce a corporate entity like Walmart, funnelling vast wealth upwards. There seems little 
hope of such wealth then being lost, absent taxation. 
 
Instead, Nozick might acknowledge that freely chosen actions could bring about the kinds of 
domination the thesis has envisaged. However, he could challenge that such actions were less 
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dangerous to freedom, and a free society as a whole, than that of an actively engaged government 
willing to engage in uncontrolled interference for the sake of greater preventions elsewhere.99 This 
is not to be confused with the second argument from Hayek presented below, as that instead holds 
that government actions of this kind cannot eliminate systemic or corporate dominion, and replace 
or displace it. Nozick’s potential argument concedes that it may do so, but only at the cost of 
uncontrolled interference. Even for a republican consequentialism, this may be concerning. 
 
Nozick does not adopt the Rothbardian idea that any taxation is illegitimate, but unlike Rawls, he 
does not seem to think that high taxation and mass redistribution could arise organically, and he 
holds a view that taxation is essentially forced labour (Nozick 2013 169-172). This might give the 
impression that anything above an ultra-minimal state would inevitably resort in uncontrolled 
interference100. If the state were repeatedly to act against its citizens’ avowed wishes and desires, it 
would fall prey to Pettit’s worries about paternalism, would be forced to avoid democratic 
contestation or corrupt the electoral process, and so on. It would fit every account of imperium. This 
requires two things to be true, however. First, Nozick – over the philosophical and practical 
objections of liberals such as Rawls, socialists such as Cohen and republicans such as Pettit– would 
need to suggest that high taxation cannot arise with the consent of the governed – or that any 
consent was in some way false or fabricated, which would require further empirical explanation and 
some indication that the apparent consent given in say, Sweden, was irrational or unjustifiable, 
which seems difficult. His grounds for concern are not entirely unreasonable, however. In a system 
with high levels of taxation and the preservation of voluntary exchange, particularly when it comes 
to employment, many involved in highly skilled or highly demanding jobs may find the tax 
 
99 Naturally, this argument is even stronger if one rejects any uncontrolled interference, no matter how desirable or useful it may be. Nozick 
adopts this, especially in regards to side-constraints (Nozick 2013, 30-33), but as Cohen notes (Cohen 1977, 16-18), this makes relatively little sense 
and may even be called illegitimate. 
100  Presumably Nozick’s ideal minarchist state would allow for taxes for the upkeep of a constabulary; it presumably being more efficient 
than everyone taking a turn. 
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demands on them to be onerous. While this may strike the reader as logically unconvincing, and 
perhaps unjustifiable, that does nothing to lessen such potential resentment. The interference would 
then be against their interests. If they had the right to emigrate, or a democratic voice101, then this 
argument would cease to have much force, however. 
 
Second, Nozick would need to demonstrate that the usage of uncontrolled interference represents a 
slippery slope, appealing to the potential consequences the extreme might entail. The first approach 
(voluntary transfers) does not seem to be a fruitful possibility. The second (potential domination) is 
on firmer ground regarding slipperiness, but may be turned on its head; it seems far more likely that 
uncontrolled acquisition of wealth and social status will result in uncontrolled interference, than the 
control of wealth and social status will result in uncontrolled government; at least, if that 
government remains accountable to a democratic electorate. 
 
Therefore, Nozick’s arguments work only so far as one wants to reject consequentialism in the 
pursuit of non-domination. There are, however, very good arguments to preserve, rather than reject, 
consequentialism as a principle, as noted in chapter two and this section alike. If it is accepted, then 
most of his arguments accomplish very little. 
 
The second argument relies upon arguments not unlike Mises’ or Hayek’s in the Road to Serfdom. 
Pettit explicitly establishes non-domination as allowing for government more “robust” than the 
states of classical liberalism, and this form of the argument can concede that point. There may well 
be room for progressive taxation, insurance and insulation, as well as a fully-fledged government on 
republican principles in such a state. For the sake of the argument, it will be assumed that Hayek 
 
101  It does not even need to be a particularly large measure, by Pettit’s “tough luck” prerequisite; they must be able to show malice, rather 
than misfortune, if they are well-paid and highly taxed. By dint of the “well-paid” portion, this is implausible. 
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accepts liberty as non-domination102. Hayek favours proceduralism, as mentioned, but that is 
tangential to this particular argument. 
 
Where such a state might err is in attempting to provide goods and services in its own right, rather 
than regulating them, in the mistaken belief that it could avert several major economic laws. While 
a government has major advantages – especially economy of scale and vertical integration103 - and 
may be able to act as a monopoly, to its own advantage, it must still maintain its economic standing 
and act within the market. If it is a steel monopoly, for example, it must be able to produce steel 
effectively, with fewer costs, and to the benefit of the citizenry – otherwise, why bother, absent 
ideological concerns?104 
 
The argument at this point has two closely related and interconnected forks. The first argues that 
any state-based market function (and especially a state monopoly) is subject to the exact same 
pressures and drives as any other function in said market. Therefore, two unpalatable options exist 
for this first fork – either the function faces competition (and therefore must respond rationally and 
selfishly or become unprofitable/unsuccessful) or it does not (and therefore ends up being 
grotesquely inefficient). Either way, it offers little to no improvement on the market for the 
consumer, with the worker only potentially benefiting in the latter case.  
 
The second argues that the state would replace the domination of corporations with bureaucrats. 
This can be phrased internally and externally. Internally, a state-run steel company is not identical 
 
102  An assumption which is somewhat difficult to contemplate, but without which, Hayek’s arguments are entirely unintelligible to 
republicanism, and vice versa. While there exists literature which claims Hayek adheres to the neo-roman/republican tradition (Irving 2017, 7-15), 
Hayek does not seem to hold to alienation or structural domination, and the paper in question seemingly ignores Pettit’s later work in lieu of focusing 
on Skinner. Moreover, Hayek states that “it is not the source but the limitation of power that prevents it from being arbitrary” (Hayek 2001, 74), and 
this seems very contrary to Pettit, let alone the neo-republican thesis. 
103  Which is one reason for the great success, cheapness and effectiveness of government health insurance and/or entirely socialised medical 
systems such as the NHS over private, fully market-driven insurance systems. 
104  One answer to this rhetorical question is, of course, to comply with the eyeball test and strict material equality (Pettit 2014), but permit 
that this is unnecessary for the sake of the argument. 
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to one that is backed by market capital – nor for that matter, a worker’s cooperative. But it has 
similar drives and organisation to the former. The need to make a profit may be secondary to some 
other political objective, but there will still be a need to produce steel efficiently. Externally, the 
steel company must still sell its steel (or supply it to some other part of the state apparatus). Again, 
little changes. Therefore, if a steel company is supposed to compete with others in the market, it 
may have certain advantages which enable it to direct a kinder hand to its workers or to benefit 
consumers. Backed by subsidies, it may be able to buy in greater quantities and make use of 
economy of scale, as an example. The individuals at the top still wield enormous power, however, 
at least within a capitalist system, and a command economy has its own issues105. 
 
Rather than erroneously making those who produce and those who regulate that production the 
same, the market should be allowed to function. A concern with the state as a market agent does not 
mean the state has no role to play. For instance, the market does not ban the sale of infants; 
government legislation does. Or so the argument might proceed. 
 
In defence of government interference in the economy, the first fork’s logic can be questioned by 
utilising the work of Alex Hirschman. Hirschman points out that two methods of redress are 
typically used: voice, so as to criticise or otherwise make one’s concerns known, and exit, so as to 
avert the flaw entirely (Hirschman 1970, 21-43). The latter approach is not available in the event of 
a government monopoly, but the first may remain, and be used effectively as a means of 
chastisement and control. Ordinarily, voice would have minimal106 impact on a monopoly. But a 
government, established according to republican democratic requirements and dealing with an 
 
105  Additionally, Hayek argued that the structure of the command economy was incredibly toxic to liberty, and this remains true under non-
domination. Just as with capitalism, domination flows downwards, this time from political figures (Hayek 2001, 68-74). 
106  Hirschman does make the point that monopolies may welcome exit over voice for this precise reason (Hirschman 1970, 56-60), as they 
may content themselves with a market share which costs them less time and effort to placate. An effective voice is something to be dreaded, but 
difficult to ensure. 
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active and committed citizenry – admittedly, quite a large caveat – would need to address major and 
popular concerns, and would therefore have impetus to act. 
 
For the second fork, curbing abuse of such bureaucratic power is vitally important. Again, the 
democratic requirements of the republican state will do much to curb them. This does little to 
ensure that the individuals within each company are well-regarded, however; consumers may only 
be aware of mistreatment and malpractice at their end. A culture of silence, and silent abuse, could 
develop as easily under a bureaucratic government division as under a capitalist company – perhaps 
a little more easily, by preying upon notions of patriotism. 
 
To address this, two things are needed. The first is, as Pettit suggests, a robust independence within 
the workplace, along with the ability and willingness to contest illegitimate decisions. This could be 
accomplished by integrating some sort of “workplace democracy”, to which the thesis will turn in 
chapter five. Less radically, it could be accomplished by enforcing transparency and oversight from 
both the government itself and individual citizens – the latter via anonymous and surprise 
inspections. The second is to ensure positions of bureaucratic power are not maintained for long 
enough, and with enough security, to build effective power. While this may be at a cost of 
efficiency, given the high turnover would affect managerial capability, it would help ensure the 
power necessary to hide abuse never became entrenched, and that if it did, there would be an 
opportunity to see it redressed after those in power had moved on. 
 
Republicanism is obviously not opposed to state intervention per se. It is worth briefly considering, 
however, how republican thinking views state control of the economy. Pettit supports some element 
of private property (Pettit 2014, 65-68, 70-72, 85), but allows for “common property” - his example 
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being a road. A road however is pretty much common property by default. Pettit’s concern with 
equitable support for cultures might entail museums or monuments as common property, upheld by 
taxes, and this seems both plausible and more substantive as an example. He refers to the prospects 
of tariffs and subsidies in some papers (Pettit 2010, 85) but again in little detail. 
 
What Pettit does cover extensively is the need for individuals to have a measure of independence 
from government; they should not have to rely upon its goodwill. He allows for various kinds of 
insurance – medical and financial, disability and pensions – but gives little detail on exactly what 
they might entail. To be entirely fair to Pettit, neither will this thesis; assessing financial security is 
beyond the author’s abilities, to give but one example. Would the NHS of the United Kingdom go 
too far? Probably not – since private healthcare remains available and the legislation surrounding 
the NHS attempts to prohibit inequitable treatment. What of nurturing industries deemed vital to 
economic development, supporting them via tariffs and subsidies? Again, there seems to be little of 
concern, assuming one does not believe that governments are fundamentally incapable of regularly 
making decisions with economic rationality and any degree of success – a statement which is 
clearly false (Chang 2010, 125-136). Their acceptability will be, as with government, to the extent 
that citizens can exert influence on the policies enacted. 
 
The practical upshot is that full centrally planned state control of the economy would go too far, but 
that this does not prevent state intervention of various kinds, up to and including nationalised 
industries. As shall be argued in the next chapter, a full command economy is not necessary to 
prevent systemic or corporate domination, but substantial state interference and a measure of state 





Section One – Solutions to the problem, and a critique of Rawls’ ideology 
 
Having summed up the problems presented for republicanism by corporate power in chapter three 
and having established a “neo-republican” viewpoint which explicitly builds in socialist and social 
egalitarian thought in chapter two, the thesis will now turn towards a solution that still upholds non-
domination and discursive control. Any such solution must account for not only Pettit’s stated 
demands on governments, and the problems previously discussed, most notably systemic 
domination and corporate power. Such a solution is to be contrasted with the liberal or social 
democracy currently practised in much of the more economically developed world. Such still allow 
for three major components of corporate power: massive material inequalities, concentration of 
wealth and power for the most well-off and the steady disregard of the majority’s economic well-
being and dignity alike. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, over-reliance on the market simply will not work. Any 
solution which necessitates authoritarian methods or governance is also flatly denied, due to 
violating non-domination and Pettit’s democratic requirements. Desiring the preservation of basic 
liberties and a loose material equality (Pettit 2014, 79-81, 107), a few ideas immediately present 
themselves, offered in no particular order. The first is a Rawlsian property-owning democracy 
organised in accordance with his difference principle; in such a democracy, the only permissible 
inequalities in distribution are those that maximise the minimum and preserve or improve the 
advantages of the least advantaged107. While Pettit argues that his system is both less and more 
demanding than Rawls’ (Pettit 2014, 107, Pettit 2012, 107-110), and certainly operates on different 
principles, an argument can be made that some blend of Rawls and Pettit would best serve non-
 
107 A brief note – Rawls does not look for any particular “pattern” of (in)equality to end up with, but rather structural principles that produce 




domination108. The second idea worth considering is some form of socialism; it must be democratic, 
but whether it would rely upon a command economy or the market is open to question. An 
anarchistic-leaning socialism would possibly preserve the material equality Pettit desires, but stands 
in direct opposition to his need for government oversight. The third would be enforced mutualism109, 
to the point it might even be considered some form of syndicalism; a wage ceiling, a wage floor, 
and ensuring that all employees of an enterprise have a stake in the business (Casassas & De 
Wispelaere 2016, 10-21). The fourth is to accept the thesis’ arguments thus far, but to reject that 
Pettit’s solutions are wholly insufficient; they require adaptation, not replacements. Instead, the 
problem is one of implementation of those solutions. Two strands of this approach will be discussed 
in the thesis. One is the “marketisation” and exit-prospects championed by Taylor in Exit Left. The 
other is to build in “workplace republicanism” and ensure that capitalism accomplishes its goals in a 
fair and equitable manner. No major organisational changes need to be made on such an account, 
though basic income has republican support (Lovett 2009, 825-828, Pettit 2007, 1-7, Casassas & De 
Wispelaere 2016, 10, etc). 
 
The range of solutions in organisational terms is thus quite diverse. Some might also require an 
ideological shift, or yet more theorising built into the neo-republican framework. This is particularly 
the case with any discussion of Rawls, but Taylor’s solution brings in neo-liberal ideas towards the 
market, socialist doctrine might continue to blend socialism and traditional republicanism, etc. The 
thesis will argue for the second solution – a form of socialism relying upon market functions, 
voluntary exchange, and yet simultaneously, the elimination of private property and the control of 
the means of production, financial exchange, etc, in the hands of society rather than individuals. 
The principles behind this organisation remain entirely republican, following Pettit and Lovett’s 
logic – loose material equality (expressive egalitarianism) is necessary for non-domination, and the 
 
108  For example, a republican property owning democracy is defended by Dagger (Dagger 2006, 156-162). 
109 For clarity, this refers not to the anarchist tradition of political thought dating back to Proudhon, but the idea of a social movement based 
on mutual interdependence. 
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more equal individuals are, the less likely domination becomes (Pettit 2012, 88, Lovett 2009, 825-
828). This is coupled with the need to preserve discursive control and prevent systemic domination, 
as previously outlined. 
 
The best way to proceed is both to outline the strengths of such a strategy, and the weaknesses of its 
competitors. Such weaknesses are not limited to organisation; Rawls’ blueprints for a society may 
or may not work, but it must equally be demonstrated that the principles he depends upon (maximin, 
liberal egalitarianism, etc) are insufficient to achieve the desired material equality, resources, and 
protections necessary for non-domination110. Such socialism would not necessarily be incompatible 
with a universal basic income of some kind, nor with mutualism. Their inclusion or exclusion can 
therefore wait. Instead, the thesis will discuss the distinctions between Rawlsian liberalism and 
republicanism. Considering the ways in which they are (in)compatible will aid in any proposed 
synthesis. 
 
An exhaustive list of every detail would require more space and time than is available to the thesis 
and to the reader. Therefore, the thesis will focus on three critical differences: Rawls and 
republicanism’s views on freedom, institutions and inequality, and the role of the state in 
influencing civil society (and the individuals comprising it) towards a particular view of “the good”.  
 
As noted above, Rawls and republicanism operate on substantially different versions of freedom. 
The thesis has already outlined the republican view in considerable detail, and defended it against 
objections from those who prefer a more liberal, egalitarian view.  But Rawls’ view has yet to be 
suitably outlined. Rawls, like Pettit, rejects the classical positive-negative view; he instead argues 
 
110 Rawls does not aim at non-domination, and begins from very different ideological premises (Pettit 1997, 50, Maynor 2003, 23, 55-56, 92). 
This can be seen via his discussion of slavery in contrast to being free and equal, where Rawls makes an argument from personhood and on 
competing claims, as opposed to social position (Rawls 2001, 20-24). Consider indentured servitude, with fixed rules and where the person was still 
viewed as “claim-worthy”. Rawls might have problems with this, but not, it seems, on grounds of freedom. Rawls also distinguishes “classical 
republicanism” from liberalism (Rawls 2001, 144), considering them compatible, but separate. What is necessary to be free, and what resources are 
necessary to be free, thus differs substantially. However, it is still arguable that Rawls’ methodology might eliminate corporate power in a way Pettit 
does not, and thus would be preferable for securing republican freedom despite not actually being designed to do so. As will be made clear in this 
section, this is not the case, but maximin could theoretically be more extensive than the very loose principles Pettit offers in Just Freedom. 
 
155 
that the entire debate is merely a question of emphasis rather than meaningful content. Instead, “this 
or that person (or persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to 
do (or not do) so and so.” (Rawls 1973, 202). Moreover, Rawls argues that there are many such 
liberties, whose value is interconnected and ultimately dependent on the lack of interference by 
persons or by institutions, mandating legal restrictions and a “rather intricate complex of rights and 
duties” (Rawls 1973, 202-204). In contrast to Pettit’s view, he does not accept that resources are 
necessary for liberty to apply, but rather that their lack devalues the “worth” of liberty (Rawls 1973, 
202-204). In the Law of Peoples, he goes still further, arguing that freedom and justice are 
interconnected and approximately follow one another (Rawls 1999, 14-16, 36-37). Rawls also 
expresses some scepticism towards a consequentialist approach to liberty and other ends, like utility; 
he views this as far too flimsy a justification, instead anchoring liberty in just practice, and allowing 
for liberty to be restrained only for the sake of greater liberty overall. Further, any loss of particular 
liberties must be acceptable to those who find themselves with less-than-equal liberty (Rawls 1973, 
210-211, 250). Rawls’ first priority is the so-called “basic liberties”, the most important ones; they 
may only be limited to arrange a greater overall supply of such liberties, or to prevent them from 
being denied. The exact arrangement, in Rawls’ view, does not matter so long as it is compatible 
with a provision of such liberties to all involved (Rawls 1973, 203-204, 250). Liberty thus comes 
prior to equality of opportunity, which then passes on to Rawls’ definition of justice, to be 
discussed shortly. How is this liberty to be provided and guaranteed?111 Unlike Pettit, who focuses 
on a large number of institutional specifics on one hand and very general principles like the eyeball 
test on the other, Rawls focuses primarily on the idea of a social contract, one which can only be 
supported by institutions, to which the thesis now turns. 
 
Briefly, Pettit criticises Rawls’ position in On the People’s Terms as not giving enough security and 
resources as part of his definition of freedom, thus necessitating the connection with justice (Pettit 
 
111 Pettit  similarly orders liberty as the first priority, but makes no use of Rawls’ “lexical” mode of ordering.  
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2012 82-94), while his own theory maintains a “richer” value of freedom. Moreover, Rawls’ 
definition lacks the distinction between controlled and uncontrolled interference; the thesis will 
return to this point after continuing the explanation of Rawls’ position.  
 
Rawls’ view on institutions is intricate, so a summary will have to suffice . He defines an institution 
as “a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers 
and immunities...an institution may be thought of in two ways: first as an abstract object, that is, as 
a possible form of conduct expressed by a system of rules; and second, as the realisation in the 
thought and conduct...specified by these rules” (Rawls 1973, 55). But an institution is not the mere 
sum of its parts, nor is the overall structure of society merely one “super-institution”. Parts of the 
institutions may be just112 or unjust, without affecting the status of the whole. In the same way, a 
society may be flawed by the presence of unjust institutions without its own constitution being so. 
Rawls explicitly ties formal justice – adherence to procedure – with substantive justice, the 
recognition and provision of rights, liberties, and various other goods (Rawls 1973, 55-60), arguing 
that any formally just institution will tend towards substantive justice as well. The critical element 
of this view is that institutions are subject to his two principles of liberty and justice as well (Rawls 
1973, 60-64, 250).  
 
Rawls also argues that institutions must be just and/or free over time – a continuous procedural 
justice (Sugin 2004, page 2007). They need not necessarily be so in every single instance. This 
presents an interesting dichotomy with his rejection of consequentialism, but not one that is 
necessarily inconsistent. He seems much more concerned with justice as an ongoing project; any 
particular instance of injustice, while regrettable, cannot be the focus of a society as a whole. Indeed, 
he seems to think it is impossible to speak of justice and fairness (or indeed, justice as fairness) 
“from a social point of view” in any given individual circumstance (Rawls 1993, 266). 
 




In Political Liberalism, Rawls sets out further details on “the basic structure” (Rawls 1993, 35) and 
how it might look, informed by his own conception of procedural justice113 and a “public political 
conception of justice”. The basic structure is a key component to a “well-ordered society”, if and 
only if it satisfies those conceptions of justice, with liberty anchored to it, following Rawls’ “two 
principles of justice” and basic liberties (Rawls 1973, 60-65). To do so, the basic structure must 
secure “just background conditions”, (Rawls 1993, 266). These conditions may, however, be eroded, 
even inadvertently, by methods not unlike those highlighted earlier in the thesis: “the invisible hand” 
of capitalism does much to detract from justice and fairness, while the market’s complexity makes it 
increasingly difficult to control or legislate over it, without resulting in a regulatory quagmire 
(Rawls 1993, 266-269). He proposes thus a “division of labour” - individuals act as they will and he 
claims no conformation to “any observable pattern”, but the rules and laws are held to the principles 
of justice; thus public law, statutes, taxation and entitlements (Rawls 1993, 283). 
 
On such a view, institutional injustice and (propagation of) inequality is much more severe than any 
in the individual sphere, which potentially sets him against Pettit’s view – Pettit is more concerned 
than Rawls appears to be with individual instances of domination, and criticises Rawls on this point; 
under republicanism, no domination can be entertained, and a system which “depends (depending) 
on the goodwill of someone who is unlikely to turn nasty” is unacceptable (Pettit 2014, 103)114. 
Pettit’s concern is on action, particularly individual action, and is termed “individualist” here.  
Rawls’ two principles of justice as fairness, and Pettit’s concepts of justice as insulation, must be 
examined in greater detail, and then the thesis can discuss their respective solutions for inequality. 
 
 
113 To be discussed and compared with republicanism shortly. 
114  This has particular contrast with Rawls’ view on the family, where Pettit insists on interference (of a non-arbitrary kind, likely via law), 
and Rawls famously does his best to exclude it from political life (Kearns 1983, 36-42, Rawls 2001, 162-168, esp. 165, Pettit 2014, 15). 
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 A small clarification is needed beforehand. Rawls uses justice as fairness in two senses, which may 
explain some of Pettit’s seemingly uncharitable criticisms. In one sense, it is similar to Pettit’s 
usage – justice in terms of a just distribution, set as “a proper balance of competing claims” (Pettit 
2014, 79-81). In another, however, Rawlsian justice relates to the overall harmonious working of 
institutions and society in the greater whole; a just institution may not be distributively just, but it 
accomplishes its goals in a rational, transparent and even-handed manner – a fair manner, simply 
put. This is also the sense in which Hayek supposedly agrees with Rawls (Lister 2011, 5, 16-17). 
 
Pettit and Rawls sketch out theories of distributive justice, the latter more extensively. Rawls sets 
out the case for a distribution which maximises justice by ensuring that any economic inequalities 
maximise the interests115 of the least advantaged (Rawls 2001, 58-61), again on a procedural basis. 
He justifies such an outcome over both greater overall prosperity but bitter inequality (what he calls 
the utilitarian view) and over complete equality. The utilitarian view is discarded for its total lack of 
scruples and lack of regard for the basic structure (Rawls 1993, 258-261), while complete equality 
is supposedly “incompatible with the integrity of free persons” because “we have a right to our 
natural abilities and a right to whatever we become entitled to by taking part in a fair social process” 
(Rawls 1993, 283-284). However, it is important to remember that Rawls maintains a lexical 
priority when it comes to justice and (in)equality; the basic liberties come first, then equality of 
opportunity is to be guaranteed, and only then must economic inequality be addressed . While the 
first two provide reasons to address inequality in themselves, it may be that the establishment of 
certain basic liberties counteracts any attempts to address such inequality, e.g.: the preservation of 
systems of private property. Likewise, while Rawls is able to denounce an incredibly prosperous 
autocracy, a point on which the neo-republican view concurs, his definition of equality of 
opportunity may differ substantially from the thesis’, and may not be extensive enough to 
 
115  Rawls’ specific term is “expectations” as in “(reasonable) expectations of primary goods over a complete life. These expectations are their 
life-prospects.” (Rawls 2001, 59). 
 
159 
correspond with the equity demanded by social egalitarianism, let alone neo-republican theory, or 
even Pettit’s demands for cultural support (Pettit 1997, 145-146). 
 
Such distributive justice is, for Rawls, a desirable end in itself; for Pettit, it is simply a matter of 
ensuring that individuals are not subject to the domination of others (Pettit 2014, 102-104). It is, in 
his words, a minimalist base. Likewise, Pettit argues that Rawlsian liberalism focuses too much on 
equality of resources; to his mind, it pays too little attention to inequalities of social power and 
privilege, and on the other, it and other “radical egalitarian” programs are “moral fantasies” (Pettit 
2014, 107). Because Pettit views his ideal of freedom as richer and more demanding than the 
Rawlsian one, he is strangely both unconcerned with “a strict, substantive equality in wealth and 
power” (Pettit 2014, 82) and supportive of a “substantive and revisionary set of policies” (Pettit 
2014, 102). As freedom and equality sharply correlate, as established in chapters two and three, 
Pettit’s account of a “freedom centred principle of justice” (Pettit 2014, 78-79) is misleading, and 
his critique of equality of resources seems to be more of a critique of Dworkin or similar 
egalitarians, not Rawls’ specific vision.  
 
The procedural versus individual distinction is also useful to consider, and may be more of a 
genuine divergence. Both agree on the need for extensive protections to guarantee liberty; to 
promote the “value” of liberty on the Rawlsian side, and the resources to make use of liberty on 
Pettit’s; the two converge on similar protections despite having far different ideas of how to 
guarantee liberty and distributive justice. In an ideal Rawlsian world, individual actions and 
behaviours would have relatively little consequence;  the system as a whole would correct any 
injustices over time, via procedural means (Rawls 1973, 87-88, Rawls 1993, 265-271). In the 
absence of such a world, there may be occasions where individual action is required, although 
Rawls may prefer to avoid it (Rawls 2001, 53). Pettit is deeply sceptical of such procedural liberties, 
which he feels lack republicanism’s attention to detail and leave gaps open for personal exploitation 
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(Pettit 2014, 219). Republicanism uses systems and constitutional methods as well, but domination 
must be curtailed to the greatest extent possible. 
 
Pettit instead outlines a system of protections against any uncontrolled interference (Pettit 2014, 
103-107), relying on the long list of requirements, especially the idea of insulation – whether this is 
in relationships he deems special (corporate power, for example) or in general cases of crime, abuse 
of power, etc. Pettit too would doubtless prefer a system where these events simply did not happen. 
Unlike Rawls, however, he establishes that an ideal republican system is not only allowed but 
required to intervene in cases of individual domination. 
 
As noted above, neo-republicanism may demand additional guarantees. Too much inequality of any 
kind – social, economic or political – is a potential threat to the free individual, and an opportunity 
for domination. Likewise, the focus on process rather than individual instances means that systemic 
domination could go unnoticed for a very long time. An example of this under a Rawlsian process 
would be the matter of free speech. Rawls guarantees the right of free speech, but not its effective 
value – according to Pettit, at least (Pettit 2014, 103). A more charitable reading would suggest that 
Rawls is less concerned with social power and status than Pettit, but would be equally appalled at 
efforts to distort and control that free speech. It seems likely, however, that his focus on the bigger 
picture of institutions would result in inequalities which, following the arguments in chapter three 
on media control and concentration, diminish the standing and value of free speech according to 
republican norms. In particular, Rawls does not place a positive demand on civic virtues and 
autonomy in the same way as republicanism, and especially the neo-republicanism the thesis 
proposes, does. A plausible example would be media organisations which, although complying with 
all the institutional rules Rawls might set, did nothing to foster dialogue or challenge the status quo, 
or simply advocated passive, incremental change in solutions that benefited their owners’ socio-
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economic position. Thus, the political discourse could be narrowed, as it currently is under 
capitalism (Chomsky 2002, 31-37). 
 
Another example: it is equally possible that such a society would have a recurring case of alienation 
in Schuppert’s sense (perhaps an ostracised trade or ethnicity) who, due to a lack of effective 
representation, would be unable to effect meaningful change. Rawls places certain demands of 
reciprocity and equal treatment, coupled with the thought-experiment of the original position, and 
this would prohibit blatant discrimination116. But one may consider the development of a society on 
procedural terms, via democratic elections and the slow change of public deliberation. Over time, 
institutions will be reformed and developed in accordance with the wishes of the majority. 
Reciprocity and fairness will, ideally, compel these changes to be fair117. They are only fair to those 
with voice and interest, however. A small and relatively alien group in an otherwise homogenous 
state, such as the Ainu in Japan or the aboriginal peoples of Australia118, might be subject to charity 
and aid by reciprocity. They will still lack a voice, though; they will lack the character of being 
socially free and equal, because in a very real sense, they are not. They are dependent upon being 
heard and considered, and then factored into public policy, by a majority which has little in 
common with them. Republicanism, by dint of the demands for equitable treatment would find this 
impermissible; the status of being part of a minority group should never result in the loss of being 
socially free and equal, in other words. It is not obvious that Rawls’ principles can effectively 
address alienation of this kind without substantial modification. 
 
The key issue for both individual and systemic domination, however, is the potential for instances 
of inequality wherein social or economic power permits uncontrolled interference. This could occur 
in at least two ways – perhaps more, but these seem to be the most notable. First, individuals may 
 
116 In an ideal world, of course, but it seems difficult to blame Rawls for the persistence of unthinking prejudices. 
117 Pettit’s concept of civility in Republicanism resembles this, and the two complement one another well. 
118 For a despised trade, we might consider the world’s oldest profession – prostitutes are frequently subject to abuse and degradation, and this 
is routinely ignored. 
 
162 
become trapped in positions of economic or social vulnerability which Rawls’ procedural focus 
allows for – there may be numerous instances of individual domination, provided the system as a 
whole exhibits no such tendencies. For example, transient workers might lose out on protections 
that static workers enjoy, or such protections might be of little value. This could hold for migrants 
as well, with formal protections and liberties which accomplished little (Ottonelli & Torresi 2010, 
202-222). Alternatively, procedures themselves could become corrupted, or interact with one 
another such that each procedure was formally acceptable, but the results became inherently 
objectionable.  Tommie Shelby phrases this excellently: “unjust racial hierarchy and inequality can 
be systematically reproduced in the absence of explicit racist rules or overt racial animus.” (Shelby 
2016, 26). Flaws at any level could result in systemic failings, whether in goals, content, or 
application. Moreover, these could combine; a failure of both employment and education, for 
instance, may effectively freeze specific groups out of higher education and higher workplace roles. 
Some individuals may still get through; there may even be “affirmative action” programmes to 
allow for this (Shelby 2016, 27-30). But on the whole it would be insufficient. 
 
An immediate response from Rawls against the procedural flaws argument might be to point out 
that adherence to formal justice tends towards real justice in the long run, and a similar pattern may 
hold for inequality; “where we find formal justice...we are likely to find substantive justice as well” 
(Rawls 1973, 58-60); the lack of total success is not a reason to abandon a project, or else 
republicanism would be equally doomed. Moreover, the presence of such cases would imply that 
the basic structure was failing to perform effectively, and would therefore need reform and 
assistance. Unlike Dworkin’s equality of resources, Rawls is not committed to a kind of distributive 
equality which explicitly disallows corrective action or coldly rejects reciprocal duties. Quite the 
opposite; Rawls’ distaste for individual aid and imposing an ideal pattern (Rawls 1993, 283) need 
not be dogmatically followed, and in cases where the system has obviously broken down, the social 
contract has failed at least one party. Some individual intervention could therefore be justified. In 
 
163 
the case of interactional failure, Rawls would undoubtedly agree that such areas should be reformed; 
he also notes that “unless this structure is appropriately regulated and adjusted, an initially just 
social process will eventually cease to be just” (Rawls 1993, 266). The question then becomes 
whether the system could easily discover such flaws and eliminate them. There does seem to be 
some inconsistency in how the system is to cope with chronic cases of individual injustice. 
 
A more promising critique along these lines would be to consider who is running these institutions, 
and whether the inequalities Rawls permits could conceivably have knock on effects. Such would 
only be worsened with cases of the Schuppertian alienation mentioned previously, resulting in both 
inferiors and elites. But this is more of a problem of organisation, to be considered in the next 
section. It is enough to say at this point that the system may easily end up procedurally just for 
many, but not for a substantial minority, and this should be a serious concern. 
 
A related issue is that of private domination. Neither Pettit nor Rawls are eager to see individuals 
dependent on government (Rawls 2001, 21-23, Pettit 2014, 77-78). But their definitions of 
dependency differ, and they especially differ with regard to private institutions. The paradigm case 
for this would be a small firm which produces luxury goods; it is clearly not part of the basic 
structure, not being a “major social institution” (Rawls 1973, 7) nor does its ownership conflict with 
loose material equality or expressive egalitarianism (Pettit 2012, 103, 113-114). Assume that in 
order to remain competitive, the owner engages in abusive motivational techniques, regular threats 
of unemployment, unpaid overtime, etc. If the employees lose their jobs, they will be subjected to 
deprivation119. According to Rawls, this is regrettable and highly unpleasant, but it is not actually 
coercion, etc – it remains permissible. Rawls might argue that there are moral reasons to avert this, 
or that available legislation would aid in correcting it, but it is not, in itself, freedom-depriving. To 
Pettit, this situation is dominating, but is only problematic to the proportion it is inescapable (Pettit 
 
119 Both Pettit and Rawls agree on the need for unemployment insurance/benefit, but neither give much detail on its content. 
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2001, 155-156), or under the neo-republican thesis, to the proportion it is alienating. Thus in many 
cases it will be freedom-depriving. If there are good grounds for regarding subservience, and the 
instilling of subservience, as freedom-depriving – and chapter one, section three, argued that there 
were – then Rawls’ view seems notably lacking.  
 
Lastly, republicanism might challenge Rawls via non-domination directly. Rawls’ definition of 
liberty is closer to the standard of non-interference, although he does not characterise it in this way 
(Rawls 1973, 201-202). He speaks of constraints and duties solely, making no reference to the 
prospect of non-arbitrary interference; as with negative liberty, any constraint is at best a necessary 
evil. What if Rawls were to adopt the republican standard of non-domination, however, such that he 
would need a system which – by procedure – would ensure the loss of the potential to dominate, the 
enforcement of the eyeball test, etc? In chapter one, it was established that the republican 
conception of liberty was more nuanced and complete, and preferable to the liberal, negative liberty 
model. In chapter two, autonomy and systemic domination were established as goals for the 
republican – or neo-republican – to protect and avert, respectively. These again seem compatible 
and desirable for Rawls. 
 
Non-domination does not conflict with many of Rawls’ arguments. It is likely that he would still 
favour some form of expansive, egalitarian change over Pettit’s “loose material equality”, certainly 
considering the problem of systemic domination, which Pettit does not embrace. The original 
position, his proceduralist focus, etc, would also remain. Faced with the need to avoid subservience 
and all the other evils that republicanism rightfully condemns, and to avert dependency on others’ 
goodwill, Rawls might adopt many of Pettit’s criteria in Just Freedom, most notably protections for 




To articulate a full redesign of Rawls’ arguments under non-domination’s principles would require 
a separate thesis. If Rawls were prepared to adopt a republican conception of freedom and focus 
upon individual instances of possible domination, as well as alienation, and could offer a plausible 
solution on doing so by procedural means, then the dispute would narrow considerably. There seem 
good reasons for a Rawlsian approach to adjust itself in response to republican criticism. If that is 
the case, does Rawls need to be concerned with maximin, his two principles of justice, and so on? 
Pettit insists stridently that he does not – liberty alone is capable of grounding all such concerns. 
This seems unduly optimistic, however.  As noted, freedom and equality correlate, and Pettit does 
not allow for systemic domination. It would be more apt to say that distributive justice is contained 
and guided by republican liberty, in a way which Rawls rightly acknowledges (Rawls 1973, 151). 
The question then is whether liberty and justice would be better served by procedural policy of the 
kind Rawls favours, with republican amendments, or by some other, more individualistic solution.
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Section Two – Universal Basic Income 
 
A tangent at this point is needed. Universal basic income (UBI) is an organisational 
proposal that has been advanced by both left and right – the most comprehensive support 
coming from Van Parijs (Van Parijs 2017, 1-3). His theory, and its implementation, is the 
main one on which the thesis will focus. It is compatible with much of the current system 
of liberal and social democracy, and with the other organisational principles immediately 
outlined in section one; an exception would be most kinds of socialism, where the 
product of society is distributed equally or equitably, or in accordance with need, and all 
production is controlled. Such forms of socialism effectively encompass UBI. 
 
Universal basic income is the theory that most120 forms of welfare could be replaced by a 
single fund payable to each adult, being sufficient to live on, if meagrely, and paid in 
addition to any other funds they may receive. Lovett argues on its behalf for republican 
freedom, arguing (not unlike Pettit’s later writings in just Freedom) that equality and 
freedom are tightly bound, and that such a basic income is an opportunity for both 
(Lovett 2009, 826-829). Van Parijs suggests that such a fund could be paid for by 
additional corporate and consumption taxes, or by taxes on environmental externalities 
(Van Parijs 2017, 236-239). 
 
As an addition to current liberal democratic practice, or even the more extensive 
protections found in social democratic practice (such as in the Nordic countries), UBI has 
 
120 While not explicitly stated, Van Parijs allows for social welfare of certain kinds, e.g.: language training for immigrants, 
which presumably need not be extended to all citizens but would require some usage of government budgets, and would not be 
funded by a tax solely on their persons (Van Parijs 2017, 243) 
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much to recommend it. It would, in theory121, reduce administrative overhead and aid in 
welfare reform. Because it would be truly universal, such an income would be more 
appealing to those historically neglected in welfare opportunities. From the proceduralist 
perspective, UBI would impose no particular pattern on distribution and could be applied 
consistently, blind to individual circumstance. Most importantly for republicans, it could 
accomplish three important goals. Firstly, it would reduce the discretionary control 
governments might exert over such welfare, reducing the need for minorities or the 
dispossessed to “toady” or prostrate themselves to government officials. Secondly, it 
would aid in reducing the power of employers mentioned earlier in the thesis; a 
guaranteed income would reduce the power of threatening unemployment. Thirdly, by 
granting non-earning individuals (home-makers, for instance) an independent source of 
income, it would reduce the power and ability to dominate that their earning counterparts 
possess over them. There may be further benefits, but these already make a promising 
case for its adoption. 
 
The problem of UBI is that it is insufficient to address the problems the thesis has 
outlined on its own. Van Parijs makes an excellent case for it as a system of welfare, but 
UBI fails to address corporate power and systemic domination to any meaningful degree. 
Equally, it fails to disentangle corporate power from politics, and offers little increase in 
democratic legitimacy122. It offers no especial redress to Schuppertian alienation123; to the 
 
121 Van Parijs has lengthy chapters which discuss the history and trial runs of various kinds of basic income. Results are 
tentative, but promising (Van Parijs, 29-99, 133-169). 
122 In Pettit’s sense of the phrase; UBI solely improves the horizontal aspect of justice. 
123 Again, Van Parijs is aware of these pitfalls, but his explanations as to the feasibility of a truly universal basic income in the 
midst of racially charged “identity politics” are overly optimistic. One need merely consider the dichotomy in the Danish 
People’s Party (https://danskfolkeparti.dk/politik/principprogram/)’s strong support of welfare and governmental support, and 
utter xenophobia for immigrants, especially those from outside northern Europe. A basic income for some compounding the 
suffering or second-class status of others is a paradigm case of Schuppertian alienation. 
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extent it prohibits wage-slavery it is an aid against Marxist alienation, but it does little to 
counteract the problems of competition, differing interests, a class system, etc. It reduces 
the severity of these myriad problems, but is a palliative for them at best. For an example, 
corporate power may be maintained by moving assets elsewhere to regain leverage.124 
Subtler methods could also be used to punish a recalcitrant employee in a UBI nation. 
UBI would do nothing on its own to protect from, for example, so called right to work 
laws (Gould & Shierholz 2011, 1-13) which make it easy to fire an employee and have 
toxic effects on living standards.  Precisely because UBI, in itself, changes everyday life 
in the capitalist system so little, it lacks the ability to enact truly revolutionary change in 
our socio-political systems, and perhaps even our discourse. It is an incomplete part of a 
full solution. 
 
The thesis’ preferred solution – a neo-republican, egalitarian system in Carens’ mould – 
encompasses UBI’s strengths but goes significantly further in redistribution and 
socialisation. This may lose some agreement from proceduralists, but it loses nothing in 
positives from the republican perspective. The thesis must consider if the use of UBI 
would improve the potential of other solutions proposed; it will do so in section two 
when discussing property owning democracy, and in chapter five.
 
124 Once again, Van Parijs is aware and calls for a global change; this again seems overly optimistic (Van Parijs 2017, 217-
230). Capital flight remains an issue for the egalitarian system as well, of course. 
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Section Three – Rawls’ Property Owning Democracy 
 
Having argued for a neo-republican conception of liberty, Rawls might raise certain 
objections at this point on the grounds of distributive justice and practicality. While he 
might concede that non-domination is a more comprehensive conception of liberty, and 
one need be less concerned with distributive justice (and more concerned with individual 
freedom) if the idea of liberty-as-non-domination is “richer”, as Pettit puts it, and thus the 
basic liberties require much more material support in and of themselves, he may object to 
the thesis’ criticisms on organisational grounds. Considering part of the neo-republican 
critique of Rawls involved the proceduralist blindness to structural domination and 
“gaming the system”, as well as the problem of socio-economic inferiors, this may seem 
surprising. 
 
Rawls’ hypothetical concern takes two approaches. First, he may accuse the neo-
republican thesis of abandoning Pettit’s realism – that the demands are simply too great 
to  be feasible for any government or system that works with human individuals as they 
are now, and not as we might wish. Operating by procedure is lamentably not perfect, but 
designing and implementing a recurring system over individual instances of assistance is 
a more secure and stable method that will, over time, accomplish greater results than a 
superficially appealing system that collapses under its own weight. 
 
Second, Rawls allows for a kind of liberal socialism which still operates under the 
guidelines of “maximin”, proceduralist operating, and which focuses on the basic 
liberties, basic structure, and the establishment of public reason. If such a socialism 
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dispensed with the basic liberties as Rawls presents them, and focused on Pettit’s instead, 
then this would be akin to the neo-republican solution outlined in the introduction125. This 
would adapt to the ideological critique but maintain organisational distinctiveness. 
Additionally, Rawls might argue that the preservation of certain socio-economic 
inequalities allows for the betterment of the least advantaged, and that a neo-republican 
socialism would be fundamentally impoverished. If that impoverishment was severe 
enough, it could come into conflict with the resources needed for republican freedom. He 
might therefore support some variation on his property-owning democracy which would 
be less perfect in ideal theory, but far more practical. 
 
To begin its rebuttal, the thesis will first outline Rawls’ organisational principles and 
critique his desired outcome, a property-owning democracy, followed by noting neo-
republican amendments that could conceivably be included. This “hybrid” end-state will 
then be assessed for viability in achieving the protection of non-domination, and whether 
it would evade the problems raised in the first section. Ultimately it will be argued it is 
inadequate, and so Rawls’ account of a socialist fulfilment of his ideology will be 
critiqued in the same way. 
 
Rawls’ preferred solution is that of property-owning democracy, or POD. In contrast to 
many contemporary egalitarian theories, he rejects welfare state capitalism – social 
democratic policies – (Chambers 2008, 22, Vallier 2018, 142-143) as palliative; they 
maintain a deeply inegalitarian and unfair basic structure. Property owning democracy is 
 
125 To briefly recap, full voluntary exchange, with the society’s GDP split into equal shares for consumption, after taxation and 
business expenditures; all means of production are owned by the state and run by private individuals. 
 
171 
not alien to republicanism, either; republican principles might permit something 
resembling the proposals of Alan Thomas (Thomas 2016, Thomas 2008, 101-123). Pettit 
himself, while he does not use the term in Just Freedom, outlines a system of property 
rights and a “basic liberty of property ownership” that seems to resemble it. Certainly, 
welfare state capitalism as practiced in the modern day has failed to mitigate inequality, a 
point on which the thesis and Rawls agree in full. Indeed, one of Rawls’ major concerns 
with welfare state capitalism is the way in which citizens may be divided (between those 
who require major welfare assistance and those who do not) and dependent upon the 
market or the government, one way or another. 
 
A Rawlsian POD is still quite interventionist, however126. Such a democracy would aim 
to regulate, plan and invest, ensuring the provision of public goods. Ideally, capital would 
be widely distributed127 and dispersed in preference to pure economic efficiency, but 
efficiency would remain via the utilisation of the market. To dilute the effects of capital 
transfer, a “stiff inheritance tax” would be utilised. Presumably, this could incorporate 
capital gains taxes, housing taxes, etc. (O’Neill & Williamson 2008, 4). 
 
Rawls’ POD would be designed from the ground up to satisfy both the two principles of 
justice and the political values of liberty, equality and democracy (O’Neill 2008, 80). It 
would value reciprocity, and the establishment of equal relations between citizens. One 
interesting note is that the wide dispersal of capital would, in an ideal world, result in a 
roughly equal control of the means of production while still in individual hands. 
 
126 This point is particularly necessary in the face of very different ideologies using the term in a very different way. For 
example, Thatcherite policies in the United Kingdom support a “property owning democracy” which does not resemble Rawls’ in any 
meaningful sense. See notes 7+11, O’Neill 2008, 95. 




An immediate criticism, raised by O’Neill, is that Rawls assumes that POD alone would 
be sufficient to protect the value of political liberties (and, for our own concerns, guard 
against non-domination). For the numerous reasons outlined in chapters two and three, 
this seems implausible, or at least necessitates much more explanation. This could, 
however, be readily solved by accepting Pettit’s democratic requirements and the 
“insulation” of the political from the economic, as O’Neill suggests in the latter case. 
There would then be much more security for political liberty as espoused by neo-
republicanism. 
 
O’Neill is primarily concerned with arguing over the POD/welfare state distinction, 
however, and only briefly touches upon socialism. Rawls does touch against Marxist (and 
Schuppertian) alienation, noting that “the narrowing and demeaning features of the 
division should be largely overcome once the institutions of property-owning democracy 
are realised” (O’Neill 2008, 89). But there is little emphasis on how this is to be achieved, 
or answer for systemic domination. POD would be an improvement, but it is not clear, 
from Rawls at least, if it is enough to preclude an underclass altogether. Nor is it clear 
that it would prevent the hateful competition characterising Marxist alienation. 
Production would still remain in the hands of a portion, not society as a whole. There is 
thus little guarantee that POD’s implementation alone would be sufficient to prevent 




Likewise, there have been suggestions for inoculating Rawls via other republican 
principles. Alan Thomas argues for an explicit commitment to “effective political 
agency”, following some of Cohen’s critique of Rawls, in particular, the “overspill” 
argument wherein Cohen criticises the self-interested motivations of socio-economic 
elites. Cohen condemns the very presence of elites; one of his concerns is that, in Thomas’ 
words, “Rawls’ view is to redress, not eliminate, inequality” (Thomas 2008, 114). And 
this inequality would, per the arguments of the rest of the thesis, prove pernicious. While 
Thomas does not accept the overspill argument in its entirety, he still holds that Rawls’ 
value of freedom and the guaranteeing of justice is under extreme stress without the 
joining of republican doctrine (Thomas 2008, 117-122). This might, if sufficiently 
constituted, help POD deal with both Cohen’s critique and the thesis’. 
 
However, Thomas’ arguments notwithstanding, some issues for a joining of republican 
democracy and POD remain that question his view. In particular, it is unclear if Rawls 
has considered addressing corporate power as it arises, it is equally unclear if a 
republican POD can address corporate power effectively without implementing 
extremely rigorous controls – especially in regards to systemic domination -  and 
alienation remains a threat, if somewhat diminished in comparison to the welfare state 
and modern capitalism. 
 
 
Starting with the first, under Rawls’ POD, the economy will be directed to disperse 
capital and promote a just society over financial growth and economic efficiency. This is 
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an excellent start.  Rawls’ methodology in doing so is incomplete, however. Wealth is 
still permitted to concentrate in the hands of a few – an elite – giving them 
disproportionate influence. This is especially the case practically speaking, as any POD 
established after welfare state capitalism128 will have to rely on redistribution, and 
incomplete or ill-considered redistribution will inevitably leave the “playing field” 
unequal. An inheritance tax helps, but by its very nature only after the damage has been 
done. A global tax on capital (Piketty 2014, 515-531, Vallier 2018, 148-150) would also 
be helpful, but insufficient. Elites will assume great importance. Again, Cohen’s 
“overspill” objection raises its head, but Thomas underestimates its harm; it is also 
corrosive to republicanism and democratic liberty, as established in chapter three. 
 
In the extreme, this creates the problem of Galt’s Gulch – a number of rich and influential 
individuals who do their utmost to ensure society runs to their tune, by dint of being 
skilled, intelligent, and ruthless. Because capital has been widely dispersed, they do not 
have the ability to own everything, or almost everything. This is a great improvement on 
capitalism-as-was but they own enough to be influential. Their interests lie in self-
enrichment. They will try to sway public opinion to facilitate this129. They will try to 
wrest control of production into as few hands (i.e. theirs) as possible. And this will do 
much to threaten the system’s workings, especially because the combination of greed and 
ideology will be particularly difficult to refute; they gain nothing from egalitarianism. 
There is a risk of a more widely dispersed “political business cycle”, with detrimental 
effects (Kalicki 1943, 4-6). 
 
128 E.g.: any modern state, if one is lucky; if not, one goes from a pure liberal democracy and relatively unfettered capitalism. 




The logical step here is to point out they are hardly behaving reciprocally – like the 
rabble in Hegelian thought, they are unable to reconcile themselves to a society in which 
they do not receive disproportionate rewards for admittedly important and helpful work. 
They should be condemned and their assets seized, but this violates all manner of 
Rawlsian conditions – it disrespects their legally acquired property, it fails to maximise 
the minimum, and so on. To give in to them, however, will create further inequality 
whenever they decide to use their capital and influence to bargain against the needs of the 
rest of society. 
 
Rawls gives little guidance on how to resolve this. Perhaps instead, one might consider 
how to ensure it does not arise. Let it be assumed that the redistribution is totally 
successful in ensuring equality of opportunity, that any inequalities emerging are to the 
benefit of the least advantaged, sufficient prosperity and happiness for all, etc. It is not 
perfect, but it fulfils all the characteristics of POD very well. 
 
How does the redistributive effort ensure that this widely dispersed capital does not 
congeal back into a few hands? Thomas makes excellent suggestions, noting that “land 
and capital are widely dispersed; no sector dominates the control of resources; inheritance 
laws are strongly egalitarian; incentives are put in place for small savers; there is 
substantial public investment in the education system; and each citizen is given income 
from property and the opportunity to invest” (Thomas 2008, 113). The aforementioned 




The problem with such efforts is twofold. First, in the absence of truly global solutions 
(again, the aforementioned tax), there is a high risk of capital flight or at the very least, 
accounting tricks to minimise one’s tax burden. It is remarkably easy for the wealthy to 
move money “offshore”. Second, most of these suggestions are more assertions than 
concrete policy. Unless implemented with great care and stringent requirements, they 
may amount to nothing more than a delay. Take the inheritance laws, for instance. In the 
United Kingdom, any outright gift given to one’s offspring is subject to reduced tax, or 
no tax at all, over seven years (). This allows a rich family to, as an example, give their 
child a “small gift” of several hundred thousand pounds, and with some luck130, no tax at 
all needs to be paid. Rawls could accept an extensive inheritance tax (Rawls 2001, 53), 
but inadequately designed, loopholes such as this exist. 
 
Alienation131 meanwhile is more of an indirect problem. As mentioned, Rawls observes 
that POD will have beneficial effects on recognition and the drudgery, competition, etc, 
endemic to modern capitalism. Although likely, it is insufficient. It is unreasonable to 
criticise Rawls on being unable to address Schuppertian alienation on the grounds of pre-
existing racial or sexual prejudices, and POD certainly seems better equipped to address 
these132 than welfare-state capitalism. 
 
 
130 Luck which will be aided via access to exceptional healthcare, public or private, access to better nutrition, living in areas 
with lower crime rates...and so on. 
131 To recap, for the reader’s benefit, alienation is the loss of autonomy; it may be due to a lack of inherent self-respect and 
self-will (Schuppertian) or it may be because one’s conditions have reduced one to the barest state of humanity, lacking the ability to 
think and feel, concentrating on living through each day (Marxist). 
132 Against a potential objection; it has been argued that pure capitalism is anything but racist, as competition ensures merit in 
employment and lack of scruples with regards to selling; a customer is a customer (Friedman 1982, 108-118). A POD, by nature of 
government involvement, might allow the marginalisation of minorities, who have little effective voice. No doubt Rawls would be 
amenable to an explicit allowance for protections of minority rights and ensuring capital was deliberately available, in replacement of 
ordinary welfare, which leaves them dependent. 
 
177 
Where POD may continue to fail is in Schuppertian alienation based on economic 
grounds, for example, the very lowest and most degrading professions, and in Marxist 
alienation. The former will be supported economically by society, but Rawls says little to 
suggest their dignity will improve compared with welfare state capitalism. While they 
will not have to endure the division, dependence, and potential humiliation of welfare, 
they will still remain distinctly recognition starved. In the latter case, again, POD’s 
dispersal of capital is welcome, and done to a sufficient degree, reduces the “hateful 
competition” and the alienation of men from one another. The possibility persists, 
however, that a proportion of individuals will remain focused purely on survival, with 
resulting curtailment of autonomy and use of political rights and privileges133. Again, 
given Rawls’ focus on the “appropriate” balance of competing claims, this encourages 
individuals to see themselves at odds. 
 
Could POD be amended to address these problems? Adopting republican requirements 
aside, a universal basic income would be an easy way to disperse capital without relying 
on welfare, with advantages both in administration and support of non-domination, 
following Van Parijs and Lovett’s earlier arguments. Building upon Rawls with all 
manner of ingenious methods of regulatory capture and management of land and capital, 
as Thomas offers, is equally doable. But there is no realistic solution to accomplish this 
perfectly by procedure alone. As soon as the procedure fails, corruption ensues. At that 
point, further redistribution – on an individual level – is required. 
 
 
133 This is related to, but distinct from, the problem of alienation by Rawls’ focus on procedure. Even allowing for the more 
individualist republican view over Rawls in a POD, competition remains an issue. 
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An objection might be levied here: that every system will have some point of failure. 
Supplying airtight policy is an impossibly high standard for anyone, and the task of 
political philosophy is not to provide policy in the first place. Thus, Rawls cannot be 
called upon to create a perfect system, nor is this thesis able to offer a comprehensive 
policy in its own right. This misses the point, however. 
 
The problem remains that POD still contains all the many contradictions and tensions of 
capitalism, just mitigated. They may be mitigated very well indeed, but they remain. 
Capital being widely dispersed, perhaps aided by a global tax on capital as Piketty 
envisages (Vallier 2018, 145-151, Piketty 2014) removes the worst excesses and slows 
their return. Republican democratic requirements, as outlined by Thomas, shore up 
legitimate democratic government and help prevent corruption. Once the system has 
begun to break down, however, it is necessary to act from outside it134, or to break its 
rules in a way designed to support it rather than degrade it. These are actions Rawls 
protests, however (Rawls 1973, 354). Far better, if possible, to remove all concerns and 
begin with a new system from the ground up, ideally one which will not necessitate 
action outside of institutional process. 
 
Against this, Rawls argues in The Basic Structure as Subject that there indeed ought to be 
an “ideal form” and that “adjustments in the basic structure are always necessary” (Rawls 
1977, 163-164), a view restated in Justice as Fairness (Rawls 2001, 53-55). Were the 
problems of Galt’s Gulch, alienation, etc to appear, then reform would be necessary, to be 
 
134 For clarity, Rawls accepts that a system of institutions might require political maintenance. He errs primarily in timeframe; 
institutional reform (amending tax rates, for example) does not solve immediate and pressing problems, which may not be 
identifiable to political discourse. The thesis discusses this shortly.  
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carried out via a procedural manner. And while this would not solve individual instances 
of domination, it would, over time, correct the problems outlined; the institutions, which 
we concern ourselves here, would be adequately served. 
 
Two problems in turn. First, the scope of the problems may lie outside those of the 
procedures. It is one thing to correct an unjust law, and quite another to correct the 
alienation inherent in the society. Nor are such procedures capable of addressing global 
problems. Arguably, they could be reformed to deal with new problems, in deference to 
the “ideal form”, but that depends upon their being secure. And POD is, by its very 
nature, less secure than socialism, and less secure than a structure which can allow for 
direct action and intervention. This is again more pronounced when considered on the 
international scale. 
 
Second, Rawls offers little by way of explanation as to how the procedural system could 
be corrected if it became politically corrupt. Pettit’s dual-aspect model and contestation 
offers mechanisms for accomplishing this. And again, a society which gives greater 
power to its citizens would be preferable. The thesis’ preferred solution would, by dint of 
embracing said dual-aspect model and the socialisation, equal consumption shares, etc, 
outlined in chapter five, be preferential on this metric. 
 
Rawls’ preference for POD is thus inadequate for the thesis’ purposes. He writes of 
democratic, liberal socialism much less extensively. There is an argument to be made that 
his “reticence” to adopt socialism (Ypi 2018, 5) hamstrings his development here, that he 
 
180 
is unable to conceive of a critique of capitalism not only in its economic sphere but in its 
political ones (Ypi 2018, 10), hence the necessity of bringing in republican theorising of 
this kind.  A socialism of the kind Rawls desires would accomplish the same purposes as 
POD, it seems, but he gives no concrete proposals about the form and appearance of that 
variant of socialism. 
 
 It may be objected, however, that the thesis has merely established that Rawlsian 
practice and ideology is inadequate without substantial modification; it has yet to 
demonstrate any real improvement by way of socialism. The actual viability of (some 
form of) socialism as an economic model will be the subject of the next section – for now, 
the thesis will assume some inefficiency in comparison to full or welfare-state capitalism, 
or even Rawlsian property-owning-democracy, and begin with other major objections, 
most notably Rawls’ critique of socialism, the drain of capital, and the ability to reconcile 
it with non-domination’s political requirements.  
 
Rawls’ reluctance towards a liberal socialism is influenced by certain difficulties he 
observes in comparison to POD (Rawls 1973, 270-274). He criticises command economy 
socialism for disallowing the free choice of occupation, for its myriad inefficiencies, for 
its coercion and disregard of equality of opportunity (Rawls 2001, 138). Yet he makes it 
abundantly clear that markets and the private control of the means of production need not 
be identical, and has little difficulty with market socialism. He errs, then, in – perhaps 
subconsciously – assigning so much value to the market, but placing very little regard on 
socialism, though he notes that whichever model will best address the demands of his two 
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concepts of justice is empirical at best (Rawls 2001, 138-139). Rawls also notes that, in 
his view, the worst excesses of the market system and the bulk of socialist criticism can 
be addressed via POD (Rawls 1973, 280-281, Rawls 2001, 176-179). 
 
Given that the command economy is not something republicans would favour either, 
allowing for Rawls’ criticisms necessitates a market-based socialism of some kind, not 
least for the “decentralising” nature of its economy. This is not beyond neo-republican 
capabilities, but it may be difficult to reconcile any market functions with the necessity 
for strict material equality. 
 
Capital drain is the loss of any capital, whether it be “capital flight”, the “brain drain”, etc. 
It is a major part of the problem Rawls hoped to avoid via maximin, that talented and 
wealthy individuals will go elsewhere to invest their talents and wealth. It is exacerbated 
by the global nature of today’s world economy; never before has it been so easy to 
migrate, or hide wealth in offshore accounts and shell companies. If the intent is strict 
material equality over maximin, then it seems difficult to reason a way of averting the 
latter, except through coercive measures which may be unreasonably authoritarian. 
Enforced redistribution of wealth may135 be justifiable; refusal of emigration less so. 
 
To address this problem without coercion, individuals would need to be motivated to 
commit, to the fullest extent possible, to a system which did not profit them. While some 
degree of altruism, patriotism, and simple habituation to one’s birth-country might be a 
motivating factor, it would be a distinct weakness to rely upon it. Individuals will look to 
 
135 And is, as argued shortly. 
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their own advantage far too frequently for this preference for the familiar to suffice alone. 
One option might be to remain very secure or “profitable” in other areas – an overall 
excellent standard of living, excellent healthcare, low rates of crime, etc, or for 
investment, to maintain a high standard of technical skill, to have strong commercial ties, 
etc. This is not always an available option, however – particularly if a developing country 
wishes to adopt some form of non-capitalist economy: the country will be a pariah among 
global financial institutions and may struggle to fund one or more of these areas. 
 
A secondary option is to find another way of motivating individuals. But this is 
notoriously difficult; Rawls himself notes “the theory of justice assumes a definite limit 
on the strength of social and altruistic motivation” (Rawls 1973, 281), due to the presence 
of competing claims, individual or otherwise, that are legitimate and yet incompatible. 
Still, if achievable, it is a better option than coercion. This option will be considered 
further in chapter five. 
 
An authoritarian socialism serves neither Rawls nor republicanism. The exact nature of 
the liberal (or republican) democratic socialism will be discussed in the next section, 
when its viability is evaluated. It must be a democratic socialism; it must comply with 
Pettit’s requirements, which in theory is not difficult. While social ownership of the 
means of production and indeed the complete abolition of private capital arrangements 
are contrary to Pettit’s list of basic liberties given in Just Freedom (Pettit 2014, 72), there 
is reason enough to consider this as a point where this kind of liberty could be sacrificed 




What of the objection that socialism cannot realistically be implemented without coercive 
elements (Hayek 2001, etc)? No doubt this will depend on the kind of socialism offered. 
Briefly, we may ask if these coercive elements would violate discursive control or require 
uncontrolled, arbitrary interference. One might also ask if socialism was capable of 
adhering to Pettit’s “tough luck” test, that individuals who had to comply with its 
potentially stringent demands could attribute this to misfortune over malice. 
 
This depends on the scope of the question; there is a group of people who can be offered 
nothing, and they are right in thinking that government is an “ill-willed agency” against 
them. However, in an ideal world, individuals (or corporate entities) who had already 
achieved enormous power and wealth in complete contradiction of strict material equality 
would have to agree that their loss of said power and wealth was “compatible with the 
community-wide standards that all accept”, corresponding with neo-republican norms. 
 
Practically speaking, any solution to the problem of corporate power necessarily entails 
redistribution. If this redistribution is the result of democratic judgement and is applied 
evenly, by a body answerable to a representative government per Pettit, then at the least 
its methodology for interference is not uncontrolled136. 
 
In conclusion, POD represents an excellent step forward from modern welfare state 
capitalism, particularly if combined with Thomas’ suggestions and a universal basic 
 




income. It fails to adequately address the tensions within capitalism, however, and its 
focus on procedure – once again – means it is critically lacking in stability and in its 
ability to correct itself given cases of sufficient scope and complexity. The thesis thus 
moves on to socialism, of a sufficiently liberal kind.
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Section Four – Market Socialism 
 
If the potential solution for republicanism lies in socialism, we must consider which variant of 
socialism. Anything which relies on non-democratic principles is out; anything which mandates the 
complete dependency of the individual is questionable. Pettit notes the immense risk for such in 
Just Freedom; quite apart from the potentially unwholesome psychological effects, no government 
is perfect, and total reliance is equally a way to total control137 (Pettit 2012, 158). It will be a 
socialism that is organised on republican, rather than Rawlsian/liberal egalitarian principles, as 
outlined in the prior section; this means a commitment to ensuring specific social and economic 
norms, liberty and strict material equality, etc138. It also means, following Schuppert and Marx, a 
commitment against alienation and social vulnerability that Rawls lacks and which Pettit 
insufficiently develops. 
 
The obvious choice, if free-market capitalism and Rawlsian property owning democracy are to be 
rejected139 entirely, is that of a socialism that embraces some degree of marketisation, which may 
on the face of it wield enormous power, but in practice, democratic oversight ensures that power is 
little exercised140. Market socialism of this kind is best defined as one in which the means of 
production are still owned by the state, for the ostensible good of all, but the production of goods 
and services are set by the market and voluntary exchange. There will be downsides to such a 
solution, but the thesis will argue that this is overall the best possible solution that is practically 
achievable. Thus, the argument splits into two. First, it must be established that market socialism of 
some form is both practical and potentially desirable. Second, it must be established which of its 
 
137 This is notably similar to the argument presented in chapter three, section four, that domination under a state monopoly is both inevitable 
and worse than anything the market could concoct. It is however a narrower claim, and unlike the stronger claim of chapter three, is entirely 
compatible with state control of the means of production. 
138  It must be, to borrow the phrase if not exactly the requirements, a “civic economy”. The egalitarian system in chapter five does live up to a 
number of Dagger’s requirements, however (Dagger 2006, 161-167). 
139 Some forbearance is requested here, because the thesis’ critique of Rawls continues in the next chapter; thus far Rawls’ ideological basis 
has been denounced as unacceptable, but we have yet to establish if socialism is better on organisational grounds, if paired with republican 
doctrine. The reason to pursue socialism first is that there is a great deal of potential variance, the more so as more of the ideas of section one are 
incorporated or rejected. One given proposal may work where another might not, hence the structure. 
140 A useful comparison is the sheer difficulty of amending the United States’ constitution. Despite the legal ability to discard, to use a single 
example, the electoral college in its entirety, the practical ability to do so is nearly nil. 
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myriad forms sufficiently meets the desired republican/socialist criteria, while remaining within the 
boundaries of practicality. 
 
Market socialism has rarely been practised across a society as an economic whole. One major 
example is Yugoslavia, which although not entirely working on the basis of a market socialism, 
with key industries nationalised141, maintained a semblance of such an economy for some fifty 
years before the country broke apart. Other examples can be found within capitalism in the form of 
cooperatives, such as Mondragon in Spain and John Lewis in the United Kingdom (Errasti et al 
2003, 554-567, Paranque & Wilmott 2014, 606-614). The practical data such examples can give us 
is very limited, however, as these are but single (if sometimes quite large) companies where the 
owners and workers are mostly identical. As such, the thesis will address these only briefly before 
moving on to a more detailed examination of Yugoslavia. 
 
Cooperative businesses in modern capitalist society have varied in effectiveness but have a similar 
degree of productivity to those of normal, capitalist firms (Perotin 2014, 37-42). They seem to 
favour areas of activity with low risk, and thrive best in societies and relationships with a high 
degree of personal trust  (Monteiro and Stewart 2012, 7-13, 21). The primary benefit of the workers’ 
cooperative is in building what might be called workplace democracy, which the thesis discusses in 
considerably more detail in chapter five, section two. It is evident that such practices, which 
diminish the gap between labour and management, are beneficial to neo-republican goals, 
encouraging the eyeball test and reducing socio-economic inequality. 
 
Such evidence must, as stated, be treated cautiously. It is, however, a positive indicator towards the 
viability of some sort of economic system that is worker run and worker led. Historic concerns have 
focused on underinvestment and various kinds of discrimination (Artz & Kim 2011, 23-24), which 
 
141 Then again, certain otherwise entirely capitalist countries have state monopolies, so this may not be a disqualification in itself. 
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has been disputed. Even if true, if this was the only difficulty for such companies to overcome, it 
would again indicate viability of a cooperative system. 
 
The Yugoslavian example differs in many ways, being an entire national economy that interwove 
capitalist (and command economy socialist) economic forces, as opposed to being but one small 
part of a greater capitalist economy. At the time, globalism had not yet reached current heights, and 
so taking the view that it was essentially in the same situation (a worker cooperative country’s 
economy, amidst the greater global capitalism) seems inherently flawed. 
 
Doing a full-scale assessment of its effectiveness would require time and space the thesis lacks, not 
to mention an in-depth consideration of its history and socio-political status over at least fifty years. 
As a result, the thesis will primarily rely upon the work done by Uvalic and Chilosi in this area. It is 
possible that further research may contradict their findings. 
 
Uvalic stresses the imperfect nature of Yugoslavia, both politically and economically, in their 
assessment. It is striking, however, that despite such imperfections and the political hostility that 
surrounded it, the economy was generally functional. Certainly, it was less efficient than the more 
liberal capitalist countries in Western Europe142, and the need to balance socialist political doctrine 
with economic reality often resulted in slow or misjudged reforms (Uvalic 2018, 7, 9-10) but it was 
much more efficient and allowed for a greater level of practical democracy than the authoritarian 
and fully planned economies of the Warsaw Pact (Uvalic 2018, 13-14 18, 21). 
 
A critical element of the Yugoslavian market socialist economy, at least for the thesis’ needs, is the 
element of self-management. To varying degrees over the course of some fifty years, myriad firms 
 
142 Including countries such as the United Kingdom and West Germany, where a strong safety net with socialist characteristics, if not outright 
state control, were present and effective.  
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organised themselves with little more management than might have been seen in, say, the United 
States. Some of these were run by the workers themselves, and some by individual entrepreneurs. 
Both existed independently. While some data is mixed (Estrin 1991, 190-192), clearly it is possible 
for a socialist economy to function without strict state controls or quotas in all industries. 
 
In the same way, where there was interference in management issues, these tended to be various 
political interventions by local authorities. It is undeniable that these decisions tended to make 
things worse, and frequently far more inefficient. However, the firms themselves were quite 
autonomous and entirely in control of their own constitution. As Chilosi additionally notes, certain 
capitalist countries (his example is the Four Asian Tigers) have had considerable interference and 
achieved market success (Chilosi 1992, 177-179, Uvalic 2018, 8-9, Wikipedia, Four Asian Tigers). 
It is reasonable to suggest that a state which lacked the social pressures of Yugoslavia, in particular 
the bickering between its constituent parts (Uvalic 2018, 24-25, 27-30), might be far more 
successful in implementing and coordinating market socialism on a national scale, with its 
interference directed in aiding, rather than curtailing, innovation and productive capability. 
 
A more negative point which the literature emphasises is the failure of incentives and investment. 
This is of course shared by command economies, but it is noteworthy that market socialism has run 
into similar problems. At higher levels of skill and market contribution, there seems to have been a 
lack of motivation. Additionally, the overall attempt to guide the economy towards what was 
socially useful rather than most profitable appears to have been a dismal failure (Chilosi 1992, 182). 
The latter in particular is troublesome, because it implies the need for personal profit-based 
motivation , an incentive which is unhelpful in addressing the problems of corporate power. By 





Lastly, market socialism in Yugoslavia143 ultimately failed. With considerable economic damage by 
the 1980s, market-based reforms and liberalisation due to the need for foreign loans – not to 
mention the eventual disintegration of the Yugoslavian state – ensured that market socialism existed 
in name only. Much of this failure can be attributed to external political factors, but not all of it. 
Capitalist economies established in the same antebellum period have continued without serious 
transition. The tensions between a market economy and socialist doctrine ultimately proved 
irreconcilable. 
 
Thus, one concludes that market socialism – as of Yugoslavia – is vulnerable, by its very nature, to 
political pressure and the internal tensions of motivation and socialist ideology versus everyday 
management. It is not automatically a failure, nor is it predisposed to failure, but it is easily co-
opted. The problem of external opposition, ideological or otherwise, should not be underestimated 
either.  
 
This is a particular concern because of a recurring argument that market socialism (in its various 
incarnations) is inherently unstable, and will either collapse back into some form of capitalist 
market arrangement, or will require further micromanagement and oversight by a central political 
apparatus and will become some form of command economy socialism.  (Cohen 2001, 312, Gray 
1993, 92-99) If we accept that a centrally planned economic is neither feasible, nor desirable, then 
this critique is concerning. 
 
Cohen offers a related argument as well, which argues that market socialism - and he singles out 
Yugoslavia for particular note – may readily find itself committing the same basic errors as 
 
143 And elsewhere; similar tensions existed in the NEP of the early USSR (Bandera 1963 265-79, esp 268-269), but eventually folded into full 
command economy socialism, whereas Yugoslavia became ever more marketised. 
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capitalism and undertake its affairs such that it is still a system fundamentally detrimental to the 
welfare of human beings. This is because capitalism inherently focuses on output from work rather 
than decreasing the burden of work, and he suggests several egalitarian forms which still succumb 
to this flaw (Cohen 2001, 297-317). 
 
How might we allow for a stable market socialism, that did not succumb to the flaws Yugoslavia 
exposed? The major problems that face any solution of a socialist nature, no matter its organising 
principles, are  the prospect of averting loss of efficiency (whether via simple inadequacy, “free 
riders”, or anything else), ensuring motivation to replace or supplement the profit motive144, the 
epistemic objection145, and the method of establishing it. A strict command economy fails to 
address these problems effectively, as the long historical record has shown, and the solution must be 
democratically organised on republican principles. The thesis’ proposed solution is that of Joseph 
Carens’ egalitarian system, with some amendments. It solves each of these problems and can easily 
meet the necessary democratic requirements. Its stability will be argued in chapters five and six. 
 
A last concern before we proceed: given the explicitly Marxist understanding of class, exploitation 
and alienation on which the thesis has relied since chapter three, it may be objected that any 
solution  – no matter how avowedly socialist in character – which relies upon the function of market 
exchange is vulnerable to a charge of perpetuating alienation and exploitation146. This differs in part 
from the critique of chapter three, section three, because said critique focused upon capitalist 
exchange. It is similar to Cohen’s concern above. The objection here assumes that, of the four major 
concerns, scarcity is managed and both reward and power are widely dispersed, along with neo-
 
144 Or persuading a sufficient number that an equal, equitable or needs-based distribution is both just and in their best personal interests. 
145 e.g.: that a command economy cannot ever efficiently allocate resources due to a lack of information and that this information is 
effectively conveyed via the market. 
146 The Marxist account of alienation is not inherent to the market and voluntary exchange; alienation arises from the material conditions 
forced upon the workers, the hateful competition all parties have with one another, and the stripping away of both meaning and reward from 
labour. A market which was devoid of private property (as opposed to devoid of personal property) might avert all of the above. It may be 




republican democracy and strict material equality. This concern is that the demands of the market 
will create discord between workers and capital, or in this case management, and the demands of 
the market may necessitate the poor treatment of the worker. 
 
 Conflict arises from the differing goals and perspectives of managers and workers. It is relatively 
easy for different groups of workers within the same general band to have differing drives and 
expectations (Goldthorpe 1968, 22-37, esp 36-37).  In part, this can be explained by differences in 
social status in the Weberian sense, but an equally likely explanation is the demands of different 
types of work. To use Goldthorpe’s examples, a setter, a machinist and a dogsbody will have 
different expectations of their work, and a different perspective of how to proceed. 
 
A manager, meanwhile, will not only be approaching from the demands of different work, but from 
the perspective of employing all such work to its fullest potential147. While not the grand sweeping 
struggle of bourgeois and proletariat, this still is troubling, because the ultimate “grand design” may 
involve personal sacrifices on the part of the worker148. Hiring requirements may differ in good or 
bad times; in the latter, it may not be practical to maintain previous employment. To an extent, this 
is mitigated by the “tough luck” test and simple consequentialism; of course every worker has a 
right to feel aggrieved, but their loss is for the gain of all the rest. The problem is that this creates 
competition, and not a friendly one. If there is social or economic gain or loss by employment or 
unemployment, then two things are assured. First, every individual has a concrete reason to make 
themselves as indispensable as possible, by whatever means149. Second, those with the power to 
make the decision gain meaningful power over the remainder. 
 
 
147 In an ideal world. Naturally, many different motivations are possible; this simply assumes a paradigm case of seeking to perform their task 
effectively and efficiently, at no cost to themselves. 
148 Could this be mitigated by a democratically organised workplace? This is, again, considered in chapter five section two. But for this 
particular problem, it simply makes the competition, suspicion and potential hostility horizontal, rather than vertical. Nonetheless, it may be an 
improvement to consider on the thesis’ proposed solution. 
149 To the extent of that gain/loss, of course. Some mild shame at being unemployed is not a provocation to murder. 
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This is likely to be a problem without a great transformation of personal character. In chapter five, 
ways this might be accomplished are outlined, and in chapter six, the consideration of republican 
“civic virtue” is established as a supplement to such a solution. In its absence, this will remain a 
considerable problem. It could be partially mitigated via a robust allocation of resources towards 
needs, but this will not end the competition nor the divide of competing interests. 
 
Exploitation occurs in market socialism, following Vrousalis’ explanation, when the worker – 
although rewarded according to their needs or at least by an equitable portion of the proceeds – still 
remains in a vulnerable position. Consider two illustrations. First, one may contemplate the typical 
example of the former Soviet Union and various satellite states. While scarcity was to some degree 
managed and some prosperity remained, queue-management and a black-market economy remained 
necessary for many to secure necessary resources (Katsenelinboigen 1977, etc). In this case, the 
fault lies outside the system, but is difficult or even impossible to correct. A secondary economy 
develops, one which is very unequal and where those who do not partake and partake well become 
vulnerable. Second, the system could still permit vulnerability via monopsony. Monopolies will, 
under any socialist system, only be perpetuated if they can in some way be harnessed for the greater 
good of the population. Healthcare, for example, may end up as a government monopoly in a strong 
socialist state, or it may be more decentralised. It is, however, possible that an individual might 
have a very limited, technical set of skills and may find themselves beholden to their superiors in 
order to find work. They then have a motive to accept unfair treatment, to remain employed. 
Unemployment benefit or some sort of basic income alleviates this, to an extent. 
 
There are several ways of preventing worker vulnerability. The latter problem can be mitigated via 
a universal basic income, which the preferred solution of the thesis includes. This fails to give 
people purpose, however. A more considered approach would be to a: offer solutions against 
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monopsonies as one acts against monopolies, by offering subsidies and start-up support to new 
companies in these depleted skills. If the technical skills in question are simply hopelessly outdated, 
the government might offer the prospect of training, perhaps via apprenticeships or reduced rates. 
 
As for the secondary economy,  this could be mitigated in two ways. The first would be the 
establishment of a digitalised economy, which is discussed in greater detail in the next chapters, as a 
means of tracking expenditures150. The second would be, rather than excessive legal punishments, 
the simple confiscation of any and all unregistered goods without compensation. Seized goods 
would be sold by the government at reduced rates, thus, undercutting the black marketeers 
themselves. 
 
These are but tentative sketches, not detailed policy. Regardless, it is clear that market socialism can 
be adapted to fit, and to address potential concerns about the state of those who labour within it. If 
that is the case, then it should similarly be possible for the egalitarian system.
 






Section One – The Egalitarian System 
 
In chapter four, we began discussing the ideological and organisational bases from which the 
solution to the problem of corporate domination (and the prospect of unchecked private power in 
capitalism as a whole) ought to proceed. The conclusion was that some form of socialism was 
necessary, that the foundation for such socialism must involve democratic and republican political 
policy, and that this socialism make some use of market arrangements. A delicate balance must be 
struck between democratic control of the economy, independence of the individual, and practical 
considerations. However, such socialism must also be stable, and relatively efficient, to avoid 
problems such as those that befell Yugoslavia. 
 
With market socialism demonstrated to have some possibility of success, it would now seem 
practical to discuss more specific arrangements: most notably, the proposal of Joseph Carens found 
in Equality, Moral Incentives and the Market. Carens hypothesises that the current capitalist system 
– which he calls a personal profit motivated system, or PPM -  could be kept almost entirely intact, 
allowing for the efficiency of the market, freedom of distribution, etc. The important change he 
proposes is that all after-tax income would be split equally for the purposes of consumption. This 
phrasing is important, because of the necessity to allow income for investment, and for the 
prospects of a: redistributive taxation, and b: individuals requiring more money or resources for 
their employment; a mechanic’s tools, for instance. To support such a distribution, their motivations 
would need to change from profit maximisation to social duty maximisation151. He calls his new 
system the “egalitarian system”, and gives several practical examples to show how it might work. 
 
151 Carens naturally does not claim that individuals in the PPM system are solely driven by rational self-interest and personal profit (Carens 
1981 27-32). Indeed, almost all possible motivations one may have for working in the PPM system may remain in the egalitarian system, and there 
may remain individuals in the egalitarian system who still ardently desire personal profit in the same way some ardently desire the betterment of 





His first example is Sam Smith, who owns a factory and whose goal is profit maximisation, and 
therefore adopts a rational, utilitarian approach – paying as little as possible for resources, selling as 
highly as possible, paying his workers the most efficient rate the market will bear. In the egalitarian 
system, Sam maintains such practices; not unlike a trustee, Sam intends to get the greatest profit for 
his charge – in this case, society (Carens 1981, 27-30). 
 
His second example is that of Benedict and Arnold, who own competing factories producing a 
single good (in Carens’ example, widgets). They gain satisfaction from maximising income from 
consumption, and making widgets. Both men have an opportunity to move from a failing widget 
market into a much stronger gadget market152, but one of them gains far more satisfaction from 
making widgets than from maximising his income. Just as before, the same behaviour exists in both 
PPM and egalitarian systems; : both maximise their preferences, with one continuing to make 
widgets no matter the profit or social duty to be gained from gadgets, while the other changes his 
product. 
 
The third example he gives is that of Jane, a worker rather than a factory owner, who must choose 
her career path in order to maximise her income, and again, does so in much the same way in both 
systems. Jane makes use of prices, her wage rates, and predictions of future societal needs in order 
to maximise the value of her sold labour. 
 
 The egalitarian system thus closely resembles capitalism in how it functions. The egalitarian 
system differs when it comes to savings, investment, and (to a degree) risk. Carens outlines the 
problem of saving and investments with the example of a house or rare artwork, whose value once 
acquired only increases. It seems reasonable to allow people to save for additional, pricier direct 
 




consumption – saving up for a holiday, for example – but allowing them to buy goods for later 
resale and keep the profit would immediately reintroduce income inequality. Carens’ solution, 
which for administrative reasons, would be applied only to houses and land,153  is an annual tax. 
This would be levied on the house’s value as of the year before, establishing a new base each year. 
Borrowing money would in much the same way be paid for out of future consumption shares. 
Carens concedes that this is likely to reintroduce some inequality, if some individuals save and 
borrow prudently. 
 
Far more inequality would be introduced if Carens permitted investment and direct return on that 
investment, as in the PPM system. Those who saved prudently would then be able to apply their 
additional income for gradual returns, as in the PPM system. Not permitting investment, however, 
would be a death-knell to economic efficiency. To allay this, Carens suggests that individuals must 
– in general – not desire to gain extra pre-tax income by using their after-tax income shares, and 
outlines a mechanism to facilitate this. Essentially, a part of pre-tax income would be saved (as 
opposed to the previous saving of after-tax income only), but not capable of being spent on 
anything other than investment. Should an individual not wish to invest154, it will simply be taken 
into the net contribution, and split up appropriately. However, this is not enough. Individuals could 
still obtain disproportionate wealth via gifts and inheritance, or – although Carens does not suggest 
it – gambling or sheer luck. Carens does not believe small gifts would be troublesome, even 
aggregated, but he fails to consider examples like Wilt Chamberlain, where a widely beloved 
individual receives many small gifts in the wake of a personal tragedy and therefore becomes 
monstrously wealthy. His solution for larger gifts is to treat them as taxable income in all respects, 
including the annual tax, if necessary. For smaller gifts, it may be sufficient to demand that these be 
 
153 Given when Carens was writing (1981), it seems reasonable to suggest that a move to an entirely digital economy might allow for this to 
be expanded to more goods. 
154 Carens notes that almost everyone would have an incentive to invest with such a scheme, since to not do so would be detrimental to 
maximising one’s social duty. But there may be individuals who simply believe they cannot invest sensibly, and who would simply forfeit the 




in the form of direct consumption, or do not exceed an annual limit. The finer details of the solution 
may need to be refined in practice. 
 
Risk in the egalitarian system differs primarily from the PPM system in that individuals will take 
more risks, not fewer. While initially surprising, Carens gives the example of an individual gaining 
either £50 or a combined 60% chance of £100 plus 40% chance of £0. Under the PPM system, 
while it might seem rational to take the slightly more advantageous second option, individuals may 
in practice be averse to risking the loss. They may need that £50 to survive. The egalitarian system 
“transfers both the burdens and the gains of risk from the individual to society as a whole”. 
Reckless risks would be discouraged by the desire to maximise social duty, and sensible risks 
would be incentivised by the prospect of esteem and adulation for their success. Continuing with the 
third example above, Jane would choose her career path based upon expected return. Even if this 
did not unfold as planned, she would still have acted in a way to maximise her social duty. The 
same is true of all such risks in the egalitarian system; disapproval and approval are to be based 
more on prudence and good judgement than the actual result. 
 
All of this indicates that the egalitarian system should, if the PPM system functions reasonably well,  
function at a similar level of efficiency. Although efficiency is gained – such as with risk, where the 
diffusion of risk encourages the more “rational” decision to invest, as with limited liability – it is 
lost elsewhere, as Carens concedes that the profit motive is likely stronger than that of social duty, 
or at least ties in more neatly with the market. 
 
For Carens’ system to be achievable, it requires certain logically necessary prerequisites; Carens 
lists ten such. In summary, it must be possible for individuals to be motivated by altruism and social 




obligations as they would by obtaining profit to satisfy income consumption. They must be able to 
save income above a certain (pre-tax) level solely for investment, and all must receive the same 
income shares. Allowing that individuals will still have some interest in profit, the laws and tax 
systems must be generally obeyed (Carens 1981, 174-175). Of his ten logically necessary 
prerequisites, the most troublesome are undoubtedly the third and fourth: combined, individuals in 
the egalitarian system gain the aforementioned same relative value of satisfactions from performing 
their social duty, and individuals believe that the obligation to maximise their pre-tax income “does 
not extend to the use of their after-tax equal income shares” (Carens 1981, 174) and such additional 
income should solely be invested, as noted above. 
 
Anticipating concerns with the soundness of such prerequisites, he thus lists eight empirically 
necessary prerequisites, separate from the logical prerequisites. To again summarise, there must be 
an effective and intense socialisation process to ensure that individuals prioritise social duty (and 
thus pre-tax income) maximisation and derive satisfaction in doing so. The egalitarian system must 
be able to provide sufficient resources for the “physical subsistence” of its members. Individuals 
must be aware of relative prices to give the appropriate amount of social recognition, and there must 
be “widespread commitment to the norm of equal-income distribution” (Carens 1981, 176). Lastly, 
the social elites of such a system must share this commitment, be generally honest in enforcing and 
adhering to tax laws, and be willing to play a greater role in supporting economic activity in times 
of full employment and economic decline (Carens 1981,  175-176). 
 
Carens also voices support for a polyarchal155 system but insists this is neither a logically nor 
empirically necessary prerequisite. Fortunately, while not all polyarchies are democracies, all 
democracies are polyarchies, and so the thesis will add two more prerequisites to ensure compliance 
with Pettit. First, the egalitarian system must be capable of assuring the discursive control of the 
 




individuals within it. Second, it must be governable through democratic means. The exact form 
does not matter, provided it adheres to Pettit’s requirements. 
 
The strength of the egalitarian system as a solution to the problem of corporate power and 
domination under capitalism depends on how persuasive one finds each of these prerequisites, and 
also on how well the egalitarian system curbs the myriad inequalities of power and wealth. 
Therefore, this chapter will outline and defend the methods in which these prerequisites may be 
secured by the egalitarian system, with one important exception. Because successful socialisation 
for social-duty maximisation as a motivation is so critical to Carens’ theory, and rests on 
psychological theorising as opposed to politico-economic theorising, the motivational elements of 
Carens’ theory and the socialisation they require are discussed in chapter six, section one. 
 
The egalitarian system has a few further benefits. Firstly, it incorporates universal basic income; for 
reasons noted previously, this has benefits both economically and politically. Secondly, following 
Lovett, as well as Casassas and De Wispelaere, it also introduces a wage ceiling to accompany the 
high wage floor. As the latter two note, this is valuable to republican practice, and as the first notes, 
the high equality aids in freedom. Thirdly, it offers no impediment to workers’ cooperatives or 
similarly democratic firms, while granting more freedom of employment and entrepreneurship than 
a system based solely on such organisational modes. 
 
Equally, it compares well to other socialist or egalitarian models mentioned in chapter four. In 
comparison to a Rawlsian socialism or POD, it does not innately adopt the Maximin criterion; if 
combined with Pettit’s republican principles (the eyeball test, etc), it ensures strict economic 
equality. This makes the problem of elites one of social esteem, rather than economic power, and 




more coherent and more easily attainable. It is flexible enough to allow for common ownership, and 
there is little reason it could not be combined with the more spontaneous cooperation mutualism 
envisages. By relying on voluntary exchange and interjecting ideally only at the systemic level, it at 
least mitigates concerns that procedural theories might have about repeated interference and 
reliance upon patterned distributions156. If combined with support for differing cultures and those 
who genuinely require additional help – new mothers, to name but one of many examples – through 
taxation and government funding as Pettit outlines, it stands an excellent chance of safeguarding 
non-domination. This is in addition to being more just than the PPM system – distributively and 
otherwise – guaranteeing greater socio-economic equality, etc. 
 
To forestall a possible (and pedantic) objection at this point, Carens’ system does not seek to 
redistribute capital and offers no practical guidance about doing so. The transformative element of 
his theory may also appear utopian, no matter the strength of the egalitarian system when dealing 
with a socialised populace. Moreover, Carens discusses communist practice, and does not associate 
himself with the Marxist tradition in any way (Carens 1981, 164-165), maintaining a commitment 
and association with generic egalitarianism – although he acknowledges certain Marxist theorising 
towards a similar kind of socialising and transformative theory. He makes no particular reference to 
socialism, although he attempts to show his organisational structure is compatible with a needs-
based distribution rather than strict equality157. 
 
The problem of utopianism will be a recurring one throughout this chapter and the next. To address 
the point on market socialism, however, the thesis will reject Carens’ self-description, by two 
methods. The first is to add an amendment in which all private property – in the Marxist sense – 
belongs to a democratic government and thus to the people. Entrepreneurs and the like become 
 
156 Though Carens, as with Pettit, lacks any such concerns.  
157 Under the thesis, such needs are to be covered via democratically chosen and allocated funds: e.g, Pettit’s consideration of cultural 




more like foremen and managers. Practical, everyday activities change little, except that there is a 
greater level of government oversight. It might be argued that such would diminish the risk-taking 
and profiteering necessary for the market to function well, but this charge can be equally levied at 
Carens’ social-duty maximisation, and it seems implausible to assert a considerable loss of 
efficiency over a technical detail of this kind. Indeed, one might accrue more respect for taking 
successful and bold decisions with the lack of personal profit. The only difference is that the 
entrepreneur manages, rather than owns, his or her companies. The change from the egalitarian 
system at this point is purely one of legal ownership and ultimate authority. 
 
The second method is to question Carens’ logic. His solution to the problems of the free market 
boils down to the addition of the “intangible hand” of social esteem as a point of public policy, and 
the equalisation of wealth for the purposes of consumption; coupled with the requirements of loose 
material equality and republican democracy, it would seem absurd to suggest that the end result was 
capitalist in nature. Absent this, what else to call it but socialism? Thus, the remainder of the thesis 
will discuss Carens’ system at all times as if it had adopted the above amendment, and thus qualifies 
as socialism as outlined in chapter four, with the means of production socially controlled. 
 
A secondary concern with the egalitarian system might come from the Rawlsian perspective. 
Accepting that a democratic socialism is preferable to POD, and accepting the need for neo-
republican non-domination over the less demanding liberal conception of freedom, followers of 
Rawls might still argue that a “maximin” system was preferable on organisational and ideological 
grounds. They may argue for the implausibility of socialisation, and that allocating equal income for 





Carens concedes the possibility of a Rawlsian justification158 on ideological grounds for his system; 
the two are not incompatible. He also points out that the egalitarian system surpasses the difference 
principle in certain respects, and that the least-advantaged would presumably gain from an 
arrangement which relied on social inequalities rather than economic ones, thus fulfilling the 
maximin criteria and limiting the inequality of the whole system (Carens 1981, 208-210). 
 
As for the practical problems, socialisation will be discussed in chapter six, as stated. As for supply 
and demand, individuals will have more reason to take unpleasant jobs than under Rawls’ measures. 
While Rawls is concerned with the elite positions of society going unfilled, because individuals lack 
the esteem and money to motivate proper use of their rare talents159, the least advantaged in his 
society remain forced into a career of, for example, waste disposal treatment. Under Rawls’ 
egalitarian proposals, their lives would be far better than the wage-slavery of modern capitalism, but 
they might still effectively be forced into demeaning, unrewarding positions 
 
Not so in the egalitarian system, where one’s social esteem is based upon the extent to which one 
fulfils one’s social duties160. If a job is difficult and exhausting, then it will be rewarded by 
additional social recognition. If an elite position necessitates ferocious effort, or – as in the case of 
entrepreneurs – leads to great benefits for society, it will still be thoroughly esteemed. Human 
capital may be more difficult to obtain for some jobs, but considering the more equitable 
distribution overall, it is still worth pursuing over the basic POD. 
 
A more pressing problem is capital flight (Investopedia, Capital Flight), especially in the 
establishment of the egalitarian system. Earlier, the prospect of capital drain for the Rawlsian 
 
158 He also points out that his system could be organised on other egalitarian or socialist grounds. He himself assumes the least different 
position in order to strengthen his arguments (Carens 1981, xi.) 
159 Notably, Carens cites Rawls’ point on “the distribution of natural talent as a common asset”. 
160 This has an important secondary benefit. Certain feminist critiques have long espoused the idea that “care work” - domestic duties, looking 
after children and the elderly, nursing and care-home work, etc – is grotesquely undervalued and underpaid. The egalitarian system would in 




system was noted. Capital flight is a particularly pernicious problem for the egalitarian system as 
well. Not only is the egalitarian system vulnerable to emigration and “brain drain” - the loss of 
human capital - in a way that Rawls is not161, but by the nature of the amendments the thesis 
suggests, a great deal of private property would need to be seized. By virtue of the global economy, 
at least some of this property would belong to foreigners, which introduces additional diplomatic 
complexity. 
 
Simply seizing property without due compensation, however justified, will create diplomatic 
tensions. The existence of a state which rejects liberalism and capitalism, though neither democracy 
nor liberty, is unlikely to be welcomed. Such a state which restricts emigration, or imposes taxation 
upon those emigrating, may be seen as hypocritical and equally unwelcome. 
 
Yet to do neither means that the state and society will suffer (greater) economic shock, at exactly 
the time when the system is most vulnerable. This is likely to be compounded by a lack of foreign 
investment, for even in the most amenable circumstances162 (compensation, financial enticements to 
invest, legal enshrining of property rights), investment seems improbable. 
 
Regarding the brain drain and the loss of skilled professionals, there are several means the 
egalitarian state might employ. First, polices to reward skilled immigrants might draw those who 
prefer a strong safety net, who favour the state on ideological grounds, or those who would find it 
an improvement to their material conditions. Second, the egalitarian system could target particular 
jobs via social recognition and socialisation, holding them up as ideal professions, and pointing to 
them as areas where one might maximise their social duty. Retraining initiatives, investment in 
higher education, etc, could be of use here. Third, many mid-ranking professionals will see (in 
 
161  In theory; as a counterpoint, the egalitarian system also lacks problems of acquisition and still allows for motivating “elites” via social 
recognition, and Rawls’ system might still be subject to the brain drain when contrasted with a far less substantively just state. 





theory) an improvement in their lives, and possibly also in direct income; replacements may be 
plausible, certainly in legal, bureaucratic or financial roles. 
 
Investment is more troublesome. There will undeniably be great economic volatility to begin with, 
but even absent this, there is less reason to invest where there is less profit. Carens gives little 
indication as to how it might work (Carens 1981, 12, 16, 26, 66-72, 157, 228, 229, 249). Pre-tax 
investment could be rewarded with the dividends owed, but this is questionably fair, and still 
unlikely to be appealing.  Absent rare resources, abundant technical or logistical skills or a market 
too large to ignore, which can hardly be guaranteed, there is substantial risk of underinvestment. 
Some loss of efficiency was expected, but this would be a drastic economic shock.  
 
Unlike human capital, this has no easy solution. In part, one could expect the economy to improve 
given the “unlocking” of capital, dispersion of capital, etc, which may act as a counterpoint in 
providing more domestic investment. It may simply need to be an unfortunate trade – economic 
efficiency and raw economic product in exchange for more secure liberty. It is likely to be most 
harmful at the most vulnerable moment – that of transition – and thus must be prepared for, the 
nature of such preparation varying from state to state. 
 
There is also the prospect that inculcating republican and socialist social norms may be anathema to 
Rawls. Maynor argues that Rawls strives for “a neutrality of aim” which is anathema to the 
republican goal of “advocating and supporting certain substantive ideals, institutions and versions 
of civic virtue and citizenship that support and maintain the principles of nondomination”. 
Moreover, republicanism challenges certain ends and individual characters, standing contrary to 





Rawls, by contrast, maintains political virtues which are not part of any comprehensive doctrine, 
but rather supplement the establishment of the basic structure. These virtues are not neutral, in the 
sense that Rawls still supports a democratic liberalism over other, less enlightened states, and 
desires a doctrine of “public reason” (Maynor 2003, 55-102). In an ideal Rawlsian world, 
individuals would set aside their nonpolitical163 views and debate solely on the merits of political 
virtue. Rawls does, as Maynor notes, allow a proviso to permit reasonable, in his sense of the word, 
nonpolitical doctrines to be brought forwards, but Maynor equally points out that this proviso is 
hamstrung by ambiguities and the fact that individuals are still likely to “bracket off parts of their 
identities” for an indefinite, perhaps perpetual, amount of time (Maynor 2003, 105-107). This also 
seems an impossible standard to maintain; Rawls himself is forced to concede and allow legitimate 
use of coercive force in certain areas outside the “basic structure”, or to include more and more into 
it, such as family life (Maynor 2003, 110-114). 
 
Republicanism, by contrast, has no qualms about accepting or denouncing beliefs, political or 
nonpolitical, in accordance with its own values and judgements. This might be a valid reason to 
favour liberalism over republicanism, should this concern holders of those beliefs, but it certainly 
means it lacks the problems Maynor outlines for Rawls. Is Maynor’s critique fair, however? Is there 
no way in which Rawls might answer these criticisms? 
 
The way forwards lies, as before, by allowing for the strengths of both theories to be considered. In 
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, Rawls (Rawls 1999, 131-180) discusses the viability of 
religious or “nonpolitical” reasoning influencing political decisions. He concedes that it may do so, 
highlighting the issue of public prayer in schools (Rawls 1999, 164-168), by appealing to public 
reason, and he might further concede, in response to Maynor’s argument, that republican methods 
 
163 This terminology seems to capture the distinction poorly. It may be better to say discourse-acceptable and discourse-unacceptable, as while 
one’s moral, philosophical and religious beliefs may massively influence one’s personal politics, they do not, in effect, “count” for anything and 




might better serve the public interest, and on those grounds – not the grounds of republican virtue or 
discursive control per se – they ought to be promoted. The basic structure would be readily 
supplemented by republican principles. For example, Rawls notes that women have been 
historically disadvantaged by systemic disregard for their care-work and by male-advantaged 
divorce laws, societal conduct, etc (Rawls 1999, 160-163). Building the eyeball test into legislative 
functioning would help to correct such disadvantages. Despite Rawls’ claim that enforcing a more 
equal division of labour, or compensating it, cannot be justified – as this transgresses against the 
basic liberties – one might justify it and similar “reasonable” doctrines, on the basis of extending 
those liberties still further. This is despite the republican position’s clear conflict with religious 
freedom in this case, as many religions dictate precisely such disadvantageous positions. Rawls 
hopes to eliminate involuntary disadvantage, and permit voluntary. Republicanism would go still 
further.  
 
This does not address Maynor’s arguments regarding bracketing. It does suggest, however, that 
republican political doctrine can be justified on grounds of public reason. If one was to prefer the 
egalitarian system’s justification to spring from Rawls, then republican and indeed egalitarian 
socialisation could be appealed to on the grounds of eliminating unjust disadvantages, eliminating 
dependency, etc. If combined with a view of freedom more republican than liberal-egalitarian, the 
net result would be similar and similarly acceptable as the thesis’ preferred solution. 
 
The egalitarian system has many merits. It combines the efficiency of the voluntary market 
exchange with the strict material equality neo-republicanism demands, and averts some of the 
criticisms levied at Rawls, while being flexible enough to make use of different kinds of 
institutional arrangements.  There remain major concerns, however, the most vital of which relate to 




may remain vulnerable, as more traditional market socialism is, to degeneration. Before addressing 




 Section Two – Amendments to the Egalitarian System, Workplace 
Republicanism, and Social Esteem 
 
This brings the thesis to republican amendments. The arguments made here may concede 
the principles of democratic corrosion, structural domination and corporate power 
established earlier in the thesis, particularly chapters two and three. The contention 
presented in this chapter is twofold, however. First, while being sceptical of unmanaged 
capitalism acknowledging the thesis’ earlier points, more orthodox republicans may 
equally be sceptical of socialism of any stripe, of the motivational aspects of Carens’ 
solution, and of the explicit social egalitarian and Marxist influences on the “neo-
republican” position the thesis has adopted. The extent of this scepticism may differ, but 
they may prefer a solution which minimises change to the economic system. Taylor, in 
particular, argues that republicans ought to be “celebratory” towards markets and 
embrace market functions, particularly the tool of exit (Hirschman 1970), while others 
articulate that the problem is primarily one of hierarchical workplaces and modern 
organisation (Breen 2017, 424-438, Hsieh 2005, 134-140, etc). Second, these problems 
are as much caused by social power as economic, so that our solution may actually 
exacerbate them by introducing new mechanisms for social esteem and recognition to be 
wielded as a weapon instead of the market. 
 
As he stands in greatest opposition to the thesis’ points, I begin with RS Taylor. 
 
Taylor writes that republican theorising, such as Pettit, mostly focuses on voice over exit , 
which he views as a mistake (RS Taylor, Introduction). While aware of Hirschman’s 
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arguments against an emphasis on exit (RS Taylor, Introduction Hirschman 1970, 45-6, 
82-85, 100-112), Taylor believes it is better to “double down” on exit and encourage 
one’s complete withdrawal. The suggestions of greater voice, he argues, have severe 
issues. He does not support a completely unhindered market; quite the opposite: 
“securing competition and free exit requires what I call an ‘Anglo-Nordic’ package of 
policies, including informational campaigns, labor-market reform, aggressive antitrust, 
capitalist demogrants, and a basic income” (RS Taylor, Introduction). In this he does not 
depart unduly from the thesis, but Taylor does not support the market being co-opted 
towards socialist ends, arguing that more direct methods will sooner or later increase 
domination. He concedes that this may be subject to trade-offs, and that republicanism 
has room for multiple approaches. A Carens-esque system falls outside the broad 
boundaries that he permits, however. Therefore, the thesis will examine Taylor’s 
arguments for greater exit and especially support and use of the market, and his 
arguments against government control. When suitably dissected, the thesis will respond 
to both, drawing upon other works, such as Hsieh’s. 
 
Taylor’s arguments for exit are multifaceted. To begin with, he highlights the utility of 
voice, although correspondent with Hirschman’s arguments, namely that exit can 
diminish (or “atrophy”) voice (Hirschman 1970, 34, 43). Voice is given greater power by 
the sudden threat or application of exit (Hirschman 1970, 126), but once that exit is 
utilised, especially by those with the greatest access to voice, those left behind have far 
less power. Taylor questions, however, whether we should be concerned with voice, or 
with “the security of those most vulnerable to institutional failure”. To alleviate this, we 
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should not turn away from exit, but rather guarantee “more and better resourced exit”. He 
makes rhetorical comparisons to Milton Friedman’s voucher system (RS Taylor, EVC, 
Friedman 1982, 85-107), arguing that deliberate policy could be utilised to guarantee 
effective exit against the least advantaged. While he considers the benefits of a “no-exit” 
policy, such as a society where no private schools exist and everyone is forced into the 
same system, he argues that this is (in the United States) constitutionally impossible and 
more importantly, subject to “free residential mobility”, a freedom that is unlikely to be 
infringed; it would seem highly authoritarian to attempt to do so. Thus, free exit vs partial 
exit seems to make the case that if exit is inevitable, it at least should be facilitated and 
supported for the most vulnerable and least advantaged as a priority. 
 
A problem to raise immediately is that exit means very different things in different 
contexts, and this is a problem that repeats throughout Taylor’s arguments. Hirschman 
defines exit primarily in terms of the firm and gives little indication as to how it is best 
applied in other contexts. He also notes that many cases of political exit are of “true exit”, 
that is, without caring for their effects on the “society that was left behind” (Hirschman 
1970, 3-5, 106-119), and Taylor never really picks up on this. Exit in the context of 
schools in the United States might mean leaving a county, or perhaps a state, or perhaps 
exit from the United States altogether. This is less significant here, but much more 
significant when it comes to markets. When he mentions a worker has a choice of exit, is 
that choice meaningful in a capitalist market, if -that- exit is purely on a company basis, 
rather than exiting the entire, structurally dominating system? This is not helped by an 




Why should we prefer the indirect aid of exit to the direct aid of voice, through 
democratic means or government regulation, however? Taylor states directly that “such 
empowerment threatens even greater domination, not by private agents, but rather by 
public (or quasi-public) agents”, drawing upon Pettit’s concerns with government 
overreach and democratic accountability. Giving an example of union disputes, he raises 
a concern similar to that of Hayek’s discussed in chapter three – government oversight of 
economic matters necessitates a class of non-economic personnel to oversee it, or 
requires the government to back one side or the other. He does not reject all state action; 
“these reforms will require a redirection of state interventions so that they work with 
rather than against the grain of competitive markets, and to this degree they may overlap 
with the policy preferences of some on the political right” (RS Taylor, EVC). He does, 
however, question the enabling of public abuse. As he points out, republican theorists 
ought to be concerned with the potential for abuse, not merely its cultivation. Workers 
instead need to be empowered with exit, and governments should not seek to interfere 
inside the behaviour of firms. 
 
His second chapter focuses primarily on marital exit, again following general principles. 
For brevity’s sake, only one section is of particular note, when he discusses “marital 
regulators”, enforced with the direct empowerment of women’s voice and protection. He 
writes:  “marital regulators, given their wide remit to stop abuse, must be granted 
discretionary powers of a sort that can themselves be readily abused, especially given the 
complexity of their regulatory task and the limited ability of other state authorities to 
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provide effective oversight due to that complexity. Regulators might use these powers to 
demand bribes from husbands in return for leniency or even to harass them as part of 
personal or ideological vendettas. Again, public domination does not require that these 
marital regulators actually abuse their positions—they may, in fact, be highly 
conscientious—but only requires that they have the ability to abuse, which they will 
certainly have given their broad powers of monitoring and enforcement.” (RS Taylor, 
Family). 
 
Again, this highlights Taylor’s deep concern with public regulation. He additionally 
states:  “Whether we consider the domination of workers by abusive managers or that of 
businesses by corrupt regulators and politicians, the kinds of policy instruments that were 
used to limit marital power through resourced exit and enhanced competition can also be 
used to limit market and political power.” (RS Taylor, Family).  
 
Allowing for this, one might think that Taylor is overstating the point. Empowering voice 
and regulation by legislation can rule with a far softer touch than he envisages. For 
example, in the case of marriage, offering subsidised assistance and marriage counselling, 
along with efforts to ensure suitable training on the part of police and care workers to 
recognise warning signs, would be both valuable and practical, and obviate the horror of 
“marital regulators”. 
 
It is not difficult to take his example to a reductio ad absurdum, as well. Consider the 
vital role of environmental regulation, given that environmental costs – as a classic 
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example of externalities – are almost never applied to the firms responsible for them. He 
emphasises the point by excluding democratic accountability:  “The democratic state can 
demand that domineering husbands include their wives in their decision-making 
processes, but because such inclusion is contrary to their interests, the state will again 
have to give regulators the necessary discretionary powers to monitor, assess, and redress 
spousal non-compliance. As we have just seen, though, such monitoring and enforcement 
powers can be abused by regulators, threatening an increase in total domination.” (RS 
Taylor, Family). This invites ready comparison to polluting companies; to be asked to 
clean up is naturally against their interests. If environmental regulation, with its 
complexity – and the need for abusable powers via regulation, if not at the same personal 
level as with marriage – is forbidden, almost any interference in the market must be 
dependent upon individual exit and the empowerment necessary to do so. So too with 
financial, health and safety regulation, and other areas subject to the prospect of abuse. 
This is a horrifically flawed design. Individual workers may not even be aware of the 
pollution that they themselves are causing, especially if any inspection procedures are 
instituted by higher management that care little for environmental harms. There are 
countless areas where privacy concerns or potential for abuse is vastly outweighed by the 
good done via effective regulation, and where the knowledge and/or ability required for 
exit is unavailable. In response, Taylor might look towards his various policies to 
facilitate exit, but if he remains focused on marital independence from regulation and exit 
as the sole recourse, his theory is untenable in practice.164 
 
 
164 Indeed, one might turn the argument on its head – does not the enormous power of personal profit allow for the corruption, 
blackmail and distortion of regulatory policy?  
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In chapter three on markets, Taylor acknowledges the prospect for markets to bring 
power to bear. Interestingly, while he notes Dagger’s point that differential incomes 
inherently cause problems for domination – consider Pettit’s eyeball test – he seemingly 
ignores this possibility, focusing instead on efforts to attain a perfectly competitive 
market. He states that republicans may be concerned that “perfect competition is a lofty 
ideal that real-world markets will rarely approach, much less attain...but it (the concern) 
applies no less strongly to the other components of republicanism. The rule of law, the 
separation of powers, bicameralism, federalism, and international legalism are also 
demanding ideals that real-world political systems at best approximate rather than 
achieve” (RS Taylor, Market). This is a poor argument, for in the vast array of political 
processes, these ideals have been attained to an effective degree, for example in the 
United States’ federal system and separation of powers, or the bicameral legislation of the 
United Kingdom; granted, Pettit and other republican thinkers are optimistic, but their 
optimism at least has some foundation. A perfectly competitive market has yet to be 
reached at any point under capitalism, nor has any capitalist economy ever remotely 
resembled such. Furthermore, an imperfect market will not become more perfect by its 
own processes, whereas the political process can include its own betterment. There is a 
difference between utopian thinking, which Pettit approaches despite his best efforts165, 
and lunacy. 
 
Taylor stipulates that his policy proposals must be employed as a package and not 
piecemeal, yet he concedes numerous difficulties of implementation, for instance with 
migrant workers (RS Taylor, Market). The package, and individual proposals, seem more 
 
165  As the thesis shall argue in chapter six, section three. 
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than a little suspect. One example he uses is licensed taxis versus Uber, Lyft, etc, 
claiming that such licenses stymie competition and promote domination. This is 
somewhat ironic given the lengthy list of abuses and power that Uber offers, to the point 
of refusing to treat its workers as workers, instead as self-employed contractors. 
(Wikipedia, Uber BV v Aslam, England and Wales Court of Appeal, Leighton 2016, 866-
871, Mishel 2018).  He suggests, at length, policies of anti-trust legislation and worker 
retraining and resourcing (RS Taylor, State), while ambivalent about union power, which 
can both increase and decrease domination. None of his proposals, however, so much as 
touch upon the prospect of externalities, of alienation, and especially of the competing 
claims between staatsvolk and marktvolk.  While it may reinforce his overall scepticism 
towards government, he seems oddly reticent to consider the prospect of market forces 
engaging in regulatory capture. Perhaps that is because resisting this would require a 
strong state with extensive regulatory powers, which he cannot accept. 
 
In his fourth and fifth chapters, he discusses republican perspectives on government 
control – via Pettit’s democratic requirements, etc – and the perspective of more right-
wing “republicans” like Hayek and Sandel, drawing away from critiques of structural 
domination as Schuppert and his example of Gourevitch offer (RS Taylor, State and RPP, 
Gourevitch 2013, 602-607). He concedes the value of political voice, especially at the 
national level, but maintains the economic model of exit has a great role to play, 
unsurprisingly (RS Taylor, State). He rejects universal basic income as an expansion of 
state power, in fact arguing that UBI would work against the eyeball test, due to the 
increase in taxation necessary to sustain it. This, coupled with consequent greater powers 
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for revenue agents, would, again following his marital freedom example, vastly increase 
the prospect of public domination (RS Taylor, RPP). One can only imagine his horror at 
Carens’ system of equal consumption shares.  He concedes that his argument might be 
extreme, but argues that it would be impolitic to assume a perfect government any more 
than a perfect market; scepticism about the escalation of government power should be a 
primary tenet on his account. 
 
His arguments remain dubious here, on multiple grounds. Firstly, he offers no critique of 
systemic domination. As established in chapter two, this is a grievous flaw to his 
arguments, more so because of the inherent systemic issues from Marxist alienation and 
exploitation. In much the same vein, he ignores subtler exertions of power like “wage 
theft”, which Anderson, Gourevitch and other workplace republicans could correct via 
regulation and collective workplace management; a lack of oversight would only 
exacerbate this problem (Meixell & Eisenbray 2014, 1-6). Secondly, Taylor 
underestimates the international difficulties he faces. If the egalitarian system has 
difficulties arising from capital flight166, his commitment to a perfect market is 
overwhelmingly hamstrung by the global market system as it exists now. Whereas the 
egalitarian system can still engage in enthusiastic commerce, his framework of anti-trust 
laws and increased competition is flawed in an age where vital industrial projects operate 
in a single, authoritarian nation with no attachment to a republican economic policy 
(Athukora 2017, 363-382). Even ignoring China, competing local attitudes to regulation 
and especially deregulation – the famous “race to the bottom” - make his proposals 
internationally unworkable. 
 




Thirdly, while he acknowledges political voice, his concentration on mobility and exit as 
a supplement leads to a particularly unpalatable conclusion. In the event of a dying 
community, the best solution is its “resourced abandonment” (RS Taylor, State), placing 
resources that would be spent on welfare on encouragement to move elsewhere, perhaps 
to “Innovation hubs”, doubtless to be combined with his retraining and “demogrants” 
initiatives in fostering entrepreneurs and competition. It is precisely this kind of mobility 
that Dagger criticises (Dagger 1997), which Taylor acknowledges but does not address 
adequately, noting that Dagger’s concerns are reasonable, but the flaw is of failing to 
secure resourcing and preconditions to make it effective. On the contrary: Taylor seems 
to regard individuals as mere economic potential, and only as individuals beyond that; his 
proposal has no problems with uprooting families, including children, and encourages 
diaspora rather than any semblance of “democratic virtue” in local communities. 
 
In the same vein, his proposal directly weakens worker voice and potential organisation. 
By ensuring that workers have no investment in any particular community, that 
community is less likely to be invested in, emotionally or financially. Likewise, the 
association of a community with its work would strengthen the solidarity of the workers 
therein, possibly developing a conscious identification with it, like the “Motor City” of 
Detroit and its automobile industry. 
 
Fourthly, Taylor exhibits economic naiveté regarding exit’s potential as a threat in 
motivating local, non-national governments. Specifically, certain industries remain highly 
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concentrated in certain points; one may consider Silicon Valley or Hollywood as 
examples where specialist, related industries cluster. Resources for start-ups in those 
industries outside of these locations may be exceedingly difficult due to high economic 
barriers to entry. In these cases, local government must act to keep the local industry 
happy, but this does not apply to individual workers, whose effective voice is dependent 
upon their economic scarcity. Any exodus of citizens is easily replaceable, barring 
spectacular incompetence. Fifthly, Taylor notes that there must be a “positive 
commitment to further their country’s welfare” for a republican state to function 
effectively. Civic virtue is discussed in chapter six, but he concedes that his economic 
approach does nothing for a national level of “democratic virtue” (RS Taylor, State). The 
egalitarian system addresses these concerns in an effective yet decentralised manner. 
There are doubtless further concerns. 
 
All of these problems being directly stated, Taylor does outline several salient points 
which neo-republican theory would be wise to incorporate. Firstly, he is right that exit 
has its usefulness. Offering exit drastically enhances one’s freedom and independence. 
Carens’ egalitarian system offers this in a more comprehensive way than Taylor’s 
proposals, which rely too heavily on an utterly imperfect market. Secondly, Taylor’s 
continued scepticism of government – while farcical to the extremes he takes it – merits 
some answer. The thesis considers how his scepticism might be answered in establishing 
the egalitarian system and avoiding corruption, in part, in section three, but his concerns 
with regulatory bodies may persist. The arguments of Gonzalez-Ricoy (Gonzalez-Ricoy 
2014, 238-248) provide some effective suggestions in the form of those regulations, but 
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not regulation of the regulations. Thirdly, questions of voice and exit’s intersection 
remain relevant in considering Alvarez’s political idiocy from chapter two. The 
resignation of voice and the option of exit must remain available at a political level, to 
serve as an effective measure of protest for those who no longer have any other. 
 
Elizabeth Anderson provides an approach contrasting with Taylor. In lectures given at 
Princeton University, she argues that individual, hierarchical firms have essentially 
become private governments. She gives a lengthy description of all the ways in which a 
firm may interfere with its workers, explaining it is private both in the sense that the 
modern state interferes with the firm’s internal mechanisms to an increasingly limited 
degree, and that business-owners reject interference from workers (Anderson 2017, 37-
41). As established earlier, she also notes that the propositions for exit from a firm or 
even from the market amount to nothing more than formality. 
 
Anderson is less hostile towards the market than the thesis presented here. She 
acknowledges its necessity and even that there be some form of hierarchical organisation 
inherent within it, following the theory of the firm (Anderson 2017, 64). Her solution is 
to extend the checks on government that one finds in public government – a rule of law, 
democratic accountability, the right of exit, etc – along with a return to high levels of 
collective bargaining and worker voice (Anderson 2017, 63-67). This would presumably 
require the addition of the safeguards demanded by neo-republican theory: strict material 
equality, discursive control, and an end to alienation  when possible, along with methods 




Where Anderson falls short is in her disregard of the inherent flaws of capitalism. She is 
right to allow that the market and modern capitalism are not remotely identical, but fails 
to follow through, by suggesting that change should merely be at the level of individual 
firms. In her defence, she is completely right to insist upon an end to “private 
government”, and there is no indication that the egalitarian system would necessarily 
deliver this. Her proposals must be accompanied by changes to the system as a whole, 
however. More stringent legislation is useful, but as the arguments of chapter three 
indicate, this is mostly wasted effort. Moreover, if one was to extend the thesis’ proposals 
to the workplace, the level of control would be incompatible with the free ownership of 
capital, suggesting that each firm should be managed by the workers. Under Carens’ 
system, this is not necessarily so, but neither does he reject the idea altogether (Carens 
1981, 178-195). Anderson herself admits that there may be practical reasons not to 
embrace full workplace democracy and cooperative labour (Anderson 2017, 131); these 
reasons may diminish in the egalitarian system, but without empirical observation, this 
remains unclear. 
 
One might ask what prevents Anderson’s reforms from being constituted within the 
framework of the egalitarian system. Nothing: some of her suggestions may no longer be 
required, but an end to the atrocious “right-to-work” laws that she (and earlier chapters) 
rightfully castigate remains essential. Carens’ theory requires very little change in the 
form of organisation between the egalitarian and PPM systems, so anything that works 




The former arguments merely indicate that the right of exit is insufficient in capitalist 
practice and Taylor’s reliance on the market is woefully misguided. Workplace 
republicanism, entailing a greater commitment to both exit and voice, can be applied to 
the egalitarian system with equal validity as to capitalism.  This has done little, however,  
to alleviate republican concerns about social power, to which the thesis now turns. To 
answer these objections effectively, the thesis will briefly restate the importance of social 
status as an element of class, and the recognition/redistribution distinction discussed in 
chapter two, section three. It will then consider the potential role of esteem and social 
inequalities, particularly the former as outlined by Pettit and Brennan, and then outline 
some of the criticism of permitting social, as well as economic, inequalities. 
 
Social status in Weber’s sense was partially accepted by the thesis as an explanation and 
driving force for the stratification of the wider class system and class struggle. It is (an 
element of) the distinction between poor white and poor black workers in the United 
States, the socio-political divide between low-paid workers and the very rich (but still not 
strictly capitalist) workers in capitalist economies, and so on. Social status is also very 
important on grounds of Schuppertian alienation, because the possibility exists for 
various minorities (ethnic, religious, political, sexual etc) to be in an extremely privileged 
position through class while still subjected to systemic domination, or to be socially 
privileged in one way while discriminated in another. Consider the example of a black 
policeman in the United States, who upon being encountered in plain clothes late at night 
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by another officer, is subjected to policies born out of racial discrimination. Vulnerability 
in Schuppert’s sense can arise despite being very secure in other contexts. 
 
In turn, the distribution of material resources is but one element to the insulation and 
insurance Pettit (and the neo-republican solution) promotes. The distribution required is 
incompatible with a class system. There is also the need for recognition, however. This 
desire is inextricably linked to that of redistribution; each case of recognition also incurs 
an element of redistribution (and vice versa), according to Fraser, whose view the thesis 
takes to be correct. This is particularly important when it comes to systemic domination 
and alienation, both in the Schuppertian and Marxist senses, because it implies that a 
single approach will ultimately be unsuccessful. It will fail because only one of the root 
causes has actually been addressed. This is why Carens’ approach is so useful; by 
anchoring the motivation in social duty maximisation, and linking social recognition to 
the fulfilment of that duty, the recognition so craved is fulfilled, and presumably in a 
mainly egalitarian way167. By allocating equal consumption shares, the need for a fair 
distribution is sated168. 
 
It is this need for recognition that Pettit and Brennan deem the “intangible hand” of 
motivation – if the iron hand of government agency and the invisible hand of profit 
motivation fail to supply a convincing rationale for action, then the intangible hand is a 
third potential motivator. We can count on individuals doing things for the fame or 
 
167 This remains a case of “mainly” because complete equality of opportunity and outcome is very probably impossible. Not 
all individuals are capable of being equally esteemed – some are just naturally charismatic. Even if there were some element of 
redistribution of recognition (although the author has no idea of the form such redistribution might take), it is impossible to give 
all vocations equal esteem. That said, it is equally impossible to ensure that all individuals will be satisfied with the work 
available to them, in terms of its recognition rewards.  
168 Pending of course the neo-republican amendments outlined in the previous section, e.g.: taxation for social security, 
equitable rather than equal treatment of minority cultures, the possibility of women-only spaces and so on. 
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prestige, and social norms will help to effectively restrain or motivate certain behaviours. 
The esteem of others is definitely worth pursuing; it provides us with self-esteem, and it 
increases our chances of favourable economic and social dealings (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 
23-33). We may even simply desire esteem as a biological imperative. 
 
This intangible hand responds in distinctive ways, according to Pettit and Brennan.  
While it cannot be directly traded – and indeed an attempt to do so is normally seen as 
disesteemable – an economy of esteem is capable of being established, with distinct 
elements of supply and demand, qualification, and so on (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 50-77). 
And just as with the invisible hand being served by the market, the intangible hand can be 
aided by institutions which encourage the distribution of esteem towards positive values 
and norms. This obviously synergises with the republican need to inculcate such norms, 
and Carens’ socialisation too. 
 
There is a danger here. Carens’ system very much depends on economic equality. It 
offers no such promise of equality vis-à-vis social recognition. Cillian McBride, in 
Recognition, distinguishes the effects of the two kinds of social recognition: respect and 
esteem169. Much of the social recognition demanded to avert alienation (of both the 
Schuppertian and Marxist kinds) or to aid in the preservation of autonomy/discursive 
control is respect-based. According to McBride, this is relatively unproblematic; respect 
in the sense he uses it is not something that can be stacked indefinitely. Rather, it is the 
kind of respect due us as free, equal human beings. We can also speak of respect or 
recognition in terms of people’s accomplishments, this being esteem, which can clearly 
 
169  See also Darwall, 1977, whose “appraisal respect” McBride touches on as a sort of esteem. 
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grow proportionately. We may consider an individual who is respected for their intellect, 
who succeeds in business and is therefore respected for that, who writes a book on how to 
succeed in business and is still more respected for their scholarship170. We may consider 
Anderson’s examples when she writes of inequalities and esteem under Amazon, and the 
horrific abuse of autonomy entailed (Anderson 2017, 128-130). Her example aligns more 
towards recognition, and to prevent this abuse seems inherently justifiable. Conversely, 
we can also consider the cult of personality that arises in the United States towards 
entrepreneurs (Galbraith 1992, 75), and how this creates an illusion of competence and 
control and is converted into political power. Supporting this seems less justifiable. 
 
It should be readily apparent that while Carens’ system is classless, it is not status-less. 
Indeed, Carens openly touts the ability of entrepreneurs to be lauded for their 
accomplishments as a strength of his system, not a weakness, but he also acknowledges 
the prospect of inequalities of social esteem and approval (Carens 1981, 153-156). He 
argues that this could be fixed via effective socialisation towards “a man’s endowments 
(fixing) the measure of his duty” (Carens 1981, 155). And while further social 
inequalities – power, prestige, and so on – are possible too, they would inflict less harm 
than in the PPM system, where they are accompanied by the myriad troublesome 
prospects of massive economic inequality, and a system of social approval directly tied to 
the pursuit of profit. 
 
 
170 Pettit and Brennan outline this distinction as isothymia and megalothymia (Pettit & Brennan, section 1), and discuss it as 
recognition vs esteem as well, rather than respect. Esteem is inherently comparative; respect is not. 
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It may, however, be possible to reduce inequalities in social esteem further; it is certainly 
a worthy goal. Carens notes, furthermore, that the basic  prerequisites of the egalitarian 
system are not necessarily incompatible with “more egalitarian versions of PPM systems” 
(Carens 1981, 181) and his premises work with a very basic PPM system. As such, many 
methods by which we might theoretically reduce the effective power status conveys are 
available to Carens as they would be to Rawls, as an example. 
 
What problems might arise from a surplus of social esteem for individuals or groups? 
One immediate issue is the establishment of an entrenched social hierarchy which serves 
to replace that of the economic. In such a hierarchy, many of the old problems would re-
emerge, with the currency one of favour trading and mutual nepotism (McBride 2013, 
85-88, 102). In effect, economic capital has been replaced by social capital (McBride 
2013, 93).  A second is that recognition and esteem may not be towards positive social 
norms – McBride uses examples of the mafia, who thrive on an infamy they must 
maintain via a mixture of an honour code and shocking brutality, and individuals who 
seek out societal disesteem intentionally, such as juvenile delinquents (McBride 2013, 
144). Likewise, incorrectly applied disesteem can be extremely harmful: for instance, the 
stigma attached to a failed career or bankruptcy, for which one may not actually have 
been at fault. A third problem relates to McBride’s scepticism that there is a “just 
distribution” of esteem, or that this is even an appropriate way to characterise esteem 




An immediate caveat worthy of note is that all of these problems exist writ large within 
the present capitalist system, where they are additionally supported by the highly unjust, 
illiberal and inegalitarian socio-economic conditions and institutional arrangements 
which dominate modern society. The egalitarian system is likely to mitigate them, but 
problems they may remain, without an effort to address them effectively. What solutions 
might be available within the egalitarian system, while maintaining its strengths by tying 
social recognition and esteem to social duty? 
 
The first issue, of social hierarchy, is obviously a concern for republicanism and 
socialism alike. And while Carens’ prerequisites rule out an officially entrenched elite 
“caste”, they do not rule out an unofficial one. Such a caste could develop when 
individuals consistently fulfilled their social duty well, and perhaps then amplified their 
esteem by favour and esteem trading, although covertly. They would wish to avoid the 
problems Pettit and Brennan outline (Pettit & Brennan 2004, 161, 181) – notably, that 
bragging or (discovered) fraud would fail to impress. 
 
In mitigation, maximising one’s social duty also implies that the elite are diligent, selfless 
individuals who are genuinely trying to make society better. The hierarchy remains a 
problem even then; although it minimises the likelihood of their influence being used to 
unpleasant ends, it is still possible for just and decent people, in a moment of moral 
weakness, to do decidedly unpleasant things. An elite may also include those who are 




As Carens’ use of social recognition of a tool is vital to the thesis, establishing a more 
favourable distribution of esteem is undesirable and may not be possible anyway. 
Conversely, political, social and economic hierarchies should be discarded and the neo-
republican thesis offers methods for their removal. If some hierarchy is inevitable, then 
the best outcome is to minimise its influence, to ensure that it remains compliant with the 
eyeball test. To accomplish this, a rigid structural framework is inadequate; this sort of 
social hierarchy is subtle and relies on what people think, which may be directed, but not 
forced, under any circumstances. Thus the unenviable task of allowing for esteem, 
without allowing for it to matter. 
 
Short of a society where independence from each other ensures no-one can be vulnerable 
to such influence, anti-hierarchical steps can be taken as part of Carens’ socialisation: 
some people deserve more praise, but that praise should not result in active influence, 
although the line may be difficult to draw in practice. Further, such esteem should always 
be dependent upon not only maximising social duty but the normative goals behind that 
duty: freedom, equality, and independence. Those who try to employ their status contrary 
to these goals should rightfully be shunned. Ultimately, both solutions are rather limited. 
The best defence to offer is simply that Carens’ system provides a marked improvement 
on capitalism vis-à-vis hierarchy and what is praiseworthy, drawing far closer to 
republican practice than anything produced by glorifying free market successes. There 




The second problem is less thorny. While McBride criticises the “rosy” optimism of 
regulation via the intangible hand, the socialisation project that Carens intends focuses on 
the maximisation of social duty, and Carens makes it exceedingly clear that 
disapprobation is not placed upon those who genuinely tried and did poorly, but upon 
those who reject the system entirely or fail to live within its constraints. Note that this 
does not require a Stakhanovite obsession with work – society will reach an equilibrium 
on how much effort is required, in much the same way as it does now (Carens 1981, 147-
149). 
 
The socialisation will therefore prize characteristics and actions which are, on the whole, 
positive, unlike the mafia example. Deviancy and conflicting socialisation, the main 
threats to this, have already been addressed, albeit not perfectly. Regulation by the 
intangible hand does require the egalitarian society’s norms to be widely valued for it to 
work effectively; thus, criticism holds more concern earlier in the socialisation process. 
At this point, greater effort is required to show the value and appeal of the norms in 
question. This could be done by tying the self-interest of individuals to the norms more 
directly – showing that they would directly benefit from their adoption. This would not 
be difficult over time, but depending upon the initial economic shocks of the egalitarian 
system, it may need more robust demonstration of the vulnerability and exploitation 
under capitalism, accentuating the negatives over the positives. 
 
The third problem cannot be wholly answered here: articulating how best to characterise 
esteem and related concerns is beyond the scope of the thesis. What can be said is that the 
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justice of the thesis’ distribution of social esteem will be dependent largely upon how it is 
characterised. Because the thesis accepts the perspectival dualism of Fraser, the thesis 
accepts that, in her words, “neither claims for redistribution or claims for recognition can 
be contained within a separate sphere” (Fraser & Honneth 2003, 64). Therefore, the 
egalitarian system will help attend to distortions of social esteem.  It will not be complete, 
and the focus on social esteem as a driving motive may  cause corruption and 
misdistribution of resources, but it will still be a much more just distribution of both 
recognition and resources than under the current capitalist system. If one holds Fraser to 
be correct, this will be true no matter how such a distribution should look, precisely 
because the egalitarian system corrects the enormous misdistribution of resources under 
capitalism 
 
In conclusion, the egalitarian system is not perfect, from a republican perspective, and it 
still allows for various socio-economic inequalities, as well as potentially inequitable 
working conditions, that may permit alienation. It does, however, accomplish a great deal, 
and much of what it does not explicitly accomplish could be built into the system while 
retaining its cohesiveness. Furthermore, because of the egalitarian socialisation towards 
duty, mutual respect and the aggressive pursuit of the common good, esteem is 
theoretically built upon goodwill and diligence, rather than wealth and  ruthless self-
interest. In practice, it will inevitably be defined less clearly. It still presents a more 














Section Three – Establishment of the Egalitarian System and 
Vanguardism 
 
Section one established the egalitarian system and its prerequisites. Section two discussed 
further amendments that might be necessary, most notably from workplace republicanism. 
It also discussed the potential concern that the egalitarian system would maintain 
problems caused by social status. Section three considers a more practical problem. How 
is the egalitarian society to be established and perpetuated? Carens side-steps the question, 
citing that a: he wishes to avoid giving a specific example to avoid lapsing into “practical 
social planning“ (Carens 1981, 21) and b: to avoid any focus on individual circumstances 
and psychology (Carens 1981, 95). This is problematic, because the socialisation in 
question is exceedingly intensive. It seems implausible that individuals, as they are 
presently under the capitalist system as it is now, would respond in the way required, to 




The problem of establishing a new constitution post-revolution171 is an old one. Rousseau 
discusses this starting in “The Legislator”172 (Rousseau 1998, 213-229), arguing that 
trying to communicate one’s ideas in full is useless; “the effect would have to become the 
cause; the social spirit, which should be created by these institutions, would have to 
preside over their very foundation.” There is a great need for “morality, (of) custom, (of) 
public opinion”. Comparable writing can be found in Xun Zi, in the need for sages to 
introduce wisdom by artifice (Stanford, Xun Zi, Liu 2006, 102-106), Plato, whose 
example Rousseau cites, and others besides. Rousseau’s solution is for a single great 
individual to present laws, to change human nature in its entirety, yet to have no power to 
actually execute or legislate for those laws, and if necessary, to deceive the population. 
 
This is relevant not because of a need for inculcating democratic norms, but economic 
ones. It is entirely plausible that, were there to be economic unrest and disruption, the 
decline in living standards might allow for a counter-revolutionary backlash against the 
egalitarian state. If not socialised or at least highly committed to the project as a 
population, the project would have a high risk of failure. Indeed, this may be too strong a 
position to start from. How exactly is the desire for an egalitarian state and system to be 
brought about, when there is – as outlined in chapters two and three – a great deal of 




171  Or at least, post political upheaval. 
172  The exact translation varies. It could be “The Lawgiver”, etc. 
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Rousseau’s solution if taken literally is not amenable to republicanism, at least of the 
kind Pettit supports (Pettit 2013, 199). A more passive citizenry does not suit the “Italian-
Atlantic tradition”, though Pettit points out that Rousseau does not rule out contestation 
altogether. If one takes the idea of a single entity to be best translated to an uncontestable 
legislature, which if in a republic is supposedly uncorruptible and resisting is misguided 
at best (Pettit 2013, 193-194, 199), as Pettit does, then Rousseau’s solution is utterly 
incompatible. Indeed, it may look rather authoritarian. 
 
A solution in Rousseau’s vein can be found in Lenin’s writings, where he argues for a 
vanguard party to bring about the revolution and side-step the lengthy process of 
historical materialism, with all of its associated ills during the bourgeois period (Lenin 
1902, Ch 3, note esp. footnote 13). He equally proposes a form of “democratic 
centralism”, wherein said vanguard party will democratically decide upon its policies and 
then proceed with one, unified purpose. This is, again, inherently anathema to republican 
policy and, historically, has led to tyranny rather than any form of democratic progress or 
socialism as he intended (Pettit 2017 B, 341-343). 
 
The two approaches might be blended: a political vanguard party which, by its own 
explicit charter, takes up no position in government. The sole purpose of this party is 
education and mobilisation towards the end of establishing neo-republican norms and 
governance. Pettit concedes, contrary to the old pure negative liberty conception, that 
there is a substantive difference between a threat and offer. He also notes a difference 
between “spin” and outright lies. Even basic factual truths, solidly established by 
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scientific and journalistic rigour, have trouble finding purchase in social media. Utter 
falsehoods must be disowned for the political apparatus employed here to have any 
legitimacy whatsoever. It is certainly viable for it to tell the truth with style, however. An 
ironclad line is therefore drawn for such a party, but this does not necessarily limit it 
greatly in its practical actions.  
 
Such an organisation must be strictly and relentlessly honest. It must engage in 
deliberative discussions when deciding how and what to focus on, inefficient though it 
may be, with an emphasis on collaboration. It must promote norms of honesty, civility, 
and inquiry, and although it may champion its own political causes, it must be equally 
demanding upon them. It must equally be capable of being contested, following Pettit, on 
its own terms: there must be some way to hold this party to account. And all of this must 
be set as a point of public principle, on which the party might be challenged. 
 
This may give rise to an objection, however. The entire point of this was to have a 
vanguard party which would promote a radical, even revolutionary agenda, to the point of 
encouraging such revolution. Such a code as outlined in the prior paragraph would 
hamstring the effectiveness of a vanguard approach. Therefore, why not simply make use 
of an ordinary democratic party apparatus? 
 
In some respects, this criticism is accurate; this is not a vanguard revolutionary party that 
aims to seize power and apply it effectively. It is not remotely Leninist in that sense. Its 
nature is more akin to activism, but highly focused and deliberately, relentlessly seeking 
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out political change. It gives direction, and does its best to shape the effective discourse. 
It creates the conditions for change, rather than enacting it. It remains accurately 
characterised as a vanguard, however, by dint of its smaller and more focused 
membership, the solidity of “core” political ideals which are fully observed, and its 
indifference to formal political office. Thus it avoids the charge against vanguardism 
Pettit raises; it aims at “persuading others, not overwhelming them.” (Pettit 2017 B, 343) 
 
A further criticism might be as to the practicality of this. How plausible is it for mass-
education? One advantage that the thesis has is the presence of social media. Social 
media has proven itself much more decentralised and thus harder to control for 
government, as well as overwhelmed with disinformation and confusion. This extends 
even to its definition – what distinguishes social media from mere social networking?  
Social media is best understood primarily as a means to transmit information en masse, to 
“enlarge the conversation” yet simultaneously it does not exist to hold that conversation. 
Social networking, by contrast, is focused on expanding contact and communication first 
and foremost. Sites like Facebook and Twitter straddle the line between the two, being 
primarily for communication yet allowing users to receive a great deal of social media 
and thus brand awareness (Edosomwan et al, 2011, 79-91). Both represent areas of 
concern, but social media is more damaging, precisely because of the inability truly to 
converse. Social media simply projects; there is no outcome by which a discourse can be 




It is clear that social media and social networking have a strong impact on both economic 
and political discourse, and participation in either (Shirky 2011, 7-9, Faulds & Mangold 
2009, 358-365, Zuniga et al 2012, 325-331, etc). It is equally clear that they have been 
used as vectors for disinformation, via reinforcement – the so-called “echo chamber” - 
and propaganda (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017, 218-230, Zuniga et al 2012, 331, Allcott et al 
2019, 1-7, Valenzuela et al 2019, 10-16). Allcott and Gentzkow’s findings suggest that 
the level of influence on political discourse is very low, but measurable and likely to 
increase as methods become more sophisticated. Other research indicates that social 
media acts as a powerful check on corruption following Pettit’s logic vis-à-vis scandals 
(Enikolopov et al 2018, 153-171). 
 
Social media must therefore be considered under the consequentialist ethos Pettit 
embraces. Its potential for harm and judgement is clear, and current methods of fact-
discerning are distinctly ambivalent in their effects (Clayton et al 2019, 1-23). But its 
potential for education and mobilisation are equally clear. It could be used to underwrite 
an entire political movement towards neo-republican ambitions. 
 
Accepting then that the vanguard party is both practical and not inherently contradictory 
to republican goals, two things remain. Firstly, how is the vanguard party to be held to 
account, to avoid problems such as disinformation, or being co-opted by a charismatic 
tyrant173, to ensure it is both scrupulously truthful and not directly intervening in the 
political process? Secondly, how effective will this be as socialisation, and under what 
 
173  As was the case for Marxist-Leninist revolutionary parties in practice. 
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timeframe should it operate? After all, such socialisation will take a considerable period 
of time. 
 
In order to be held to account, besides the ironclad line of truth, one might want to adopt 
some elements of Pettit’s political requirements. For example, there could be a charter of 
sorts – as there is a constitution within a political body – which expressly set the limits of 
conduct and action, as publically available information. And just as with appellate and 
judicial resources (Pettit 2001, 171-172), there could be formal mechanisms for 
contestation. One difficulty that would arise would be that there is no real way to allow 
for separate checks and balances as an equivalent to the “mixed constitution” or 
bicameral legislatures Pettit outlines. This is partially balanced by the necessity, even 
more than most politicians, to uphold the normative standards of the group. Scandal, and 
the avoidance thereof, would be of supreme importance to avoid tarnishing the credibility 
of the movement. This in turn could result in corruption, deliberately hiding such 
scandals. But given that such a vanguard party appeals to those with republican norms 
and values, it should in turn be reasonably inoculated from such selfishness. At least, it 
will be no more vulnerable to corruption than a government, lacking far less explicit 
power to exert, and fewer rewards and status. 
 
As to how effective such methods might be, the thesis lacks an appropriate empirical test. 
The timeframe, however, surely must extend some years past the establishment of the 
egalitarian system, until its socialisation has taken firm root in a new generation. This has 
the risk of the party simply becoming a mouthpiece of the new state, or becoming 
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irrelevant; a still worse risk would be that the vanguard party dissolved and took up a 
position within government, forming an internal cadre or obtaining a privileged position. 
Thus there is a need to preserve both independence and distance. What if the vanguard 
party remains intact, but separate? Again this is not ideal in the long term. If the new 
government and party agree in their entirety, then at best there is a crowding of political 
debate with but a single view, and at worst, one side becomes merely enforcers or 
mouthpiece of the other. If they publicly disagree, the movement undergoes the problem 
of fragmentation, as discussed above, and damages the legitimacy of the new government 
– which may, if brought about by revolution or mass civil protest, desperately need it. A 
better solution is to focus on steady withdrawal, moving from active political debate to 
simply offering encouragement, before disbanding over a steady and announced 
timeframe. Once done, no individual as a party of said party should seek political office. 
 
Allowing for a vanguard party, albeit one that must remain answerable, would seem to 
address the problem of establishing an egalitarian state. It does have certain risks attached 
to it, most notably that an inadequately resourced and transparent party, or one with 
insufficient internal debate and restraint, might be co-opted to authoritarian ends, or 
become corrupt. Yet if the alternative is to engage in a democratic process which has 
been fatally undermined, and where genuine political change has become almost 





Section One – Socialisation and Authoritarianism 
 
Organisational concerns aside, Carens relies upon certain notions of human motivation, specifically 
that the goal of social-duty maximisation can reliably replace the profit motive (Carens 1981, 111-
118), challenging any critic to demonstrate the fixed nature of the human mind. While not 
necessarily in opposition to republican beliefs about norms (Pettit 1997, 241-246), nor the 
development of civic virtue, it is worth discussing in detail given the earlier concerns about 
organisational aspects of a Carens-esque socialism. Carens’ view must be explicated, then defended. 
Given the acceptance of discursive control as a component of freedom in society, a sceptic might 
worry that a focus on changing individual psychology would result in domination and alienation. It 
would also be difficult to defend; if the charge against capitalism was that individuals were crushed 
under the weight of the system, a socialism that did the same for their own good is equally 
unjustifiable.  
 
Other elements are worth considering, too. Part of the critique against Rawls relied on 
implementing a republican notion of virtue and value, one not shared by liberalism. This will be set 
out in greater detail in section two. Another tension is between the ostensible realism that Pettit and 
Marx espouse, and the explicit utopianism of Carens’ project. Thus far, the thesis has argued that 
the solution presented is very much achievable. Yet Carens himself identifies his arguments as 
utopian, as opposed to a realistic blueprint. This is primarily dealt with in section three. 
 
Carens sets forth the case for social-duty maximisation via some of his logically necessary 
prerequisites. For his motivational arguments to work, individuals must “derive satisfaction from 
performing this duty” of income maximisation; they must “place the same relative value” on their 
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satisfactions for doing so as on acquiring income for consumption; they must place some value on 
income for consumption, and they must generally obey the laws upholding the egalitarian system 
(Carens 1981, 174-176). 
 
The thesis will assume these prerequisites to be true for the sake of the argument, although their 
truth seems intuitively plausible, excepting perhaps Carens’ third prerequisite, that of same relative 
value. It has already been discussed in chapter five, but again note that this prerequisite is at least 
logically and empirically possible, even if one doubts its plausibility..  
 
His empirical prerequisites concerning motivation necessitate more scrutiny. Carens’ theory 
necessitates an “effective socialisation process”, which “must be more intense than the socialisation 
process in the PPM system if people in the egalitarian system are to place as much value on social-
duty satisfactions as people in the PPM system place on income-consumption satisfactions.” He 
notes that no centralisation is needed for this socialisation. Beyond an effective tax structure and a 
moral motivation, the empirical prerequisites are not – in Carens’ opinion - much different to or 
more demanding than those of the PPM system (Carens 1981, 175-177). 
 
He details his rationale for these prerequisites in the first section of his book’s third chapter. Carens 
specifically notes that he wishes to avoid questions about “what empirical conditions would have to 
be satisfied to take some real person...and to transform her values” (Carens 1981, 95). His solution 
is hypothetical, and relies strongly on socialisation, specifically, perpetual socialisation (Carens 
1981, 101). He considers eight potential concerns; some involve motivation, while others do not. 
He is acutely aware of the possibility of new sources of social inequality (Carens 1981, 102). 
 
Most important here are his arguments for the plasticity of human nature, the role and practice of 
socialisation as it already occurs in the PPM system, and his rationale for suggesting the egalitarian 
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system’s socialisation must be more intense. As with Marx, Carens emphasises the “apparent 
impossibility of trying to identify any determinate human nature” (Carens 1981, 105) – instead, he 
notes a huge number of different cultural goals, practices, and values; it is not inconceivable that 
social-duty maximisation might be one of them. Humans have certain biological drives, and possess 
“differing genetic endowments”, affecting what and how they learn, but economic activity does not 
seem to be limited in this fashion. Carens cites an example of “Mountain Fur people” who labour 
solely for beer, regarding labour for wages or capital as shameful. Yet it is equally shameful to use 
money to acquire beer (or vice versa); their economic attitude is certainly distinctive enough from 
the PPM system that it suggests plasticity on this point (Carens 1981, 105-111). 
 
What of socialisation under capitalism? Here, Carens relies on Merton, citing his studies of the 
United States, where socialisation for income consumption – and acquiring that income in the first 
place – is “very intensive in terms of the social approval which is attached to this goal” (Carens 
1981, 116-119). The intangible hand here operates not unlike that of a private club or in-group 
(Pettit & Brennan 2004, 219-221) where social approval is a feedback loop – the esteem placed 
upon those who are rich becomes itself an argument for the rich to be esteemed. Because they have 
achieved the position, they must by definition deserve it (Galbraith 1992, 96-98).  
 
Naturally, there is no American government department for socialisation; rather, it adds to itself 
through “de-centralised agencies – family, school and workplace – which are primarily responsible 
for this intense socialisation, presumably for the most part because they share a consensus on the 
considerable importance they attach to this goal” (Carens 1981, 119). Celebrity culture may boost 
the impact by providing a concrete example to idealise and desire. Pettit likewise allows for just this 
sort of socialisation, noting that patterns of behaviour reinforce social norms in everyday life as well 




The intensity of the socialisation process necessary, compared with PPM, is because Carens’ system 
relies solely on satisfactions of esteem, self-esteem and social recognition, as “the instrumental 
satisfactions associated with the acquisition of income for consumption are not available in the 
egalitarian system”174 “If the goal of fulfilling one’s social obligations...were to have the same place 
in the hierarchy of values of the egalitarian system as the goal of acquiring income...in the PPM 
system, this instrumental factor would have to be replaced by an increase in the social importance 
attached” (Carens 1981, 116-118). Plainly, one must make the social duty maximisation far more 
appealing than it is today. This may be challenging if American socialisation for income 
consumption is already quite intense. 
 
The most troubling argument one might use against Carens is that his psychological reasoning is 
simply wrong. Psychology remains an uncertain science; it may be that individuals are not as 
malleable as he thinks, or that far stronger socialisation – outright brainwashing – would be needed 
for the socialisation to “stick”. This is unacceptable if we are committed to the value of  non-
domination. 
 
Evidence suggests this is not the case, however. Firstly, recent psychological studies suggest that 
the human mind is highly malleable, and that many are susceptible to obedience via social norms 
and suggestions from one’s social superiors (Altemeyer 2006, 15-21, 25, Milgram 1963,1-9, and so 
on). A notable problem for virtue ethicists has been the plethora of evidence that humans adapt to 
their circumstances and do not hold to fixed character traits, and that individuals attribute such traits 
in response to situations (the fundamental attribution error) (Harman 1999 87-94, Harman 2003 
315-331, Nisbet & Ross 1991, Berry & Fredrickson 2015, 45-54, Doris 2002, so on and so forth).175  
 
174  A small note – this is not to say that individuals will not be satisfied by consumption of their (equal) income. It is denoting the loss of 
what Rawls describes as the freedom to make use of one’s talents. 
175  It should be pointed out that other literature questions the existence of this error at all (Funder & Fast 2010, Sabini et al 2001, etc). So long 
as human minds are plastic, Carens’ argument will hold. 
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The problem is thus not one of being insufficiently malleable, but too malleable altogether. 
Secondly, even if there is some innate selfishness to human nature – some biological imperative 
towards competition – there is equally innate cooperation and reciprocity. It is not beyond belief 
that the selfishness of individuals is best sated by the common good (Carens 1981, 120-123). 
Human beings rarely resemble the close-fisted homo-economicus, reducing concepts and decisions 
to rational selfishness and irrational altruism. Instead, there is a mixture of motivations and 
impulses, which can be worked with and refined. 
 
Besides this, three general arguments to a mixture of these prerequisites spring to mind. Their 
persuasiveness varies. They cover the strongest possible objections to Carens’ motivational 
elements. The first is that of conflicting socialisation, social esteem, and “amour-propre” - the 
prospect of the socialisation being impeded in some manner176.. The second is that the intensity of 
socialisation needed may be incompatible with discursive control and non-domination, even 
assuming Carens’ arguments about decentralisation are accurate and sufficient. The third is 
deviancy – how to accommodate Carens’ system with the prospect of counter-cultures, resistance to 
socialisation, and those who lack any empathy or altruism altogether – individuals with anti-social 
personality disorder, for instance. 
 
Conflicting socialisation may have many sources, but is broadly the same problem each time. 
Consider a nation adhering to an egalitarian system, surrounded by many other countries which, 
thanks to globalisation etc, still rely on the PPM system – assuming the absence of a global 
revolution. The latter will propagate different social norms and viewpoints, which may counteract 
the egalitarian socialisation. An example might be a socialist citizen on an expensive holiday, 
seeing only the glitzy side of Vegas or Macau, and becoming enthralled with the idea of the free 
market. How might one deal with immigrants who had radically different socialisation in the same 
 
176 Carens notes that this occurred in China and Cuba (Carens 1981, 170) during their attempts at socialisation, and explains their “extra 
scrutiny” by reference to it. It is precisely this scrutiny that the second criticism fears. 
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vein? There is a great deal of literature on the problems of ethnic minorities with radically different 
beliefs and customs; finding acceptable solutions is fraught with difficulty. The same is likely true 
for economic “subcultures”. Likewise, individuals may support the egalitarian system solely to 
accomplish a need for social esteem, acting only out of self-love and pride – Rousseau’s amour-
propre – and thus obey the forms, the “patterns” in Pettit’s nomenclature, without actually adhering 
to the spirit. 
 
This criticism touches upon deviancy, but questions Carens in a slightly different way. Deviancy 
suggests that the laws and the norms of the egalitarian system are being outright disobeyed, or that 
social duty maximisation has no worth to the “deviants”. In this case, the egalitarian system works, 
at least in part, and the norms are still being obeyed. The problem is that internal or external factors 
may lessen the intensity of the socialisation process, and by doing so, threaten Carens’ empirical 
prerequisites. 
 
This problem is impossible to avoid in any society, whether PPM or egalitarian; no government can 
impose perfect socialisation. Any attempt would be decidedly totalitarian. Solutions exist, however. 
The first step for any solution is to mitigate the damage caused; a neo-republican, egalitarian system 
might adopt several plausible options. The first is to ensure that amour-propre and similar selfish 
desires that conflict with egalitarian socialisation still have every ability to find that their own 
position is a beneficial one. Often, such selfish desires come with a fallacy of judgement along the 
lines of those thwarted by Rawls’ original position. Rawls’ original position was designed to ensure 
an individual could make no assumptions about where they would end up. When confronted with a 
sharp hierarchy, it would be a mistake to assume one would end up on top. Yet this is precisely 
what such desires assume; “surely, I would be better off under capitalism”. One who has made this 
mistake may argue that the PPM society rewards risk, but this is rarely plausible. They may argue 
for responsibility, desert, etc, and for the benefit of allowing people to accomplish their own 
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rewards, but a simple assessment of probabilities indicates a reliance on luck or a hopelessly 
distorted world view. It would be extremely foolish to bet on achieving any social position at the 
top end of today’s pyramidal capitalist society, given the sheer improbability involved. 
 
The egalitarian socialisation can thus meet this head-on, whether in schools or the workplace, by 
outlining how mistaken such beliefs are historically. The self-interested can thus be persuaded to 
adopt the system as beneficial for themselves, as much as others. By accepting this and continuing 
to adopt the forms of such socialisation, they may grow closer to the ideal, consciously or 
unconsciously. This will not always be the case, but it seems plausible that the numbers would be 
sufficient for the thesis’ purposes. 
 
While external influences may be combated with censorship, restrictions on immigration and 
emigration, and simple xenophobia, these are all thoroughly unacceptable to neo-republicanism, due 
to the imposition of uncontrolled interference (censorship), acute social vulnerability (xenophobia) 
or both (emigration restrictions)177. They do much to remove both voice and exit. A more 
acceptable method is to build neo-republican values into the very framework of the society. An 
example of this can be found in the United States’ constitution. Over time, the document has 
gathered almost religious significance, despite it being no more than part of an 18th century effort to 
create a semi-democratic republic. By venerating republican principles as aspirations for day to day 
life, by defending them as the foundation for the society as a whole, they become more entrenched 
and less malleable, aiding in preserving them against conflicting socialisation. Against this, one 
might question the value of a constitution that cannot change, especially given the anachronism of 
relying on a document centuries in age. This can be answered by reference to Pettit’s dual-aspect 
model of democracy and contestatory change (Pettit 2012, 252-279); over time, the citizenry will be 
 
177  Immigration restrictions are less objectionable, but could still be used as a tool to supplement the other purposes and, in this capacity, 
would be equally concerning. 
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able to exercise an editorial control, shifting the exact balance of norms, but while maintaining a 
dedication to certain core principles. In this case, social duty maximisation. 
 
Lastly, one might ask how conflicting socialisation will generally manifest in the egalitarian system. 
If socialisation towards neo-republican, egalitarian social norms fails to produce general adherence, 
many responses are possible. Countercultures, political groups and parties, etc, are problematic but 
not necessarily crippling to society. Crime, on the other hand, both threatens Carens’ prerequisite of 
generally obeyed laws and damages the social fabric and the norms themselves over time. In 
particular, parasitical behaviour, such as fraud, theft and tax evasion178 are encouraged by PPM-
based socialisation towards personal profit at any cost. White collar crime of this kind is generally 
not treated severely in the western world, with punishments that frequently fail to outweigh the 
benefits of committing these crimes (Reiman 2004, 65-81, Sutherland 1945, 135-139). The 
egalitarian system should, to pre-empt these problems, introduce much harsher penalties . When 
they are considered in light of the damage such crimes to do to norms of cooperation, trust, and 
civility, such punishment may seem more proportionate. 
 
The second criticism rejects Carens’ sanguine attitude towards more intense socialisation in the first 
place, with a strong rejection and a weak rejection. On the account of the strong rejection, the 
pursuit of socialisation on a societal scale – even if it engendered republican civic virtues, social 
duty maximisation, benevolence towards fellow human beings, etc – is worryingly totalitarian, 
hearkening back to Berlin’s critique of non-domination. While maintaining decentralised 
socialisation, there may also be a centralised initiative towards the egalitarian system within schools, 
workplaces, media, etc. This is quite different from an intense, but organic, socialisation in the PPM 
system. Although one may promote various different kinds of beliefs and social norms as a private 
 
178 In the egalitarian system, this could be accomplished by failing to report profits accurately.  
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individual or group, this is quite different from a government or corporate entity doing so; much the 
same difference as between dominium and imperium. Such an approach contrasts with a republican 
doctrine that seeks to lead by example and inculcates such virtues within a campaign of high civic 
engagement (Pettit 2012, 224-227). 
 
The weaker rejection suggests that the intensity of socialisation, while not necessitating 
brainwashing or authoritarian methods, may easily defer to them, and is incompatible with non-
domination. Much of the literature on socialisation and the malleability of human psychology offers 
tempting prospects to those of an authoritarian bent. Thus, it is feasible that a slow progress towards 
a “properly” socialised egalitarian society would prompt an abuse of power. More urgently, 
socialisation of this kind may effectively damage discursive control, as individual beliefs are 
encouraged to conform. The cloying nature of social disesteem for speaking up already discourages 
voicing unpalatable beliefs179. How much more so in the egalitarian system? 
 
This is compounded by a further concern about social elites. Firstly, having protested the power of 
economic stratification and hierarchy, it seems reasonable to be concerned with the prospect of 
entrepreneurs and politicians etc establishing a social hierarchy, encouraging obedience and 
adherence to the status quo180.. Secondly, in order to maintain adequate socialisation over time, it 
may be that policy makers and those in positions of authority are demanded, unofficially (intense 
peer pressure and/or nepotism) or officially (via required education before service181, a requirement 
 
179  It is worth noting that Pettit and Brennan consider this objection in some detail (Economy of Esteem, section 13) and find it unpersuasive, 
precisely because one can socialise for autonomy, and in some instances, even turn the intangible hand on itself. They use the example of an 
individual “coming out” and forcing a reassessment of their esteem. 
180 This is separate but related to the problem of elites earlier, where the concern was their potential to form a new sort of class structure 
181 To allay a misunderstanding here, this would not be some hellish process of re-education and brainwashing. This would simply be – for 
example – mandatory classes examining historical economic patterns, the deprivation and inequality endemic to modern capitalism, etc. It would need 
to be entirely compatible with discursive control; a comparison might be to one required to formally educate themselves on a matter being debated 
before they could contribute to the debate. Provided the bar for such education is low, and no particular adherence to norms, opinions about the facts 
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of party loyalty, etc) to embody and conform to the socialisation. Even if these actions might not 
directly threaten their autonomy or result in the exclusion of dissenting viewpoints, they fetter 
discursive control. 
 
One potential response is to cling hard to the consequentialism embodied in Pettit’s writings – even 
if the socialisation (and education, etc) is harmful to non-domination as a principle, stifles 
democratic discourse and so on, it is a worthwhile project nonetheless. Because it aids in preventing 
many of the truly horrible problems endemic to modern society, including those which are equally 
toxic to non-domination, for example, the purchase of political influence, it is still worth pursuing. 
This only works for the weaker rejection, however, as the stronger makes a claim for the utter 
incompatibility of republicanism and socialisation. 
 
A more palatable solution is likely to emphasise the point of the egalitarian system: human liberty, 
which includes autonomy, ie the freedom of thought, opinion and conscience. Part of the 
socialisation should include engagement and vigilance as Pettit and other republicans outline. If the 
egalitarian system is to succeed, it should be able to withstand the criticism and concerns levied 
against it, from inside and out. Totalitarianism can be averted by decentralising the socialisation and 
combining it with an encouragement of scepticism and cautious optimism – trust but verify, to 
borrow a phrase. This still remains quite consequentialist in character; instilling a healthy distrust of 
authority, by an authority, is certainly open to a charge of hypocrisy.182 
 
If more intense socialisation is needed, especially amongst the “elites” of Carens system who must 
be capable of rallying to its defence, and one has no desire to restrict such privileged position solely 
 
presented, etc, this is compatible with discursive control. Considering Pettit himself outlines a system of civic education and norm-holding as an ideal 
(Pettit 1997, Pettit 2012), this should equally be compatible with republican democratic requirements and policy. 
182  It’s worth considering Rawls’ comments on stability in The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus (Rawls 2003, 170-172), 
wherein he outlines that a liberal conception ought to gain not merely practical stability but the stability won by reasoning citizens who hold disparate, 
conflicting views. It will be well-ordered if it averts “unreasonable comprehensive doctrines”. And the socialisation offered here will allow for 
disparate views while averting the latter. See also Rawls 1993, 140-144. 
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to those who are most dedicated, and the prospect of a selective, elite group engaging in peer 
pressure to conform is decidedly anathema to republican principles – all of which seem to be true – 
then the only other option is by enormous societal pressure from the masses below. If politicians act 
against social norms and lie, or if public servants become corrupt, they must be savaged in the court 
of public opinion. This would force them to rectify their behaviour, or at least justify it; thus 
winnowing out the selfish by imposing socialisation from the bottom up, not the top down183..  
 
For public opinion to hold the elite accountable, however, the majority must believe in neo-
republican social norms and the spirit of the egalitarian system. This may not be the case at the 
beginning; even a devout believer in the power of the egalitarian system would not have been 
socialised in the same way as one born to such a project a century in. It is too dangerous to rely 
solely on the elite leading by example for socialisation. Thus, the conundrum remains: how to 
socialise the egalitarian system when attempting to inculcate certain values by schooling disrespects 
the discursive control of the pupils. Partially, this can be answered by making no specific demands 
for obedience to these norms and facts, merely understanding them. Partially, it can be answered via 
consequentialism. The tension and potential dangers remain, and the thesis can only answer that 
they necessitate further debate on where and how to draw the line. As with the vanguard party, the 
thesis will err on the side of some risk, if this will ensure that the present and ongoing threats to 
autonomy are dealt with. 
 
Deviancy is best considered as an objection to Carens’ points of “general” obedience to laws, the 
“general” support of elites, etc, but also to the socialisation process. He discusses deviancy in some 
detail. Carens points out there is considerable deviance in the PPM system – very few people are 
 
183 And of course, it may be promptly pointed out this relies on a tyranny of the majority. But this exerts no direction, no thought control, 
except from the greater masses of the people; it is certainly not totalitarian if their persecution extends solely to voting them out of office 
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solely motivated by acquiring income for consumption, and some actively resist it, but the system 
still works. Deviancy up to a certain point hinders, but does not stop, society functioning “as 
intended”. Even extreme deviancy and nonconformity is, to Carens’ mind, only a problem in the 
egalitarian system to the same extent as in the PPM one. This applies only to motivation on income 
consumption/social duty maximisation; “with regard to the equal distribution of income, the 
egalitarian system could not afford to tolerate any significant range of behaviour, because this 
would compromise the basic nature of the system” (Carens 1981, 129-136). His solution partially 
involves the use and motivation of elites, discussed earlier, and partially more socialisation and 
commitment to the social norms involved. Because of the sensitivity of their nature, these norms 
would need to be enforced “through formal laws...and formal sanctions of criminal procedure” 
(Carens 1981, 136-137). 
 
Carens may be overly optimistic at this point. Formal laws and criminal sanctions require suitable 
social norms to back them up, or they risk being seen as impractical, illegitimate, and tyrannical; 
extreme deviancy may in turn become more common and thus more problematic. This is all the 
more problematic if deviancy arises from group identity and behaviours (Akers et 
al 1979, 636-640, 644-651). Deviancy as regards equal distribution directly threatens such norms; 
the solution Carens proposes to curb deviancy requires them to be in place before the socialisation. 
This is impractical, to say the least. 
 
The problem of extreme deviancy is most evident when considering individuals who are not merely 
dissatisfied by the egalitarian system, but are actively opposed to it. Selfishness and amour-propre 
can be mitigated; what of those who are simply malicious? Carens’ point on “general” obedience 
aside, consider those who Altemeyer describes as “social dominators”; cruel, status-obsessed, and 
aggressive (Altemeyer 2006, 161-173). Consider those with anti-social personality disorder; 
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consider the small but influential numbers of entrepreneurs who have most to gain from the PPM 
system. 
 
This leads directly to dissatisfaction with equal shares; those who resent labouring on behalf of the 
common good are hardly apt to view their share as adequate. Indeed, they may be more likely to 
ascribe disproportionate value to their own labour, and feel that this system cheats them. Likewise, 
any pretence of adherence to social norms is just that – a pretence. Initially, those who lost out 
entirely in the transition to the egalitarian system may present less extreme cases of deviancy which 
nonetheless are more severe than mere conflicting socialisation. As Cohen notes, there exists a class 
of people for whom an egalitarian redistribution can offer nothing, and who will only concede to it 
via coercion184 (Cohen 2011, 156-157) 
 
These individuals will pay no heed towards the greater social good, nor towards equal distribution. 
They are the classic “free riders”. Their numbers may be small, but they will be disproportionately 
influential, either due to lingering social status and the “allure” of having once been great, or 
through their innate willingness to cheat and disregard social norms to get ahead. The expression 
“one bad apple spoils the bunch” is appropriate here; the effects of even a single deviant against 
social duty maximisation may act so as to drag others down with him, especially if the deviancy is 
successful and is not – immediately- accompanied by any retribution. Retribution could, of course, 
take the form of law, but could also be the acquisition of a bad reputation, social disesteem, etc. 
 
Managing such deviance is an expanding field, and being primarily a matter of sociology and 
psychology, is not one the thesis is equipped to discuss in detail. The exact response will, however, 
depend enormously on the reasons for deviancy; does deviancy arise because of group identity, or 
 
184 While sceptical, Cohen allows for this to be non-violent coercion, e.g.: by a general strike. 
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perhaps because of a discrepancy between personal goals and the norms espoused by society? The 
answer will inform the egalitarian system’s response. A general note, however, is that deviants 
mostly thrive on their general acceptability by the wider “group” or society as a whole. Persecution 
will not necessarily remove them, especially if it sways public sympathy in their favour through 
being regarded as heavy handed, or unfair. If it is emphasised, as with white-collar crime, that the 
deviants are harmful, selfish, and offer society nothing while attempting to take everything – with 
no regard for social duty – their status might be diminished, and public sympathy lost. 
 
In conclusion, the kind of motivational transformation that Carens wishes to enact is plausible, as a 
goal. It does not require authoritarian methods to implement, being widely decentralised, but it does 
require political support and widespread “dispersal” to prove effective. The major problem it faces 
is managing the individuals for whom socialisation is utterly ineffective or unwelcome. Modern 
society operates with deviancy, but deviancy is less harmful to it; it is admittedly unclear exactly 




Section Two – Socialisation and Civic Virtue 
 
Civic virtue has been mentioned throughout the thesis, although usually in a minor 
context. It is worth examining in further detail before the thesis is concluded. Without 
such an examination, erroneous assumptions may be made about what constitutes civic 
virtue for republicans; one might even conclude that republicanism was tied to some sort 
of virtue ethics. One must also consider its interaction with socialisation and social duty 
maximisation; presumably a required “civic virtue” would be altruism, at least towards 
fellow citizens. This section will thus begin with Pettit’s account of civic virtue, to be 
contrasted with other republican scholars like Skinner, Lovett and Laborde. A further 
discussion of the socialist and Marxist perspective will follow. It will then consider how 
neo-republican civic virtue might work in the light of the need for Carens’ socialisation. 
 
Pettit discusses civic virtue extensively in Republicanism, but some refinement of his 
thought can be found in On the People’s Terms and Just Freedom. In Republicanism, he 
calls it “civility” - “socially established norms that give an added salience and security 
and lustre to those areas (that are proofed against interference)” (Pettit 1997, 245-246). 
Civility is of extreme value to any republican state, for three major reasons. Firstly, it 
“buttresses” laws and public order, giving a reason for laws to be observed that is not out 
of mere fear of punishment or a sense of shame – it has a sense of legitimacy, not unlike 
the vertical democratic legitimacy established in chapter two. It gives greater moral 
weight to authority. Secondly, civility smooths out tensions between differing groups. 
Any state will contain “different groupings and different interests”, and civility between 
these groups enables the acceptance of differing perspectives and overall fair treatment of 
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these different interests, to the point that non-members might still support an interest 
which does not represent their own selfish concerns in the slightest. They instead act 
because of a “norm requiring concern for the common good...not just a politics of 
difference, but a politics of common concern”. (Pettit 1997, 246-248). Thirdly, civility is 
necessary for vigilance and the pursuit of criminals. If there is a general sentiment that 
“everyone does it”, or that the law favours particular interests (and thus if not part of 
those interests, one is disadvantaged), then the republican state may fracture. Driving out 
corruption is an endless battle for republicanism, but one that must be fought185. 
 
Pettit calls for another side to his virtue, however: trust, “in particular personal trust”. In a 
society such as Pettit envisages, individuals rely on adherence to social norms; they allow 
for public officials to act in the interests of all, they “treat other citizens with the same 
confident reliance, being prepared to accept reliance even when they are exposed and 
vulnerable: even when they have to trust the testimony or advice of relative strangers”. 
He acknowledges the discrepancy between trust and the suspicion towards corruption and 
crime, and the still greater discrepancy between this acceptance of vulnerability and the 
need to prevent domination from its exploitation. This is more so in the neo-republican 
thesis, given the prospect of systemic corruption and systemic domination recurring. 
 
 
185 Pettit considers briefly if republicans should require a “restless citizenry” or if it is sufficient to respond to corruption as it 
arises, with overwhelming force (Pettit 1997, 248). Given the need for greater awareness the egalitarian system necessitates, the 




Pettit argues that such differences are not irreconcilable; he returns to the notion of the 
intangible hand as a solution for advancing both civility and trust. For civility, the 
intangible hand reinforces and promotes social norms of a certain benevolent character. It 
is plausible that one might offer greater esteem towards someone with an unswervingly 
just attitude. For trust, he refers to “the cunning of trust”, in a vague appeal to the well-
known psychological factoid that asking for a favour from someone makes them better 
disposed towards you, and to another that individuals live up to the expectations others 
place upon them. By signalling that you think that the other individual is acting in 
accordance with social norms and is therefore trustworthy, Pettit suggests that you will 
encourage them to be trustworthy. 
 
Such trust is unlikely to be so easily established; even so, Pettit remains committed to the 
idea of patterns of behaviour (Pettit 2014, 58-60). Even if a few individuals contradict 
said patterns, social norms reinforce them – and the rewards for behaving in accordance 
with them. Socialisation from Carens could therefore benefit from and enhance this 
process. 
 
Other modern republicans take a similar line to Pettit. Maynor notes that “the principles 
of non-domination can become ordinary functions of modern life” - much as with 
socialisation towards maximising social duty, a decentralisation of virtue is a possibility, 
and the practice of one encourages the other (Maynor 2003, 200). Costa argues that Pettit 
does not go far enough in his proposals, and argues for a moral education and the 
inculcation of a “virtuous citizen” who embraces civic virtues that support non-
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domination and the functioning of society (Costa 2009, 411-415). In developing 
socialisation via Carens, the thesis allows for Costa’s arguments. Lovett compares the 
discussion on civility and civic virtue as not unlike Rawlsian discussions on stability, 
with an emphasis on establishing good practice that enables mistakes to be corrected 
internally, or be prevented from arising at all (Lovett 2013, 2, 10-17). 
 
Skinner’s approach differs from Laborde and Pettit because he makes use primarily of the 
historical republican tradition, examining the “Italian Atlantic” (Pocock 1975) historical 
literature which gives examples of civility and trust in practice. In particular, Skinner 
touches on Machiavelli, who in the Discourses on Titus Levy offers extensive practical 
advice, despite his reputation as an authoritarian apologist thanks to The Prince. Skinner 
notes that “(republican) communities are well adapted to attaining glory and greatness” 
because – citing Machiavelli - “it is not the pursuit of individual good but of the common 
good that makes cities great, and it is beyond doubt that the common good is never 
considered except in republics.” (Skinner 1998, 61-62). 
 
Machiavelli more directly comments on this in a way similar to Pettit’s discussion of 
“dissensus” - republics are strong not just because of their institutions and the common 
good, but because their quarrelling forces laws and regulations which appeal to all. More 
pressingly, he suggests that corruption develops when individuals are excluded from 
political discourse (Maynor 2003, 24-30), which in turn mainly occurs when private 
interests and indeed self-interest triumph over the common good. As noted in chapter 
three, the collapse is thus locked in a feedback loop; self-interest and a loss of virtue 
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creates corruption and exclusion, which creates and rewards more self-interest and 
punishes virtue, leading to its loss. It is vitally important that this not be allowed to occur. 
 
Should we then encourage discord for its own sake? Not necessarily – some 
disagreements are essentially irreconcilable186 and a free state which is unprepared for the 
turmoil accompanying such disagreements is vulnerable to societal unrest or a desire for 
security over free debate, which all too easily leads to authoritarianism. For a society to 
thrive, it must have institutions in place to deal with these disputes, and more importantly, 
to end or bypass such irreconcilable disagreements. Machiavelli’s solution was patriotism; 
the value of the republic had to override everything else. Such a nationalistic view is 
unlikely to succeed; it fails to account for the complexity and atomisation of modern life, 
and could be encouraged towards national enmities, which may be equally destructive. A 
solution will be found in socialist thought, to which the thesis turns shortly. 
 
Skinner does make it clear that virtue and liberty are not identical in the historical 
tradition (Skinner 1998, 74) but that the historical republican theory of freedom – in 
contrast to the liberal strands, which he associates with thinkers like Paley – can only 
achieve the interplay of virtue and liberty inside a free state. A state will only be free to 
the extent it allows for participation and representation and encourages individuals to be 
independent. No-one who may be dependent upon another’s goodwill can truly be free.  
 
A brief digression: this may put one in mind of Rousseau’s republicanism and his pursuit 
of the civic good, but Pettit directly rejects this. He states in Just Freedom: “Rousseau’s 
 
186  Notably, the struggle between classes. 
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vision would have appeared to celebrate a form of dependency...at odds with a vision of 
freedom as non-domination. The Rousseauvian version of republican thought might be 
better described as communitarian in character.” (Pettit 2014, 12). The Italian-Atlantic 
definition of the common good is more of an enlightened self-interest; by preserving the 
republic as a whole, each individual is freed from the prospect of tyranny, and may 
otherwise do as he wishes. While this critique may be somewhat unfair to Rousseau, it 
still emphasises the distinctive distaste for subservience that runs through republicanism. 
It is precisely this kind of subservience, too, which is toxic to virtue; as Pettit takes pains 
to outline, if I am dependent upon another’s goodwill, and yet can manage to avoid 
uncontrolled interference by acceding to their wishes, my liberty is still infringed. 
Because I must act or be a certain way to avoid trouble, developing civility, trust, 
independence and pride, etc, are all curtailed as well. 
 
Virtue, in the republican sense, is thus highly important and inextricably tied with its 
sense of liberty. Only with virtue can liberty be appropriately prized; only as free 
individuals can virtue be properly cultivated. Civic virtue has been less emphasised in 
socialist and Marxist thought, but there are still suggestions of it. Much has been made of 
the ideal of a motivated and enlightened working class, who are more capable and 
“worthy” than the parasitic bourgeois class.  
Marx himself does little to specify how individuals should behave. A large part of his and 
Engels’ writings, however, speak of the free and cultivated man; a man who is not 
alienated nor a slave to the division of labour, but who can truly realise all of his talents 
and abilities (Marxism.org – Virtue, Marx 2007, 42-43, 54). This has a certain 
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resemblance with the free citizen of Machiavelli and Skinner’s writings. Also noteworthy 
is a line from Marx in one of the manuscripts, where he notes that “Association, society 
and conversation, which again has association as its end, are enough for them; the 
brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them, but a fact of life,” (Marx 1844, Human 
Requirements), in contrast to the alienated state he describes elsewhere in the text: human 
beings are brought below animals, turned into machines, “submerged in Avarice”. 
 
The idea of virtue in Marx, then, dwells less with civility and trust, and more with 
solidarity – by working for the common good, the good of each individual can be better 
achieved. Is this a return to Rousseau, to dependency? Again, not necessarily. Marx 
remains focused on the individual’s needs and ability. It is not contradictory to suggest 
that by coming together in the cause of liberty, the liberty of each can be preserved; 
nothing is more republican. It is by adopting this solidarity in response to disagreements 
that a more appropriate solution than Machiavelli’s patria can be found. With solidarity 
of this sort, it is possible to conceive of one’s existence as naturally entangled with all 
others, in a symbiotic and ultimately beneficial relationship, if we view one another not 
as competitors, but as common citizens and partners. This will most certainly aid in 
establishing the civility and trust Pettit espouses. 
 
While Machiavelli and to an extent, Pettit, focuses on laws and institutions, socialism 
focuses on the individuals in question, just as the neo-republican thesis challenged Rawls 
on his focus on procedure and the system. In this case, individual disagreements and 
personal interests remain buried, as each agrees the best way to serve themselves is to 
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cooperate, to identify themselves as more successful together than apart, in the face of 
adversity. This adversity need not be predicated on class antagonisms, either, as this 
would give the solidarity a built in expiration date, fatally undermining it. Rather, it is the 
adversity of life – scarce resources, sickness, and natural disasters. 
 
Would this virtuous solidarity be compatible with the republican tradition? It seems 
reasonable that it would foster the active and dedicated citizenry that is so prized. By the 
same measure, it would also encourage a communitarian approach quite different from 
the Italian-Atlantic tradition, one closer to Rousseau. It could encourage an atmosphere of 
conformity in accordance with social norms. Pettit addresses this in part via a short 
discussion in Republicanism (Pettit 1997, 251). Here he considers that an active and 
indeed zealously spirited citizenry may be necessary to punish certain offences, such as 
environmental pollution. Presumably, the possibility of going too far in this zeal is 
considered, and accepted, as part of the overall consequentialist ethos. 
 
In terms of civic virtue and political discourse, Carens’ theory stands in opposition 
neither to republicanism nor socialism, and could allow for just such an active and 
engaged citizenry through socialisation. The polyarchal character of government he 
offers would be as enriched by civility and trust, solidarity and charity, as any others 
would be, and kept in check via contestation. The proposed socialisation could promote 
republican and socialist virtues to be embraced, and the decentralised process is amenable 
to Pettit’s social norms. Moreover, the decentralisation aids in averting republican fears 
of overreach. While Carens makes no reference to virtues, social norms, etc, as 
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republicans do, he notes briefly that societies (and individuals) may hold many different 
and inconsistent values187 (Carens 1981, 172-174), not unlike the tension between trust 
and vigilance that Pettit mentions. Indeed, as all societies grow organically; it is 
impossible to expect one to maintain a flawlessly harmonious set of values, let alone 
identity, over an extended period. 
 
So long as solidarity is maintained, however, this tension may be, if not curbed, then 
lessened. Personal and political solidarity feed into one another. For the egalitarian 
system to thrive, and a diverse republican state which cannot otherwise establish 
solidarity188. to do likewise, the most effective solution is to embrace such an inculcation 
as a point of policy, over and above that of Carens’ decentralised socialisation. This could 
conceivably be done via the promotion of laws and regulations to encourage solidarity 
and to discourage disregard for others.  
 
To allay fears about overreach, such regulations should not be punitive but instead 
provide social rewards and satisfaction, or open up the possibility of actions – as the 
Good Samaritan laws do – which might not always be permissible. In the egalitarian 
society as described, for example, the giving of gifts requires some regulation, to avert 
just the sorts of problems Cohen foresaw with Rawls. It is conceivable that these could be 
relaxed in accordance with good conduct.  
 
 
187 A useful example he gives to explain this is a society’s contradictory needs for change and stability.  
188  There is a great deal of literature, little of which the thesis has space to do justice to: Putnam’s writings on ethnic tensions, 
Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship, etc 
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Comparison might be drawn between this and the PRC’s “social credit system” 
(.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/27/c_133443776.htm), which has otherwise been 
roundly condemned as a means of authoritarian control. True, the social credit system has 
three flaws: it can also be used for punitive measures, it involves mass surveillance, and it 
is being enacted by a one- party state which is decidedly less than democratic189, a state 
of affairs equally common in  Amazon’s treatment of its workers (Philips and Rozworski 
2019, 84-99). Absent these elements, such a system would encourage cooperation if 
nothing else; it does not seem inherently totalitarian, but clearly should not be imposed 
from the top down, whether by government or corporation. One potential concern might 
be that it would further encourage the abuse of favour/esteem trading (Pettit & Brennan 
2004, 72-73, 217-219) and social esteem as an establishment of hierarchy, as previously 
discussed. 
 
Against this, the thesis presents two points. Firstly, the system is to be based upon the 
demonstration of solidarity, both personal and political, and to reward individuals in ways 
that ideally encourage further virtuous behaviour. This does not negate such risks, but 
reduces their likelihood. To be discovered favour/esteem trading would bring disgrace 
and scandal, at the least, whilst establishing an anti-hierarchical ideal – and an altruistic, 
“we’re all in this together” mentality – will blunt the power of a social hierarchy. 
Secondly, the arguments on behalf of Carens’ use of esteem are equally valid here. 
 
 
189 Tangentially, such scoring is already practised by financial, rental and other industries 
(http://www.datascienceassn.org/sites/default/files/The%20Scored%20Society%20-
%20Due%20Process%20for%20Automated%20Predictions.pdf) If this is equally objectionable, then republicanism has a great deal to 
object to, particularly regarding “Big data”. 
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To conclude, the republican project of civic virtue is compatible, if not perfectly so, with 
socialist ideals. Carens’ socialisation project provides an additional way to inculcate these 
virtues, as opposed to the patterns of political life and reciprocity on which Pettit relies. 
An active and engaged citizenry, which is fully committed to the socialist principle of 
solidarity and support for all, yet simultaneously in support of republican debate and 
discourse, is likely to be a vital part of any neo-republican state, and aids in both forming 
and maintaining the egalitarian system.
 
263 
Section Three – Utopianism and Realism 
 
The last matter before the thesis moves to concluding remarks is that of utopianism 
versus realism. To again define these, utopian theories seek to establish a grand change in 
human behaviour and politics, while realism focuses on the here and now – the “limits of 
the possible”, as it were. Utopians focus on how human beings may be brought to be 
better; realists believe human beings are flawed and must be worked with as they are 
(Nicholson 1998, 65-67). The subtitle of Carens’ book betrays it – utopian market theory. 
Indeed, much of the thesis may have seemed utopian in character; the condemnation of 
modern market conditions and corporate power is predicated as much on the potential for 
a better system as it is on their general awfulness. This may be seen as contradicting the 
core sources of criticism. Pettit makes the point of dealing with people as they are, and 
not as they could be. Socialism does have certain utopian strands, but in the Marxist 
tradition – which has been called upon heavily – there is at least a claim towards a 
scientific methodology, towards analysing and assessing the real forces of human nature 
and market functions. One may adopt a certain scepticism on this point, given that it is 
elsewhere contradicted. by Marx’s own insistence on the transformatory nature of human 
emancipation (Marx 2007, 92-94). It is still the ideal, whereas Carens focuses on a social-
duty maximisation that currently exists haphazardly, if at all. As Mencius and Rousseau 
note, only the most inhuman would feel nothing if they saw a child in harm’s way 
(Rousseau 1998, 74, Liu 2006, 73-74). This is not enough to guarantee more complex 
reactions, however. While the psychological requirements have been thoroughly justified, 
those requirements say little as to how we get from a PPM market system, to one which is 




The thesis must therefore address this. The first way by which this can be done is to argue 
that Carens is not so utopian after all; much as with the argument about whether or not 
his work counts as market socialism, it is plausible to say that Carens’ scepticism about 
the prospects of his own arguments may not be justified. This is not the case with his 
political doctrine; he deliberately gives no guidance as to how to create such a state as he 
envisions. The thesis will, however, argue that Carens’ psychological and organisational 
arrangements are not in themselves utopian, and require a redirection, rather than a 
transformation, of human nature. 
 
The second way is to question the “realist” credentials of Pettit and Marx. While the latter 
is, as mentioned, much more susceptible to such an attack, Pettit’s own guidance towards 
political reform is equally difficult to apply usefully. In particular, his constitutional and 
legislative requirements, along with his need for democratic legitimacy, are almost 
impossible without a revolution of some kind. This is being generous, and taking the 
countries, such as the United States, which lie closest to his needs, as viable models. 
 
The intention of these two strands of arguments is thus to show that Carens is hardly 
alone in having a utopian, or at the very least presently impractical, need for specific 
politico-economic institutions and organisational principles. At the same time, however, 




Carens himself stresses that he wishes to address a realistic utopia, and that his utopia 
pales in comparison to that promised by “the traditional egalitarian socialist vision” 
(Carens 1981, 178-179, 185). Many of the problems of the old order of capitalism may 
remain, or at least have the potential to do so; one need only recall the challenge of 
exploitation and alienation levied in chapter four, section three. The very idea of a 
“realistic utopia” may seem a contradiction, however  
 
Perhaps by way of contrast, Carens talks explicitly about the experiences of Cuba, China 
and others in attempting to create societies based upon altruistic motivations. He also 
allows for the prospect that the egalitarian system could be amended to be compatible 
with a needs-based distribution (Carens 1981, 184-187) closer to traditional socialism’s 
approach to distributive justice, as opposed to the simpler equal shared distribution that 
he embraces and which is compatible with Pettit’s loose material equality. 
 
The failure of such models is admitted squarely by Carens, but at the same time, he 
argues that all such nations were attempting to change their economies rapidly, in an 
equally rapid period of cultural and social change, and in the face of immense short-run 
economic costs190 (Carens 1981, 164-170), after which he again declines to offer a 
blueprint as to how his system might be established. 
 
From another perspective, there is little to indicate that Carens’ logical and empirical 
prerequisites cannot be achieved when the egalitarian system has arisen and socialisation 
 
190  Aided neither by both countries’ severe lack of industrialisation and a true bourgeois class, thus being the countries least 
likely to attain communism, according to Marx. Likewise, the economic sanctions placed upon Cuba cannot be forgotten, nor can the 
devastation wrought by the Japanese upon China in World War II. 
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is ongoing. The system, as outlined and with neo-republican amendments, requires a 
great deal of work, but nothing that seems impossible to achieve: a reworking of 
bureaucracy and character alike. The difficulty is that of generating the egalitarian system 
in the first place, which he concedes and then ignores. The thesis has outlined a way by 
which the egalitarian state might be established, despite the presence of corporate power 
and hostile socio-political forces. It would be an error for the thesis to assert that this was 
guaranteed; a vanguard party leading to a mass movement, through education and 
agitation rather than by directing and ruling, has many points on which it might fail - but 
it is a possibility.  
 
As for his psychological theory, Carens again has a harder time establishing such 
socialisation than he does in justifying it. The primary requirement for his theory to work 
is that individuals are capable of obeying laws which do not personally profit them191 
capable of being motivated by social duty, and have mental plasticity. This has already 
been advocated extensively and is not an unachievable state; it seems to resemble reality 
far more than the coldly rational homo-economicus. 
 
Carens’ unwillingness to argue for a specific mechanism to establish the egalitarian 
system does not mean the egalitarian system is unattainable. To tie his utopian vision to 
any particular state would diminish the rhetorical effect of his arguments, becoming 
entangled in minutiae and empirical disagreement. The thesis, however, is concerned 
with the threat to non-domination posed by corporate power in modern liberal or social 
 
191 And in the case of elites, supporting a system contrary to one which would be massively more beneficial for them, 
personally. This has historically taken great fortitude, but is not impossible. 
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democratic states that one is normally apt of to think of as “free”; thus the difficulty of 
establishing the egalitarian state must be faced. 
 
Despite that difficulty, it is worthwhile, as only a few alternatives to the egalitarian 
system suggest they will be able to deal with corporate power. Most prospects are 
palliative, or delay and frustrate the implementation and concentration of that power. 
Those alternative solutions lack practical benefits that the egalitarian system entails. 
Universal basic income is incomplete and does not address corporate power. 
Marketisation and rights of exit, as Taylor outlines, simply do not work. Workplace 
democracy is again incomplete. A fully-fledged property owning democracy, with neo-
republican amendments, comes the closest. This still lacks a proper commitment to strict 
material equality, and lacks the explicit socialisation of Carens, however. 
 
One disadvantage that of the egalitarian system, although this is a potential problem for 
many egalitarian proposals, is that it requires a relatively strong economic base and the 
clout to address threats caused by globalisation. It is an unfortunate point of practicality 
that prohibits the establishment of such a society amongst those nations which could most 
benefit from it – one may think of the still struggling states of the “global south”, lacking 
in economic and political resources. This is not insurmountable, though. Unification into 
new countries is a possibility, and one which may even be desirable, in forming a nation-




Despite such concerns, a neo-republican socialism – based on explicitly democratic 
principles and strict material equality following Carens – is a worthwhile blueprint, and 
one which is eminently achievable. While Pettit might argue that Carens’ system would 
not survive corruption (Pettit 2017 B, 340), marrying his economic proposals with Pettit’s 
contestatory theorising should aid in correcting this.  
 
This brings us to realism. Marx will be discussed first, followed by Pettit. Marx’s 
determination to make use of a “scientific socialism”, supported by many of his 
intellectual descendants, has rightfully been questioned. Arguing against utopian socialist 
moralism, much of his condemnation of capitalism is normative in character. Most 
tellingly, the inexorable progress of historical materialism ends in a very nebulous note of 
the state “withering on the vine” and true communism arising from socialism almost 
spontaneously. 
 
For the purposes of the thesis, a lengthy critique is unnecessary. It is enough to outline 
certain major areas in which Marx is politically utopian. One example, which resonates 
with Carens, is in the impracticality of the command economy. Marx, without the benefit 
of experience, supposed that the rational allocation of resources by mandate and planning 
would be effective. Very obviously to the modern reader, he was wrong about this in 
almost every respect.192 For a command economy as Marx envisaged it to function, 
economics or human psychology would have to be up-ended. In this, Carens is decidedly 
 
192  Notwithstanding the arguments regarding planning under modern capitalism (Chang, Galbraith, Anderson etc) 
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more realistic, for the system on which he bases his utopia is one that has been tried and 
tested.193 
 
Similarly, Marx, for all his distaste towards erratic predictions of future events and 
philosophical musings on political theory, was not incapable of latching onto singular 
events and extrapolating the immediate transformation of society from them. This 
happened in 1848, and again in 1871 with the Paris Commune. The Bolsheviks assumed 
that the October revolution would transform the world; more modern Marxists have 
pointed to similar alternatives. Eagleton notes that Marxism “has traditionally set its face 
against utopia, (it is) not because it rejects the idea of a radically transfigured society, but 
because it rejects the assumption that such a society could be, so to speak, simply 
parachuted into the present...If a transformed future is not in this sense anchored in the 
present, it quickly becomes a fetish.” (Eagleton 2000, 34). The appearance of utopianism 
in Marx’s work is therefore more of an overly ambitious optimism. It bears little 
resemblance to the whimsical utopian socialism that Marx attacked for a lack of 
consideration and attendance to practical reality. Carens only falls into the latter category 
because he does not attempt to outline how the egalitarian system could be created, and 
does not sufficiently develop its political structures. Neo-republicanism helps to provide 
an answer to both. 
 
Yet Marx also commits the same error as Carens in insufficiently detailing how this 
transformation might be accomplished. Noteworthy ambiguities like the “dictatorship of 
 
193  This is unlike the labour theory of value, where Marx was equally wrong on the economics, but not utopian; he goes to a 
great deal of effort to ground his work and refer back to Smith, Ricardo, etc. The command economy was utopian precisely due to its 
detachment from reality. 
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the proletariat” aside, his theory of historical materialism claims that capitalist tensions 
and their accompanying crises will inevitably destroy capitalism as a system (Winternitz 
1949). The proletariat will rise up and create a strong socialist state, which will later 
“wither away”. There is almost no detail on this process. Perhaps Marx felt so confident 
in this victory that little detail was needed, or perhaps he felt that, as one who was so 
rooted in the economic determinism of capitalist society, he could not outline the steps to 
move from socialism to true communism. It is hard to tell, precisely because of that lack 
of detail. Again, this challenges the “realist” credentials of Marx and Engels’ writing. 
 
Marx, as a political and economic theorist, clearly intended on a “scientific”, empirical 
methodology that would not be swayed even by his own normative critique of capitalism. 
The historical materialism and material dialectic were, supposedly, simply the natural and 
inexorable progress of capitalism. Yet the necessity of revolution, of “class consciousness” 
(Lukacs 1920 S1-S3) and the obscurity and clearly enormous difficulty of achieving the 
end-state he so desired – a classless society of abundance and production – renders his 
thinking more utopian than he believed. That is not to say that it is wrong, merely that 
Carens and he are not so far apart in scope. 
 
What of Pettit? In Just Freedom, Pettit is highly dismissive of more “radical” egalitarian 
proposals, believing his policies of insurance and insulation are readily attainable as a 
political program. He gives requirements for a state to be democratically legitimate, 
outlined throughout his work and especially in the dual-aspect model in On the People’s 
Terms, and he again argues that these are readily implementable and take individual 
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human beings as they are. And he makes the very realist claim that a stateless existence is 
impossible (Pettit 2014, 117). Moreover, he defines republicanism as realist, and argues 
for, indeed, anti-utopianism (Pettit 2017 B, 339-341). 
 
Pettit asks for egalitarian taxation, a “sustainable natural environment”, social, medical, 
judicial and financial security, independence through minimising “exposure to possible 
abuse” and preventing domestic dependence. He favours regulation and protection from 
unchecked unions and workers, as well as employers and corporate interests, yet with 
severe limits on the penalties the criminal justice system can inflict, despite its (hopeful) 
robustness and far-reaching capabilities. He also suggests corporate entities should be 
tried as persons under said criminal justice (Pettit 2014, 104-106). 
 
As noted, this is not terribly different in intent from Rawls’ property owning democracy, 
but Pettit gives very little indication as to how his proposals be achieved in practice. To 
be fair to Pettit, he offers them as proposals of policy, rather than actions to be achieved 
as rapidly as possible, and the flexibility of this approach was praised in chapter two. Yet 
two points strike the author as decidedly utopian. First, although Pettit’s requirements are 
not onerous and do not mandate a particularly demanding pattern of distribution, they 
would still necessitate sweeping changes even in democracies closest to his ideal. Such 
radical transformations do not tend to spontaneously arise; if Carens is to be criticised for 
his inability to articulate the transition between PPM and egalitarian systems, so too must 
Pettit be criticised on like grounds. Consider the United States, which hews to many 
(constitution, contestatory resources, bicameral legislature) of Pettit’s democratic 
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requirements, but also has “shortfalls and offenses of egregious proportions” (Pettit 2014, 
149). Changing it to allow for greater influence from the citizenry, and what form that 
should take194 are thorny questions.  
 
Second, Pettit’s requirements work in part at cross purposes. The most obvious clash is in 
his limits on criminal justice, despite the need to wield that justice effectively against 
powerful recidivists, such as large transnational corporations. This problem is not 
insurmountable, but it seems bizarre to claim to “take men as they are” and yet hamstring 
efforts to curb their worst impulses via legislation (Pettit 2014, 97-98, 101, 106). This is 
assuming Pettit does not intend a widespread effort to inculcate social norms, as Carens 
does. Were he to do so, however, the project would need justification – which republican 
theory is readily equipped to provide – and a practical outline for achieving it, which 
Pettit does not provide. There seems to be a great need to reform and implement policy. 
None of Pettit’s proposals (Pettit 2014, 104-106)  are unrealistic in the sense of 
impractical; many are unrealistic in the sense that modern society would need drastic 
reform; there seems to be a definite strand of not taking institutions, as opposed to 
humans, as they are. 
 
A secondary point towards realism is that Pettit, unlike Marxist socialism and Carens, 
demands virtue but no great transformation of human psychology and motivation. He 
purports to take humans as they really are, and still extract virtue and democracy from 
them. The others may need something new; he argues he does not. While Carens does not, 
as noted above, make demands that are unrealistic, Pettit’s ideas vis-à-vis social 
 
194  For example, the electoral college and its attendant controversies. 
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recognition make very few psychological demands, more matters of policy (Pettit & 
Brennan 2004, 279-294). 
 
Against this, Pettit still relies heavily upon established social norms, and is aided by their 
cultivation. Their presence may not be strictly necessary for the neo-republican state to 
thrive, but the norms he invokes – civility, trust, etc – are increasingly absent in modern 
politics and modern political discourse. This absence may be lethal to a developing 
republican state, because there is no ability to offer a government trust when it 
demonstrates ever-increasing unworthiness of it. He gives little indication on how to 
correct this, and it seems unlikely short of direct revolution or a great transformation of 
character – not unlike Carens. 
 
The most notable argument for Pettit’s lapse into utopianism is his section of political 
ontology; Pettit outlines that the will of the constituted people - “an agent that emerges 
under the norm-imposing control of its constituting members” - is undominating because 
it “is formed on the basis of interaction...materialising under the direction of the norms 
they endorse”. Pettit suggests that individuals may challenge these norms and the 
government they affect before they are implemented; “things going well, it is pre-tested 
case by case for whether it is suitably controlled and non-arbitrary” (Pettit 2012, 290). 
 
He follows this by arguing that “the will of the constituted people may look similar to 
Rousseau’s general will...but there need not be any will that is common to the 
constituting people, as we saw, let alone a will to which they might subject government. 
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All that may be in common is a network of norms that people impose on government as 
the unintended consequence of pursuing influence” (Pettit 2012, 291). 
 
This not only seems far too swift in denying the resemblance to Rousseau, who Pettit 
adamantly insists is not the same kind of republican, but it seems extraordinarily 
optimistic. There is nothing about these statements that guarantees that these norms will 
be good norms, or that this constituted will, shall be properly representative of the people 
in question. There is certainly no guarantee of republican virtue or effective influence, 
and this supposes that there are not distortions. Pettit admits that his vision is “optimistic”, 
and “will only materialise under quite demanding conditions” (Pettit 2012, 279). But 
given the modern political state, with all of the problems raised by Streeck, and the 
difficulties of standing up to the global market as a whole, one might say that Pettit’s 
constituting will is naïve. There will certainly be external influences on government that 
the people cannot control, especially in a “debt state”. And how a debt state is to 
transition into a responsive, norm-conditioned, influence-driven democracy is not 
something Pettit answers in his writings. 
 
Consider also the problems of elected politicians, private lobbies, and unelected 
authorities with influence over government (Pettit 2012, 232-238). For Pettit, this is but 
theory – how can we prevent these things from taking root? In the real world, of course, 
they have already taken root, and deeply. It is unfair to expect Pettit to offer a 
comprehensive list of how he intends to get rid of these entrenched problems, but equally,  
he claims that “the political institutions would require many amendments in even the 
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best-practice democracies today; but they would not be so distant from current 
arrangements as to seem utterly infeasible or utopian” (Pettit 2012, 239). 
 
It is precisely this point the thesis challenges. Pettit’s view is inconsistent, offering 
realism on the one hand and optimism on the other; he offers up a vision of the modern 
world and of dual-aspect democracy that in no way exists. It does not mean that it is 
impossible for Pettit’s state to be brought into existence; it does not mean that norms of a 
republican kind could not be inculcated, both into the people and into the state. It does 
mean that he drastically underestimates the scale of the changes, the resistance of 
established interests, and the difficulty of institutional amendment without undertaking a 
similarly revolutionary approach as a socialist economy or the socialisation processes 
Carens offers. If the measure of the political realist is, as Pettit himself argues, that  they 
look for institutions that are “feasible” and “reliably sustained” (Pettit 2017 B, 340), then 
each of the philosophers named here has lapsed. Pettit is admittedly more grounded in the 
political world as it stands than either Marx or Carens. The distance is not as great as 
might be assumed, however. It is certainly not sufficient to render their ideas 





Republicanism must ensure freedom as discursive control and autonomy alike. But to do this, 
greater safeguards and more focus on socio-economic equality is necessary. By utilising Carens’ 
egalitarian system, and by embracing the social-egalitarian and Marxist critiques, it is possible to 
ensure a strict material equality that adequately protects republican liberty. Such neo-republican 
safeguards would include social control of the means of production, elimination of media 
monopolies, and equal consumption shares, while preserving the strong contestatory tradition, 
democratic methodology and civic virtue that republicans invoke  It is clear that a market with 
insufficient regulation is of great threat to non-domination. The solution of the thesis passes a great 
deal of power into the hands of governments. Some, like Taylor, would be sceptical of this. It is not 
the only solution, and there are various ways it might be adapted, perhaps to incorporate Rawls’ 
ideas further than the thesis presents. Pettit’s listed amendments in Just Freedom are insufficient, 
and his democratic requirements necessitate further protection against a distortion of the 
contestatory, “dual-aspect” democracy he envisages. The argument of the thesis risks further harm, 
in search of a more comprehensive end to the problem. When sufficiently corrupted, it may be that 
a democratic state will require revolutionary activity to function once more. And to call for such a 
revolution is very much within both the socialist and republican strands that this thesis has called 
upon. 
 
There are some things that cannot be concluded, however, due to lack of space or evidence. It 
cannot be concluded, for example, that this is the best solution possible; it may be, but it has yet to 
be tested. It still has substantial flaws over the republican or socialist ideals, as inequalities of social 
status and the level of socialisation required allow for domination and some degree of alienation. 
Suitably regulated, the egalitarian society’s government’s interference should not be of an arbitrary 
nature, but the strength of it may yet be counter-intuitive. Due to insufficient space to do justice to 
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the topic, immigration has mostly been glossed over, as have irrational prejudices like racism, 
sexism, etc. Were the thesis’ proposals to be put into practice, these would need to be addressed. 
Lastly, there may remain scepticism about the stability of the egalitarian system, as there is with 
market socialism. It cannot be concluded either way, but the Yugoslavian experience suggests that it 
may require a solid economic base to begin with. There is also little space on the international 
demands of the egalitarian state, as one might find in Rawls’ Law of Peoples (or Pettit’s works, for 
that matter). 
 
It is also worth noting that socialism and republicanism are not incompatible, nor are they 
incompatible with the social egalitarianism of Schuppert, etc. While the presentation of neo-
republicanism, as opposed to Pettit, is explicitly egalitarian and anti-capitalist, this does not override 
the efforts of republican theory to enshrine freedom first and foremost. Rather, it indicates that the 
best way to secure that freedom is via a more collectivist and socialised approach than Pettit and 
other authors have thus far accepted. So long as there remains a robust network of norms and 
ironclad legal and political support for the democratic requirements Pettit envisages, even quite 
extensive interference will remain appropriately controlled in character. The extent to which this is 
required and how it is best done would be worthy of consideration. One area where debate and 
experimentation might be useful is in the procedural vs individual dichotomy between Rawls and 
Pettit, explored in chapter four. While the thesis offers theoretical arguments against Rawls, his 
focus on system and limited personal interference may prove necessary for the egalitarian system in 
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